Virtue epistemology and the sources of epistemic value

A basic question for virtue epistemology is whether it represents a ‘third force’ – a different source of normativity to that offered by internalism and externalism. It is argued that virtue epistemology does not offer us a distinct source of normativity. It is also argued that virtue theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred state of ‘virtue’. Claims that phronesis can unify a virtues-based axiology are specifically opposed

Preface to this special issue on free will and epistemology

This is a preface to the special edition of the European Journal of Analytic Philosophy on my 2018 monograph and the topics from that monograph: Free Will and Epistemology. It addresses some of the criticisms commonly made against transcendental argumentation and sets the scene for the papers which follow