WHAT THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT FORGOT: A CALL FOR WOMEN\u27S SELF-DEFENSE

When the issue of violence against women emerged as an issue in the early 1970s, feminists on both sides of the Atlantic responded by creating domestic violence shelters and rape crisis and counseling centers, in addition to agitating for legal reform. These strategies remain dominant in contemporary feminist thinking on how to combat violence against women. The funding provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) constitute, for instance, a notable, modem arena in which such an emphasis appears. Enacted in 1994 as part of President Clinton\u27s crime bill, VAWA authorized the tripling of then-existing levels of funding for battered women\u27s shelters and currently allocates $80 million per year for rape prevention and education programs. As of the fiscal year 2001, more than$30 million in federal money under VAWA has been directed to institutions of higher education. Additional funding has been allocated to states and Native American tribes, mainly for establishing shelters and crisis and counseling centers; prosecuting offenders; training police officers, prosecutors, and health and social service providers; and researching violence against women and educating the public about it. VAWA also created a national, toll-free telephone hotline to provide information and assistance to domestic violence victims. What is so striking about the statute and the manner in which it has been implemented, however, is what has been left out. The government\u27s response to violence against women makes no direct mention of providing women with the means to help combat the problem themselves: through training in self-defense. Moreover, self-defense was not even a topic of discussion during the legislative drafting of VAWA, according to those involved

The Hippocratic Oath as Literary Text: A Dialogue Between Law and Medicine

An oath represents the strongest possible commitment a speaker can make. In linguistic parlance, an oath belongs to a specific class of statements known as speech acts or performative utterances. By their very articulation, such statements have the power to put their contents into effect. In short, speech acts do more than just say something; they also do something. By swearing an oath, for example, a person promises to perform certain actions in the world. This promise is all the more powerful if, as is usually done, the oathtaker swears upon some divine power and utters the oath in a public setting. Perhaps the most well-known example of an oath is the Hippocratic Oath - the famous code of medical ethics often taken by those about to begin medical practice. This Article examines the use of this important text in contemporary judicial opinions. In these settings, the Oath does not promise to perform what it says, thus losing its quality as a speech act. We hear the voice not of the oathtaker but rather that of the court. The judicial references to the Hippocratic Oath create a kind of secondary performative effect that serves to convince the reader of the Oath\u27s enduring legacy, even if courts do not abide by the Oath\u27s literal words. The main argument of this Article is that the Hippocratic Oath exerts a powerful influence on modem legal controversies implicating medical ethics, leading courts to adopt an overly doctor-centered view of these disputes. This doctor-centered view results from two distinct phenomena: first, the history and enduring legacy of the Oath have served to dignify the medical profession, causing courts to treat social issues as medical ones and to displace difficult ethical choices onto doctors; and second, judicial reasoning based on the Oath treats the patient as subordinate to the physician, because the text of the Oath itself places a greater emphasis on doctors than on patients

Montelukast added to fluticasone propionate does not alter inflammation or outcomes

BackgroundAirway inflammation is a key pathological feature of asthma which underlies its clinical presentation.ObjectivesTo examine whether adding a leukotriene modifier to an inhaled corticosteroid produces further clinical and/or anti-inflammatory benefits in patients symptomatic on short-acting β2-agonists.MethodsPatients uncontrolled on short-acting β2-agonists were treated for 12 weeks with either fluticasone propionate (100 mcg BD) or fluticasone propionate (100 mcg BD) and montelukast (10 mg QD) in a randomized, double-blind, parallel group study. Bronchoscopy with endobronchial biopsy and bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) was performed before and after treatment to compare effects on airway inflammation.ResultsOf 103 subjects enrolled, 89 subjects completed treatment and 82 subjects had matched pair biopsy samples. Submucosal eosinophil counts, the primary endpoint, and asthma control improved to similar extents after both treatments (p ≤ 0.008). Both treatments significantly reduced submucosal mast cell, CD3+, CD4+, CD8+ and CD25+ cell counts. Submucosal mast cell reduction was greater in the fluticasone propionate plus montelukast group. There were no differences between treatments in BAL markers of inflammation or thickness of sub-epithelial collagen.ConclusionsLow-dose fluticasone propionate significantly improves clinical disease control and reduces airway inflammation in asthma patients uncontrolled with short-acting β2-agonists without further improvement when montelukast is added to low-dose fluticasone propionate