Wrongfulness as a Necessary Cause of the Losses - Removing an Alleged Difference between Strict Liability and Negligence

In several Law and Economics publications in the area of tort law, emphasis is being placed on an alleged difference between strict liability and negligence. Under strict liability, an injurer is liable for the losses of the victim, irrespective of his level of care. Under negligence, the injurer is not liable if he took at least the legally required care level. According to the mainstream Law and Economics literature, this feature of negligence causes a discontinuity in the expected private costs of the injurer. In this paper, I argue that this discontinuity does not exist in reality, because courts, when applying the negligence rule, require that the negligence was a necessary cause of the accident. After all, if the model adopted in economic analyses of tort law does not reflect the essence of this body of law, it will not be able to yield correct predictions or valuable policy recommendations

Vergoeding van "verlies van tijd" als ander nadeel

De workshop Aansprakelijkheid en Verzekering van het Ius Commune congres 2011 had als overkoepelend thema ontwikkelingen in nieuwe vormen van immateriële schade. Een van de onderwerpen die hierbij genoemd werden, was schade door enkel tijdsverlies. Omdat art. 6:106 BW in beperkte vergoedbaarheid van immateriële schade resulteert, werd in de workshop onderzocht of het Nederlandse recht in dezen opener zou moeten worden. In de call for papers werden enkele vragen opgeworpen die, zeker vanuit rechtseconomisch gezichtspunt, erg interessant zijn. In deze bijdrage zal ik vanuit dat rechtseconomische perspectief drie van die vragen proberen te beantwoorden: Waarom zou zulke schade voor vergoeding in aanmerking moeten komen? Hoe kan zulke schade worden berekend? Bestaat er een spanning tussen het compenseren van zulke schade en het vermijden ervan

QALY-tijd in de vaststelling van smartengeld bij letsel?

Inleiding In de Nederlandse literatuur over smartengeld bij letsel1 bestaat een vrij algemeen gedeelde onvrede over de omvang van het smartengeld hier te lande en er wordt vaak geconcludeerd dat de bedragen in Nederland te laag zijn. Ook menen diverse auteurs dat er sprake is van een scheefgroei tussen de bedragen die worden toegekend bij zeer ernstige letsels en de bedragen die bij lichte letsels worden toegewezen. De eerste groep blijft sterk achter bij de tweede. Beide problemen worden er mede door veroorzaakt dat smart subjectief en niet goed meetbaar is, zodat het moeilijk is om smartengeld op een meer objectieve manier vast te stellen

The Legal Duty to Incorporate Mistakes of the Victim

Abstract: In many jurisdictions, potential injurers are under a legal duty to incorporate possible mistakes of the potential victim. I distinguish three types of mistakes. First, victims might make mistakes because it is too costly to avoid them (e.g. little children in traffic). Second, the actual care level of an actor might sometimes be a bit above, and sometimes a bit below his average care level. Third, people might choose a lower care level than is optimal for them, even though they were able to take optimal care. This is the type of mistake I analyze in this paper. I argue on the basis of a game theoretical analysis that the duty to incorporate such mistakes might frustrate the preventive goal of tort law, because it decreases the care incentives provided to the victim, while simultaneously increasing the care incentives for the injurer. I provide examples of the legal duty to incorporate possible mistakes of the victim from different legal systems. I discuss the doctrine of the Last Clear Chance, as well as Donald Wittmans idea of Marginal Cost Liability. In cases where this idea is not feasible, I argue that the defense of comparative negligence might be a good alternative

Justifications and Excuses in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law

Abstract: In the economic analysis of tort law, scant attention is paid to justifications and excuses. An injurer invoking a justification argues that he did not act wrongfully. Excuses imply that the injurer acted wrongfully, but that his act cannot be imputed to him. If torts are described in general terms, on an abstract level, the possible role of justifications and excuses is larger than if the tort is subjectively defined. After all, the specific circumstances of the case that could lead to the conclusion that the injurer should not be liable are already incorporated in a subjectively defined tort, so that there is no separate function for justifications and excuses anymore. In this paper I argue that the use of general, abstract norms is preferable to applying subjective concrete norms. This generalization saves on administrative costs, it might lead to a better allocation of resources and it can provide better care and activity incentives. In circumstances where the objective norm would lead to undesirable outcomes, due to the specific circumstances of the case, justifications can serve as a correction. I analyze force majeure, necessity, necessary self-defense, legal duty or legal authority, authorized legal order, permission of the victim, assumption of risk and acting in the general interest. I argue that most, but not all, justifications make economic sense. In situations where the general norm provides correct incentives but where the specific injurer at hand would not change his behaviour as result of specific circumstances, excuses might avoid liability and hence save on administrative costs. I analyze mental or physical disability or illness, excusable error regarding the law or the facts, self-defense with excessive force and unauthorized official order. I conclude that most of the analyzed excuses are problematic from an economic point of view

Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages

Introduction: Many lawyers regard compensation as the most important goal of tort law. However, in the words of Williams, “this…does not look below the surface of things. Granted that the immediate object of the tort action is to compensate the plaintiff at the expense of the tortfeasor, why do we wish to do this?… An intelligent approach to the study of law must take account of its purpose, and must be prepared to test the law critically in the light of its purpose.”1 Keeton argues that the primary function of tort law is not to compensate the losses, but to determine when compensation is required.2 A similar argument is made by Fleming and Rogers.3 Losses of the victim are only shifted to the tortfeasor if there are reasons to do so. These reasons can be found in the goals of tort law. ... etc

Tort Damages

Abstract: In this Chapter, I provide an overview of Law and Economics literature regarding tort damages. Where necessary, attention is also spent to rules of tort liability. Both types of rules provide behavioral incentives to both injurers and victims, with respect to their level of care and activity. Moreover, they determine who is the residual risk bearer. Many topics determine who ultimately bears which risks, among which the applicable liability rule (strict liability or negligence), the question which losses are included in the damages and which are excluded, the issue whether punitive damages are possible, how future losses, damages for nonpecuniary losses and fatal accidents are calculated, and how the topic of multiple tortfeasors is dealt with. Finally, empirical research regarding tort damages is briefly touched upon. The Chapter is followed by an extensive bibliography