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A Reply to Louis Michael Seidman\u27s Respons

Book Review: Nothing To Lose But Our Chains: On Constitutional Disobedience, by Louis Michael Seidman

Book review of Nothing To Lose But Our Chains: On Constitutional Disobedience, by Louis Michael Seidman

The End of Constitutional Law?

Book review: On constitutional disobedience. By Louis Michael Seidman. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2013. Pp. xii + 162. Reviewed by Adam Shinar

The End of Constitutional Law?

Book review: On constitutional disobedience. By Louis Michael Seidman. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2013. Pp. xii + 162. Reviewed by Adam Shinar

Against (Constitutional) Settlement. Book Review Of: Our Unsettled Constitution: A New Defense of Constitutionalism and Judicial Review. by Louis Michael Seidman

Book review of: Our unsettled Constitution: a new defense of constitutionalism and judicial review. By Louis Michael Seidman. Yale University Press. 2001. Pp. 260. Reviewed by: Brannon P. Dennin

Against (Constitutional) Settlement. Book Review Of: Our Unsettled Constitution: A New Defense of Constitutionalism and Judicial Review. by Louis Michael Seidman

Book review of: Our unsettled Constitution: a new defense of constitutionalism and judicial review. By Louis Michael Seidman. Yale University Press. 2001. Pp. 260. Reviewed by: Brannon P. Dennin

Can Free Speech Be Progressive?

Free speech cannot be progressive. At least it can\u27t be progressive if we are talking about free speech in the American context, with all the historical, sociological, and philosophical baggage that comes with the modern, American free speech right. That is not to say that the right to free speech does not deserve protection. It might serve as an important side constraint on the pursuit of progressive goals and might even protect progressives against the possibility of catastrophic outcomes. But the notion that our free speech tradition might be weaponized to advance progressive ends is fanciful. The American free speech tradition is too deeply rooted in ideas about fixed property rights and with an equation of freedom with government inaction to be progressive. Instead of wasting energy on futile efforts to upend our first amendment traditions, progressives should work to achieve their goals directly

Substitute Arguments in Constitutional Law

In this article, I argue that that substitution is crucial to our practice of constitutional law. Of course, if one wished, one could easily extend the domain of substitution beyond these boundaries. Substitute arguments are an important aspect of law more generally and, indeed, of life. I have nonetheless chosen to limit my discussion to constitutional substitution because, I believe, overt discussion of substitution in this particular area illuminates important aspects of our constitutional regime-–aspects that substitution itself regularly obscures. To put my central point directly, I hope to show that constitutional law amounts to one, giant substitute argument

Political and Constitutional Obligation

In his provocative, courageous, and original new book, Against Obligation: The Multiple Sources of Authority in a Liberal Democracy, Abner Greene argues that there is “no successful general case for a presumptive (or ‘prima facie’) moral duty to obey the law.” In my own book, On Constitutional Disobedience, I argue that there is no moral duty to obey our foundational law–the Constitution of the United States. This brief article, prepared for a symposium on the two books to be published by the Boston University Law Review, I address three issues related to these claims. First, I discuss what seem to me to be important ambiguities in and problems with Professor Greene’s argument. Second, I defend my own stance against criticisms advanced by Greene and others. Third, I explore the relationship between his claims and mine

The Triumph of Gay Marriage and the Failure of Constitutional Law

The Supreme Court\u27s much anticipated invalidation of gay marriage bans improved the personal lives of millions of ordinary Americans. It made the country a more decent place. Even Chief Justice Roberts, at the conclusion of his otherwise scathing dissent, acknowledged that the decision was a cause for many Americans to celebrate. But although the Chief Justice thought that advocates of gay marriage should by all means celebrate today\u27s decision, he admonished them not [to] celebrate the Constitution. The Constitution, he said, had nothing to do with it . Part I of this article quarrels with the Chief Justice\u27s assertion that the Constitution had nothing to do with it. It argues that it is the dissenting justices, rather than their colleagues in the majority, who have ignored the traditions of American Constitutional law. Part II argues that the Chief Justice is exactly right when he says that we should celebrate the Obergefell decision, but not the Constitution, but he is right for reasons that he, himself, would disagree with. The Court\u27s decision marks a partial and flawed but nonetheless important advance toward inclusion and decency. The majority\u27s opinion, replete with invocations of the supposedly binding force of constitutional obligation, belittling of the large and growing number of Americans who are unmarried, and mischaracterization of the nature of the movement for gay rights, is exclusionary, reactionary, and authoritarian. Even as the Court demonstrates its (concededly limited) capacity to advance the cause of social justice, it unwittingly also demonstrates the failure of constitutional law to serve its core purpose of providing a just ground for cooperation among people who disagree about fundamentals. A brief conclusion discusses the implications of this failure