How does state ownership affect optimal export taxes?

This note discusses the influence of state ownership on optimal export taxes. We demonstrate an invariance theorem: the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal export levels nor welfare nor the level of optimal trade taxes.

Public Ownership and Trade Policy

This paper discusses the influence of public ownership on trade policy instruments. We demonstrate three important invariance results. First, the degree of public ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. Second, in the case of rivalry between domestic export firms, the optimal export tax is independent of the degree of public ownership. Third, in the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of public ownership. In this case, the optimal production subsidy decreases with public ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy is an increasing function of the public ownership share, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax is an increasing function of that parameter. Cet article considère l’influence de la propriété publique sur les choix des politiques commerciales. Nous démontrons trois théorèmes sur l’invariance. Premièrement, le degré de la propriété publique n’a aucun impact sur le niveau des activités optimales si le gouvernement utilise les politiques commerciales optimales. Deuxièmement, dans le cas de concurrence entre les firmes qui exportent, le taux de taxe optimale est indépendant du degré de la propriété publique. Troisièmement, dans le cas de concurrence sur le marché domestique, le taux de tarif douanier optimal est indépendant du degré de la propriété publique. Dans le cas de concurrence à la Cournot sur un troisième marché, le taux d’aide optimale est une fonction croissante du pourcentage de la possession publique, tandis que dans le cas de concurrence à la Bertrand, le taux de taxe optimale en est une fonction décroissante.Semi-public firms, trade policy, Entreprises semi-publiques, politiques commerciales

The Effects of Trade Liberalization on Productivity and Welfare: The Role of Firm Heterogeneity, R&D and Market Structure

This paper develops an oligopolistic model of international trade with heterogeneous firms and endogenous R&D to examine how trade liberalization affects firm and industry productivity, as well as social welfare. We identify four effects of trade liberalization on productivity: (i) a direct effect through changes in R&D investment; (ii) a scale effect due to changes in firm size; (iii) a selection effect due to inefficient firms leaving the market; and (iv) a market-share reallocation effect as efficient firms expand and inefficient firms reduce their output. We show how these effects operate in the short run when market structure is fixed, and in the long run when market structure is endogenous. Among the robust results that hold for any market structure are that trade liberalization (i) increases (decreases) aggregate R&D for low (high) trade costs; (ii) increases expected firm size if trade costs are high; and (iii) raises expected social welfare if trade costs are low. --international trade,firm heterogeneity,R&D,productivity,market structure

Relay-proof channels using UWB lasers

Alice is a hand-held device. Bob is a device providing a service, such as an ATM, an automatic door, or an anti-aircraft gun pointing at the gyro-copter in which Alice is travelling. Bob and Alice have never met, but share a key, which Alice uses to request a service from Bob (dispense cash, open door, don't shoot). Mort pretends to Bob that she is Alice, and her accomplice Cove pretends to Alice that he is Bob. Mort and Cove relay the appropriate challenges and responses to one another over a channel hidden from Alice and Bob. Meanwhile Alice waits impatiently in front of a different ATM, or the wrong door, or another gun. How can such an attack be prevented?Final Accepted Versio

Innovation and Trade with Heterogeneous Firms

This paper examines how trade liberalization affects the innovation incentives of firms, and what this implies for industry productivity. For this purpose we develop a reciprocal dumping model of international trade with heterogeneous firms and endogenous R&D. Among the robust results that hold both in the short run when there is no entry, and in the long run under free entry are that trade liberalization increases (decreases) aggregate R&D for low (high) trade costs and increases expected industry productivity. The central results of the paper regarding firm and industry level R&D spending differ significantly from the case of homogeneous firms.international trade, firm heterogeneity, R&D, productivity, market structure

DCF Valuation of Nonprofit Universities

We conduct the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation of two nonprofit organizations: Syracuse University and Indiana University. We transform nonprofits to for-profits by converting nonprofit social benefit to net earnings and by adopting for-profit cost of equity and tax rate. These adjustments attempt to capture considerable hidden value to equityholders. We find that in the best scenario, the net worth (market value of equity) could be about 2 times the book equity for both universities in June 2017