Monetary regime choice in the accession countries - a theoretical analysis

This paper studies the choice of the monetary regime in a small open economy with special focus on the EMU accession countries. In the framework of a two - country DSGE model we conduct policy experiments consisting in analysing the effects of different monetary regimes (roughly representing the current choices of the accession countries) on the dynamics and volatility of an accession economy. We study the real exchange rate determination in the long run and the short run as it summarises the pattern of the stabilisation of an accession economy in response to the shocks. Our benchmark analysis indicates that the managed float regime can attain the lowest consumption gap and at the same time guarantee the moderate changes in the nominal interest rate, nominal exchange rate and inflation. However parameters summarising its sensitivity to nominal exchange rate movements and inflation pressures depend on the underlying shocks. Additionally the sensitivity analysis indicates that choice of the monetary regime is dependent also on the specific structure of a small open economy. In particular a small share of nontradables, a high degree of openness and the high pass through are advocates for the managed regimes frequently observed in the accession countries.monetary regime choice, real exchange rate dynamics, accession economies

The Maastricht convergence criteria and optimal monetary policy for the EMU accession countries

The EMU accession countries are obliged to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria prior to entering the EMU. What should be the optimal monetary policy satisfying these criteria? To answer this question, the paper proposes a DSGE model of a two-sector small open economy. First, I derive the micro founded loss function that represents the objective function of the optimal monetary policy not constrained to satisfy the criteria. I find that the optimal monetary policy should not only target in�ation rates in the domestic sectors and aggregate output fluctuations but also domestic and international terms of trade. Second, I show how the loss function changes when the monetary policy is constrained to satisfy the Maastricht criteria. The loss function of such a constrained policy is characterized by additional elements penalizing fluctuations of the CPI inflation rate, the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate around the new targets which are different from the steady state of the unconstrained optimal monetary policy. Under the chosen parameterization, the optimal monetary policy violates two criteria: concerning the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. The constrained optimal policy is characterized by a deflationary bias. This results in targeting the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate that are 0.7% lower (in annual terms) than the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate in the countries taken as a reference. Such a policy leads to additional welfare costs amounting to 30% of the optimal monetary policy loss.Optimal monetary policy; Maastricht convergence criteria; EMU accession countries

The Maastricht Criteria and Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Mix for the EMU Accession Countries

The Maastricht convergence criteria set constraints on both monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU Accession Countries. This paper uses a DSGE model of a two sector small open economy with distortionary taxes to address the following question: How do the Maastricht convergence criteria modify an optimal monetary and fiscal policy mix in an economy facing domestic and external shocks? We find that targets of the unconstrained optimal monetary and fiscal policy are similar to those of the optimal monetary policy alone. The constrained policy is characterised by additional elements that penalize fluctuations of monetary and fiscal variables around the new targets which are different from the steady state of the unconstrained optimal monetary policy. Under the chosen parameterization (which aims to reflect the Czech Republic economy) the optimal monetary and fiscal policy violates three Maastricht criteria: on the CPI inflation rate, the nominal interest rate and deficit to GDP ratio. Both the stabilization component and deterministic component of the con- strained policy are different from the unconstrained optimal policy. Since monetary criteria play a dominant role in affecting the stabilization process of the constrained policy, CPI inflation and the nominal interest are characterised by a smaller variability (than under the unconstrained policy) at the expense of a higher variability of deficit to GDP ratio. The constrained policy is characterised by a deflationary bias which results in targeting the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate that are lower by 1.3% (in annual terms) than the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate in the countries taken as a reference. The constrained policy is also characterised by targeting surplus to GDP ratio at around 3.7%. As a result the policy constrained by the Maastricht convergence criteria induces additional welfare costs that amount to 60% of the initial deadweight loss associated with the optimal policy.Optimal monetary and fiscal policy, Maastricht convergence criteria, EMU accession countries

The Maastricht Convergence Criteria and Optimal Monetary Policy for the EMU Accession Countries

The EMU accession countries are obliged to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria prior to entering the EMU. What should be the optimal monetary policy satisfying these criteria? To answer this question, the paper proposes a DSGE model of a two-sector small open economy. First, I derive the micro founded loss function that represents the objective function of the optimal monetary policy not constrained to satisfy the criteria. I find that the optimal monetary policy should not only target inflation rates in the domestic sectors and aggregate output fluctuations but also domestic and international terms of trade. Second, I show how the loss function changes when the monetary policy is constrained to satisfy the Maastricht criteria. The loss function of such a constrained policy is characterized by additional elements penalizing fluctuations of the CPI inflation rate, the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate around the new targets which are different from the steady state of the unconstrained optimal monetary policy. Under the chosen parameterization, the optimal monetary policy violates two criteria: concerning the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. The constrained optimal policy is characterized by a deflationary bias. This results in targeting the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate that are 0.7% lower (in annual terms) than the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate in the countries taken as a reference. Such a policy leads to additional welfare costs amounting to 30% of the optimal monetary policy loss.Optimal monetary policy, Maastricht convergence criteria, EMU accession countries

The Maastricht Convergence Criteria and Monetary Regimes for the EMU Accession Countries

The goal of this paper is to study the ability of different monetary regimes to satisfy the Maastricht criteria. We perform our analysis in the framework of a two-sector small open economy DSGE model with nominal rigidities exposed to both domestic and external shocks. We analyze the regimes that reflect the policy choices observed in the EMU Accession countries, i.e. peg regime, managed float regime and flexible exchange rate regime with CPI inflation targeting. There exists a significant trade-off between compliance with the CPI inflation criterion and the nominal interest rate criterion. The sensitivity analysis reveals that the probabability that some of the regimes will satisfy all the criteria increases with openness of the economy and also degree of substitution between traded goods. Moreover, provided that two previous conditions are satisfied, degree of exchange rate pass through determines which of the regimes can comply with the criteria. Low degree of pass through enables regimes with managed exchange rate to fulfill all the criteria while high degree of pass through implies that the CPI targeting regime satisfies all the criteria.monetary regimes, the Maastricht convergence criteria, EMU accession economies

The Maastricht Criteria and Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Mix for the EMU Accession Countries

The Maastricht convergence criteria set constraints on both monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU Accession Countries. This paper uses a DSGE model of a two sector small open economy with distortionary taxes to address the following question: How do the Maastricht convergence criteria modify an optimal monetary and fiscal policy mix in an economy facing domestic and external shocks? We find that targets of the unconstrained optimal monetary and fiscal policy are similar to those of the optimal monetary policy alone. The constrained policy is characterised by additional elements that penalize fluctuations of monetary and fiscal variables around the new targets which are different from the steady state of the unconstrained optimal monetary policy. Under the chosen parameterization (which aims to reflect the Czech Republic economy) the optimal monetary and fiscal policy violates three Maastricht criteria: on the CPI inflation rate, the nominal interest rate and deficit to GDP ratio. Both the stabilization component and deterministic component of the con- strained policy are different from the unconstrained optimal policy. Since monetary criteria play a dominant role in affecting the stabilization process of the constrained policy, CPI inflation and the nominal interest are characterised by a smaller variability (than under the unconstrained policy) at the expense of a higher variability of deficit to GDP ratio. The constrained policy is characterised by a deflationary bias which results in targeting the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate that are lower by 1.3% (in annual terms) than the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate in the countries taken as a reference. The constrained policy is also characterised by targeting surplus to GDP ratio at around 3.7%. As a result the policy constrained by the Maastricht convergence criteria induces additional welfare costs that amount to 60% of the initial deadweight loss associated with the optimal policy

The Maastricht Convergence Criteria and Monetary Regimes for the EMU Accession Countries

The goal of this paper is to study the ability of different monetary regimes to satisfy the Maastricht criteria. We perform our analysis in the framework of a two-sector small open economy DSGE model with nominal rigidities exposed to both domestic and external shocks. We analyze the regimes that reflect the policy choices observed in the EMU Accession countries, i.e. peg regime, managed float regime and flexible exchange rate regime with CPI inflation targeting. There exists a significant trade-off between compliance with the CPI inflation criterion and the nominal interest rate criterion. The sensitivity analysis reveals that the probabability that some of the regimes will satisfy all the criteria increases with openness of the economy and also degree of substitution between traded goods. Moreover, provided that two previous conditions are satisfied, degree of exchange rate pass through determines which of the regimes can comply with the criteria. Low degree of pass through enables regimes with managed exchange rate to fulfill all the criteria while high degree of pass through implies that the CPI targeting regime satisfies all the criteria

The Maastricht Convergence Criteria and Monetary Regimes for the EMU Accession Countries

The goal of this paper is to study the ability of different monetary regimes to satisfy the Maastricht criteria. We perform our analysis in the framework of a two-sector small open economy DSGE model with nominal rigidities exposed to both domestic and external shocks. We analyze the regimes that reflect the policy choices observed in the EMU Accession countries, i.e. peg regime, managed float regime and flexible exchange rate regime with CPI inflation targeting. There exists a significant trade-off between compliance with the CPI inflation criterion and the nominal interest rate criterion. The sensitivity analysis reveals that the probabability that some of the regimes will satisfy all the criteria increases with openness of the economy and also degree of substitution between traded goods. Moreover, provided that two previous conditions are satisfied, degree of exchange rate pass through determines which of the regimes can comply with the criteria. Low degree of pass through enables regimes with managed exchange rate to fulfill all the criteria while high degree of pass through implies that the CPI targeting regime satisfies all the criteria