Alliances and entry in a simple airline network

This paper constructs an entry and code-sharing alliances game to demonstrate that the alliance between the incumbent carriers may play a significant role of entry deterrence in a given airline network. We show that incumbents can use the alliances as a credible threat to deter the entry of the potential entrants who have no significant cost advantage. This finding suggests that the role of the alliance in entry deterrence should be considered carefully when governments promote and maintain competition in the deregulated airline network markets.

Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities

This study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated com- posite good. Although the joint profits from a parallel alliance between the composite goods firm and a components producer are always larger than those from a complementary alliance between components producers, through Nash bargaining, a components producer prefers the complementary (parallel) alliance when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (small). Combined with the result that a complementary alliance is socially preferable, our findings provide meaningful implications for antitrust policy.Complementary alliance; Parallel alliance; Nash bargaining; Antitrust policy

Multi-market competition, R&D, and welfare in oligopoly

We investigate a multi-market Cournot model with strategic process R&D investments wherein a multi-market monopolist meets entrants that enter one of the markets. We find that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditure of the incumbent firm. That is, entry can stimulate R&D effort. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entrycan appear.

Causality in Quantiles and Dynamic Stock Return-Volume Relations

This paper investigates the causal relations between stock return and volume based on quantile regressions. We first define Granger non-causality in all quantiles and propose testing non-causality by a sup-Wald test. Such a test is consistent against any deviation from non-causality in distribution, as opposed to the existing tests that check only noncausality in certain moment. This test is readily extended to test non-causality in different quantile ranges, and the testing results enable us to identify the quantile range for which causality is relevant. In the empirical studies of 3 major stock market indices, we find that, while the conventional test suggests no causality in mean, there are strong evidences that lagged volume Granger causes return in all but some middle quantiles. In particular, the causal effects have opposite signs at lower and upper quantiles and are stronger at more extreme quantiles. These relations form (symmetric) V shapes across quantiles. They also show that the dispersion of the return distribution increases with volume so that volume has a positive effect on return volatility. It is also shown that the quantile causal effects of lagged return on volume are mainly negative.Granger non-causality in quantiles, quantile causal effect, quantile regression, return-volume relation, sup-Wald test