Security Against Collective Attacks of a Modified BB84 QKD Protocol with Information only in One Basis

The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol BB84 has been proven secure against several important types of attacks: the collective attacks and the joint attacks. Here we analyze the security of a modified BB84 protocol, for which information is sent only in the z basis while testing is done in both the z and the x bases, against collective attacks. The proof follows the framework of a previous paper (Boyer, Gelles, and Mor, 2009), but it avoids the classical information-theoretical analysis that caused problems with composability. We show that this modified BB84 protocol is as secure against collective attacks as the original BB84 protocol, and that it requires more bits for testing.Comment: 6 pages; 1 figur

Attacks against a Simplified Experimentally Feasible Semiquantum Key Distribution Protocol

A semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol makes it possible for a quantum party and a classical party to generate a secret shared key. However, many existing SQKD protocols are not experimentally feasible in a secure way using current technology. An experimentally feasible SQKD protocol, "classical Alice with a controllable mirror" (the "Mirror protocol"), has recently been presented and proved completely robust, but it is more complicated than other SQKD protocols. Here we prove a simpler variant of the Mirror protocol (the "simplified Mirror protocol") to be completely non-robust by presenting two possible attacks against it. Our results show that the complexity of the Mirror protocol is at least partly necessary for achieving robustness.Comment: 9 page

Geometry of entanglement and separability in Hilbert subspaces of dimension up to three

We present a complete classification of the geometry of entangled and separable states in three-dimensional Hilbert subspaces of bipartite and multipartite quantum systems. Our analysis begins by finding the geometric structure of the pure product states in a given three-dimensional Hilbert subspace, which determines all the possible separable and entangled mixed states over the same subspace. In bipartite systems, we characterise the 14 possible qualitatively different geometric shapes for the set of separable states in any three-dimensional Hilbert subspace (5 classes which also appear in two-dimensional subspaces and were found and analysed by Boyer, Liss and Mor [Phys. Rev. A 95:032308, 2017], and 9 novel classes which appear only in three-dimensional subspaces), describe their geometries, and provide figures illustrating them. We also generalise these results to characterise the sets of fully separable and entangled states in three-dimensional subspaces of multipartite systems. Our results show which geometrical forms quantum entanglement can and cannot take in low-dimensional subspaces.Comment: 24 pages; 5 figure

Security Proof Against Collective Attacks for an Experimentally Feasible Semi-Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

Semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) allows two parties (Alice and Bob) to create a shared secret key, even if one of these parties (say, Alice) is classical. However, most SQKD protocols suffer from severe practical security problems when implemented using photons. The recently developed "Mirror protocol" [Boyer, Katz, Liss, and Mor, Phys. Rev. A 96, 062335 (2017)] is an experimentally feasible SQKD protocol overcoming those drawbacks. The Mirror protocol was proven robust (namely, it was proven secure against a limited class of attacks including all noiseless attacks), but its security in case some noise is allowed (natural or due to eavesdropping) has not been proved yet. Here we prove security of the Mirror protocol against a wide class of quantum attacks (the "collective attacks"), and we evaluate the allowed noise threshold and the resulting key rate.Comment: 17 pages; 3 figure

Simple and rigorous proof method for the security of practical Quantum Key Distribution in the Single-Qubit regime using mismatched basis measurements

Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols aim at allowing two parties to generate a secret shared key. While many QKD protocols have been proven unconditionally secure in theory, practical security analyses of experimental QKD implementations typically do not take into account all possible loopholes, and practical devices are still not fully characterized for obtaining tight and realistic key rates. We present a simple method of computing secure key rates for any practical implementation of discrete-variable QKD (which can also apply to measurement-device-independent QKD), initially in the single-qubit lossless regime, and we rigorously prove its unconditional security against any possible attack. We hope our method becomes one of the standard tools used for analysing, benchmarking, and standardizing all practical realizations of QKD