Exploring the remuneration ‘black box’: establishing an organizational learning insight into changing remuneration committee ‘social worlds’

Current executive compensation research posits a need to extend analysis beyond principalagent theory in order to explore the complex social influences and processes implicated in Remuneration Committee (RemCo) decision-making (e.g. Bender, 2007; Kakabadse et al, 2006; Main et al., 2007), particularly given the current uproar surrounding reported levels and structuring of executive remuneration. We respond to this international need by highlighting how innovative organizational learning theorizing can be integrated into further investigations of the remuneration ‘Black Box’, in order to focus attention upon the nuances of what and how organizational learning takes place in the remuneration process. Additionally, we note the importance of investigating the main actors and particularly their performance of complex roles within their rapidly evolving ‘social worlds’. By exploring the organizational learning phenomena implicated in executive remuneration, we argue that practitioners, regulatory bodies etc. can appreciate further the implications of their respective decision-making

The impact of research and development on relative performance evaluation in the UK

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether R&D spending influences the association between the cash compensation of boards of directors and relative performance evaluation (hereafter RPE). Design/methodology/approach Design/methodology/approach – The empirical modelling of directors' compensation focuses on the multiperiod compensation approach suggested by Lambert, Lambert and Larcker and Janairaman, Lambert, and Larcker. A panel sample of 586 UK non-financial public listed firms for the period 1990 to 1998 is employed to test for the existence of RPE in both R&D intensive and non/low R&D firms. Findings – The main results suggest that implicit RPE is used to determine directors' cash compensation before the institutional influences and self-regulation are likely to have taken effect. We find that the association between the cash compensation of directors and accounting measures of relative performance is lower in R&D intensive firms compared to firms with non/low R&D. It is possible that R&D intensive firms do not use accounting-related RPE at all. In comparison, a statistically significant relationship indicates that non/low R&D firms do use accounting-based RPE. The results also show that, in both intensive and non/low R&D firms, cash compensation is negatively related to own firm stock returns and industry average stock returns. Originality/value – This paper contributes to the limited RPE found in the existing UK compensation literature by establishing the implicit use of accounting-based RPE for non/low R&D firms in the UK.Accounting information, Performance appraisal, Research and development

The impact of research and development on relative performance evaluation in the UK

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether R&D spending influences the association between the cash compensation of boards of directors and relative performance evaluation (hereafter RPE). Design/methodology/approach Design/methodology/approach – The empirical modelling of directors' compensation focuses on the multiperiod compensation approach suggested by Lambert, Lambert and Larcker and Janairaman, Lambert, and Larcker. A panel sample of 586 UK non-financial public listed firms for the period 1990 to 1998 is employed to test for the existence of RPE in both R&D intensive and non/low R&D firms. Findings – The main results suggest that implicit RPE is used to determine directors' cash compensation before the institutional influences and self-regulation are likely to have taken effect. We find that the association between the cash compensation of directors and accounting measures of relative performance is lower in R&D intensive firms compared to firms with non/low R&D. It is possible that R&D intensive firms do not use accounting-related RPE at all. In comparison, a statistically significant relationship indicates that non/low R&D firms do use accounting-based RPE. The results also show that, in both intensive and non/low R&D firms, cash compensation is negatively related to own firm stock returns and industry average stock returns. Originality/value – This paper contributes to the limited RPE found in the existing UK compensation literature by establishing the implicit use of accounting-based RPE for non/low R&D firms in the UK

Relative performance evaluation in board cash compensation: UK empirical evidence

This paper presents an empirical examination of whether evidence of the implicit use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) can be found in the cash compensation of boards of directors for 169 UK non-financial listed companies that existed for all of the period from 1971 to 1998. We perform two types of analyses. Initially, we estimate individual firm time series regressions of the change in board cash compensation against measures of firm and peer group performance. The measures of firm performance we use are annual cash stock market returns and pre-tax accounting earnings. Peer group measures of performance are industry value-weighted average cash stock market returns and industry value-weighted average pre-tax accounting earnings. Subsequently, we analyse the data as a balanced panel. We provide evidence that board cash compensation is positively related to accounting earnings and negatively associated with peer group pre-tax accounting earnings. Some evidence suggests that board cash compensation is related to firm stock market returns but none suggests it is related to peer group market returns. This result implies the presence of RPE based on accounting earnings in the design of UK board compensation, with the cash compensation of boards of directors implicitly (partially) protected from industry uncertainties