Minder concurrentie door Lelystad Airport

Door vluchten te verplaatsen van Schiphol naar het veertig kilometer verderop gelegen Lelystad krijgt Schiphol de ruimte om zijn routenetwerk uit te breiden. De keerzijde van zo’n verplaatsing is dat de concurrentie tussen de luchtvaartmaatschappijen flink kan dalen

The impact of competition on productive efficiency in European railways

This paper empirically explores the relationship between competition design and productive efficiency in the railway industry. We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to construct efficiency scores, and explain these scores, using variables reflecting institutional factors and competition design. Our results suggest that competitive tendering improves productive efficiency, which is in line with economic intuition as well as with expectations on the design of competition. We also find that free entry lowers productive efficiency. A possible explanation for this result is that free entry may disable railway operators to reap economies of density. Our final result is that more autonomy of management lowers productive efficiency. Most of the incumbent railway companies are state owned and do not face any competitive pressure. As a consequence, increased independence without sufficient competition and adequate regulation may deteriorate incentives for productive efficiency

Interpretation of cruise industry in a two-sided market context:An exploration on Japan

Two-sided markets are characterised by the presence of an intermediary and two groups of end-users. In the cruise market, cruise lines may play the role of intermediaries to connect the two end-users, viz. cruise passengers and cruise ports. Our research explored whether the cruise industry can be regarded as a two-sided market, starting with a theoretical modelling. The findings show that cruise lines might be hybrid intermediaries, selling their own ship-based products and services, while offering also a platform to enable the transaction between cruise passengers and cruise ports. This particular business model of a quasi-two-sided market is also reflected in the pricing scheme of cruise industry, whereby cruise ports charge an entry fee from cruise lines and port dues from cruise passengers. We illustrate an empirical analysis on the basis of the cruise market in Japan, and it provides a preliminary clue that the behaviours of cruise ports and cruise lines are consistent with our theoretical framework. The results are not convincingly significant due to data limitations, hence, the concept of a ‘two-sided market’ in the cruise industry call for further empirical research