Policy Biases when the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities have Different Objectives

Central bank independence has contributed to achieve price stability and fiscal discipline for many countries. This is an accepted first-generation reform of fiscal and monetary policy. The question this paper asks is whether a second-generation reform consisting of institutional incentives for domestic policy coordination could be beneficial. The paper presents a game-theoretic model where the fiscal and monetary authorities interact to stabilize the economy. These authorities are different in that they have dissimilar preferences with respect to output and inflation gaps and control different policy instruments. Modeled as Nash or Stackelberg equilibria, the solution under lack of policy coordination implies that an increase in the preference divergence between the monetary and fiscal authorities leads to, ceteris paribus, larger public deficits (the fiscal authority's policy instrument) and higher interest rates (the central bank's instrument). The empirical section of the paper tests this conclusion on a pooled sample of 19 industrial countries with annual information for the period 1970-94. Controlling for other shocks and economic conditions, the estimation results support the main conclusion of the theoretical section. The policy implication of the paper is that, without prejudice to the gains from central bank independence, institutional arrangements that allow for coordination both at the level of setting objectives and at the level of policy implementation can alleviate the biases that move the economy to sub-optimally higher fiscal deficits and real interest rates.

Saving and growth in Egypt

This study illustrates the mechanisms linking national saving and economic growth, with the purpose of understanding the possibilities and limits of a saving-based growth agenda in the context of the Egyptian economy. This is done through a simple theoretical model, calibrated to fit the Egyptian economy, and simulated to explore different potential scenarios. The main conclusion is that if the Egyptian economy does not experience progress in productivity -- stemming from technological innovation, improved public management, and private-sector reforms -- then a high rate of economic growth is not feasible at current rates of national saving and would require a saving effort that is highly unrealistic. For instance, financing a constant 4 percent growth rate of gross domestic product per capita with no improvement in total factor productivity would require a national saving rate of around 50 percent in the first decade and 80 percent in 25 years. However, if productivity rises, sustaining and improving high rates of economic growth becomes viable. Following the previous example, a 2 percent growth rate of total factor productivity would allow a 4 percent growth rate of gross domestic product per capita with national saving rate in the realistic range of 20-25 percent of gross domestic product.Economic Growth,Access to Finance,Economic Theory&Research,Emerging Markets,Achieving Shared Growth

Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth

This paper attempts to reconcile the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). This paper starts by illustrating these opposing effects by, first, analyzing the dynamics of output growth and financial intermediation around systemic banking crises and, second, showing that the growth enhancing effects of financial depth are weaker in countries that experienced such crises. After these illustrative exercises, the paper attempts an empirical explanation of the apparently opposing effects of financial intermediation. This explanation is based on a distinction between transitory and trend effects of domestic credit aggregates on economic growth. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of long- and short-run effects, following Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999)’s Pooled Mean Group Estimator. The main result of the paper is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship.

A test of the international convergence hypothesis using panel data

The author, using a neoclassical Solow model, estimates an economy's rate of convergence to its own steady state. Using panel date for a sample of 98 countries, the author applies Chamberlain's (1984) estimation procedures to account for the presence of country-specific effects resulting from idiosyncratic unobservable factors. This procedure also prevents the estimation bias due to measurement error in the Gross Domestic Product. Controlling, additionally, for the country's level of education, the author estimates the rate of convergence to be 0.0494, which implies a half-life of about 14 years. This estimated rate of convergence is about two and a half times higher than those obtained by Barro and Salai-Martin (1992) and Makiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). The author claims that those estimates are biased toward zero because they fail to account for country specific effects. Finally, the author estimates the capital share in production to be 0.374, which is very close to the accepted benchmark value.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Inequality,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Economic Growth

Financial development, financial fragility, and growth

The authors study the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (for example, Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (for example, Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The authors account for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, they estimate an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). Their conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth coexists with a mostly negative short-run relationship. The authors further develop an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility (namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Financial Intermediation,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Environmental Economics&Policies,Econometrics,Achieving Shared Growth,Financial Economics,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Macroeconomic Management

Market-Oriented Reforms: Definitions and Measurement

This paper presents ways of measuring the progress of market-oriented reforms in both traditional areas of first-generation reform and the areas of institutional reform that have been emphasized lately. These policy areas are the domestic financial system; international financial markets; international trade; the labor market; the tax system; public infrastructure and public firms; the legal and regulatory framework; and governance. For each of them, first, we discuss the general principles underlying market oriented reform; second, we present various indicators of the policy stance in the area in question; and third, we present various outcome indicators of the policy stance.

Financial Structure in Chile: Macroeconomic Developments and Microeconomic Effects

The objectives of this paper are, first, to describe the developments in Chilean financial markets at the macroeconomic level and, then, to examine their effects at the level of firms. After reviewing the main government policies towards financial markets in the last three decades, the paper describes the remarkable changes in the size, activity, and efficiency of the banking sector and other capital markets (bond, stock, pension and insurance markets) during 1980s and 1990s. Then, the paper analyzes econometrically the access to financial markets, the financing (balance-sheet) structure, and the revenue growth performance in a sample of 79 Chilean firms during the period 1985-1995.