An elementary proof of the optimality of threshold mechanisms

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Why is language vague?

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Disclosure and choice

An agent chooses among projects with random outcomes. His payoff is increasing in the outcome and in an observer's expectation of the outcome. With some probability, the agent can disclose the true outcome to the observer. We show that choice is inefficient: the agent favors riskier projects even with lower expected returns. If information can be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs of the observer, the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access to information, excessively risk{averse when the challenger has better access, and efficient otherwise. We also characterize the agent's worst-case equilibrium payoff

Reflexivity and rigidity for complexes, II: Schemes

We prove basic facts about reflexivity in derived categories over noetherian schemes; and about related notions such as semidualizing complexes, invertible complexes, and Gorenstein-perfect maps. Also, we study a notion of rigidity with respect to semidualizing complexes, in particular, relative dualizing complexes for Gorenstein-perfect maps. Our results include theorems of Yekutieli and Zhang concerning rigid dualizing complexes on schemes. This work is a continuation of part I, which dealt with commutative rings.Comment: 40 page

Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness

We show that in a class of I‐agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, for each agent i, we construct a simple disclosure game between the principal and agent i where the equilibrium strategies of the agents in these disclosure games give their equilibrium strategies in the game corresponding to the mechanism but where the principal is not committed to his response. In this equilibrium, the principal obtains the same payoff as in the optimal mechanism with commitment. As an application, we show that certain costly verification models can be characterized using equilibrium analysis of an associated model of evidence.Accepted manuscrip