Evolution of cooperation in spatial traveler's dilemma game

Traveler's dilemma (TD) is one of social dilemmas which has been well studied in the economics community, but it is attracted little attention in the physics community. The TD game is a two-person game. Each player can select an integer value between $R$ and $M$ ($R < M$) as a pure strategy. If both of them select the same value, the payoff to them will be that value. If the players select different values, say $i$ and $j$ ($R \le i < j \le M$), then the payoff to the player who chooses the small value will be $i+R$ and the payoff to the other player will be $i-R$. We term the player who selects a large value as the cooperator, and the one who chooses a small value as the defector. The reason is that if both of them select large values, it will result in a large total payoff. The Nash equilibrium of the TD game is to choose the smallest value $R$. However, in previous behavioral studies, players in TD game typically select values that are much larger than $R$, and the average selected value exhibits an inverse relationship with $R$. To explain such anomalous behavior, in this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in spatial traveler's dilemma game where the players are located on a square lattice and each player plays TD games with his neighbors. Players in our model can adopt their neighbors' strategies following two standard models of spatial game dynamics. Monte-Carlo simulation is applied to our model, and the results show that the cooperation level of the system, which is proportional to the average value of the strategies, decreases with increasing $R$ until $R$ is greater than the threshold where cooperation vanishes. Our findings indicate that spatial reciprocity promotes the evolution of cooperation in TD game and the spatial TD game model can interpret the anomalous behavior observed in previous behavioral experiments

Phase transitions in a holographic s+p model with backreaction

In a previous paper (arXiv:1309.2204, JHEP 1311 (2013) 087), we present a holographic s+p superconductor model with a scalar triplet charged under an SU(2) gauge field in the bulk. We also study the competition and coexistence of the s-wave and p-wave orders in the probe limit. In this work we continue to study the model by considering the full back-reaction The model shows a rich phase structure and various condensate behaviors such as the "n-type" and "u-type" ones, which are also known as reentrant phase transitions in condensed matter physics. The phase transitions to the p-wave phase or s+p coexisting phase become first order in strong back-reaction cases. In these first order phase transitions, the free energy curve always forms a swallow tail shape, in which the unstable s+p solution can also play an important role. The phase diagrams of this model are given in terms of the dimension of the scalar order and the temperature in the cases of eight different values of the back reaction parameter, which show that the region for the s+p coexisting phase is enlarged with a small or medium back reaction parameter, but is reduced in the strong back-reaction cases.Comment: 15 pages(two-column), 9 figure