Exploring cooperative game mechanisms of scientific coauthorship networks

Scientific coauthorship, generated by collaborations and competitions among researchers, reflects effective organizations of human resources. Researchers, their expected benefits through collaborations, and their cooperative costs constitute the elements of a game. Hence we propose a cooperative game model to explore the evolution mechanisms of scientific coauthorship networks. The model generates geometric hypergraphs, where the costs are modelled by space distances, and the benefits are expressed by node reputations, i. e. geometric zones that depend on node position in space and time. Modelled cooperative strategies conditioned on positive benefit-minus-cost reflect the spatial reciprocity principle in collaborations, and generate high clustering and degree assortativity, two typical features of coauthorship networks. Modelled reputations generate the generalized Poisson parts and fat tails appeared in specific distributions of empirical data, e. g. paper team size distribution. The combined effect of modelled costs and reputations reproduces the transitions emerged in degree distribution, in the correlation between degree and local clustering coefficient, etc. The model provides an example of how individual strategies induce network complexity, as well as an application of game theory to social affiliation networks

A Top-down Model for Cash CLO

We propose a top-down model for cash CLO. This model can consistently price cash CLO tranches both within the same deal and across different deals. Meaningful risk measures for cash CLO tranches can also be defined and computed. This method is self-consistent, easy to implement and computationally efficient. It has the potential to bring the much needed pricing transparency to the cash CLO markets; and it could also greatly improve the risk management of cash instruments.Comment: 14 pages, 12 figure