Political Resource Curse under Authoritarianism: Evidence from China *

Abstract By analyzing a panel constructed on the political turnovers of 4,390 county leaders in China during 1999-2008, we find that the revenue windfalls accrued to these officials from land sales since 1998 have both undermined the effectiveness of the promotion system for government officials and fueled corruption. Instead of rewarding efforts made to boost GDP growth, promotion is now also positively correlated with signaling efforts or specifically increased spending on flamboyant (so-called "image") public projects, with those politically connected to their superiors and those who are beyond the prime age for promotion being the primary beneficiaries. Likewise, the same revenue windfalls have also led to corruption, as gauged from the increases in the government workforce and administrative expenditure but not social welfare spending. Our findings highlight how land revenue windfalls can lead to a political resource curse in a highly politically centralized authoritarian regime