Folk moral objectivism

This PhD thesis presents an investigation into the thesis of “folk moral objectivism” (FMO). According to FMO, people believe that moral judgments are objectively true or false. In my first chapter, I review existing research and I evaluate whether or not they provide evidence for or against FMO. My investigation reveals that it unclear whether they provide genuine evidence. In the second chapter, I present research in which I investigate whether an existing psychological construct (“perceived objectivity”) measures moral objectivism or also related metaethical views. My results suggest the latter. In Chapter 3, I argue that it is unclear whether measurement instruments used previously measure implicit or explicit commitments. I present an investigation specifically focusing on the former. The results suggest that a majority of people seems to implicitly believe that FMO is true. In the fourth chapter, I explore whether people believe in the possibility of moral progress, knowledge, and error. The results show that people believe this applies to scientific statements but less so for moral statements or statements about personal preferences or conventions. Overall, my research reveals that we should be careful in interpreting empirical results as evidence against FMO. First, previous studies do not always measure what is relevant for FMO. Second, the studies in this thesis do not provide univocal evidence for it. Third, an ultimate verdict requires a thorough investigation of the distinction between implicit and explicit commitments. If FMO is true, this is not immediately obvious if we look at empirical data

Folk moral objectivism and its measurement

Experimental philosophers and psychologists investigate whether people perceive moral judgments to be objectively true or false. Existing research focuses on a single dimension of ‘perceived objectivity’. The present research examines whether multiple dimensions of folk moral objectivity underlie moral judgments. It also examines whether such dimensions relate to perceived objectivity, tolerance, and people’s behavioral intentions to punish norm-violators. Exploratory factor analysis on twenty ethical items revealed three different ways of perceiving moral truth (Independent Truth, Universal Truth, Divine Truth), which each form reliable subscales (Study 1). This three-factor structure was supported by confirmatory factor analysis (Study 2). Each of the dimensions is differently related to perceived objectivity (Study 3). With respect to tolerance, perceived objectivity is a mediator in the relationship between perceiving moral truth as absolute or universal and tolerance (Study 4). With respect to a willingness to harm measure, Independent Truth is negatively related and Universal Truth is positively related, to people’s punitive attitudes toward norm-violators

How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences

How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences Quintelier, K.J.P.; Zijlstra, L

A comparison of echocardiographic and electron beam computed tomographic assessment of aortic valve area in patients with valvular aortic stenosis

The purpose of this study was to compare electron beam computed tomography (EBT) with transthoracic echocardiography (TTE) in determining aortic valve area (AVA). Thirty patients (9 females, 21 males) underwent a contrast-enhanced EBT scan (e-Speed, GE, San Francisco, CA, USA) and TTE within 17 ± 12 days. In end-inspiratory breath hold, a prospectively ecg-triggered scan was acquired with a beam speed of 50–100 ms, a collimation of 2 × 1.5 mm and an increment of 3.0 mm. The AVA was measured with planimetry. A complete TTE study was performed in all patients, and the AVA was computed using the continuity equation. There was close correlation between AVA measured with EBT and AVA assessed with TTE (r = 0.60, P < 0.01). The AVA measured with EBT was 0.51 ± 0.46 cm2 larger than the AVA calculated with TTE measurements. EBT appeared to be a valuable non-invasive method to measure the AVA. EBT measures the anatomical AVA, while with TTE the functional AVA is calculated, which explains the difference in results between the methods

The role of coronary artery calcification score in clinical practice

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Coronary artery calcification (CAC) measured by electron-beam computed tomography (EBCT) has been well studied in the prediction of coronary artery disease (CAD). We sought to evaluate the impact of the CAC score in the diagnostic process immediately after its introduction in a large tertiary referral centre.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>598 patients with no history of CAD who underwent EBCT for evaluation of CAD were retrospectively included into the study. Ischemia detection test results (exercise stress test, single photon emission computed tomography or ST segment analysis on 24 hours ECG detection), as well as the results of coronary angiography (CAG) were collected.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>The mean age of the patients was 55 ± 11 years (57% male). Patients were divided according to CAC scores; group A < 10, B 10 – 99, C 100 – 399 and D ≥ 400 (304, 135, 89 and 70 patients respectively). Ischemia detection tests were performed in 531 (89%) patients; negative ischemia results were found in 362 patients (183 in group A, 87 in B, 58 in C, 34 in D). Eighty-eight percent of the patients in group D underwent CAG despite negative ischemia test results, against 6% in group A, 16% in group B and 29% in group C. A positive ischemia test was found in 74 patients (25 in group A, 17 in B, 16 in C, 16 in D). In group D 88% (N = 14) of the patients with a positive ischemia test were referred for CAG, whereas 38 – 47% in group A-C.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Our study showed that patients with a high CAC score are more often referred for CAG. The CAC scores can be used as an aid in daily cardiology practice to determine further decision making.</p

Are People Implicitly Moral Objectivists?

In this paper I argue that there are at least two ways in which people can be moral objectivists, namely implicitly and explicitly. It is possible to explicitly deny being a moral objectivist while being implicitly committed to it. Enoch (2014) presents three thought experiments to convince his reader that they are moral objectivists even if they explicitly think otherwise. As it happens, Enoch’s tests, which he uses as intuition pumps, provide excellent measures of implicit metaethical commitments. In this paper I use each of them as material for survey experiments to test whether people are implicit moral objectivists. Overall, results provide support for the idea that people are moral objectivists