Does Corporate Culture Matter for Firm Policies?

Economic theories suggest that a firm's corporate culture matters for its policy choices. We construct a parent-spinoff firm panel dataset that allows us to identify culture effects in firm policies from behavior that is inherited by a spinoff firm from its parent after the firms split up. We find positive and significant relations between spinoff firms' and their parents' choices of investment, financial, and operational policies. Consistent with predictions from economic theories of corporate culture, we find that the culture effects are long-term and stronger for internally grown business units and older firms. Our evidence also suggests that firms preserve their cultures by selecting managers who fit into their cultures. Finally, we find a strong relation between spinoff firms' and their parents' profitability, suggesting that corporate culture ultimately also affects economic performance. These results are robust to a series of robustness checks, and cannot be explained by alternatives such as governance or product market links. The contribution of this paper is to introduce the notion of corporate culture in a formal empirical analysis of firm policies and performance.Economics of corporate culture; firm policies; firm performance

Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?

Using options- and press-based proxies for CEO overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b, 2008), we find that over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development (R&D) expenditure. Overconfident managers only achieve greater innovation than non-overconfident managers in innovative industries. Overconfidence is not associated with lower sales, ROA, or Q.CEO Overconfidence; Innovation; R&D; Patent

The dark side of outside directors: Do they quit when they are most needed?

Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong support for the existence of this dark side. Following surprise director departures, affected firms have worse stock and operating performance, are more likely to suffer from an extreme negative return event, are more likely to restate earnings, and have a higher likelihood of being named in a federal class action securities fraud lawsuit.

Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?

Using options- and press-based proxies for CEO overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b, 2008), we find that over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development (R&D) expenditure. Overconfident managers only achieve greater innovation than non-overconfident managers in innovative industries. Overconfidence is not associated with lower sales, ROA, or Q

Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?

Using options- and press-based proxies for CEO overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b, 2008), we find that over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development (R&D) expenditure. Overconfident managers only achieve greater innovation than non-overconfident managers in innovative industries. Overconfidence is not associated with lower sales, ROA, or Q

Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation

Equity-based compensation affects managers' risk-taking behavior, which in turn has an impact on shareholder wealth. In response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 6%. This risk reduction is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives, in particular firms with low chief executive officer portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility. Furthermore, the risk reduction is value-destroying. Finally, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift by providing managers with greater incentives for risk-taking.

Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior and Equity-Based Compensation

I study managers' risk-taking behavior and how it is affected by equity-based compensation. I find that in response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 5%. I also find that the decrease in firm risk is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives. In particular, firms with low CEO portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility experience more than 10% reduction in risk. Further, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift with greater incentives for risk-taking.

The Designation and Removal of Trustee Stock Status: Wealth Effects

This study investigates the impact of trustee stock status announcements on shareholders' wealth in Singapore. An event study methodology is used to ascertain the abnormal returns around the announcement day. The results show that there is a positive and permanent wealth effect on trustee stocks resulting from designation announcements. Conversely, when trustee stocks lose their status, the significant negative abnormal returns suggest that shareholders' wealth is adversely affected. This reaction, however, appears to be a temporary phenomenon and is not simply a mirror image of designation announcements. The differences in the underlying regulatory structures partially explain the findings. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2004.