Bank equity Involvement in Industrial Firms and Bank Risk

The regulatory framework in Europe does not prevent banks from taking large or controlling equity stakes in non-financial firms, potentially contributing to higher levels of bank risk and financial instability. Using a panel of European commercial banks for the period 2004-2008, we find that higher levels of equity positions in industrial firms and higher proportions of industrial firms where the bank is the majority shareholder lead to higher bank activity and insolvency risk. At low levels of shareholder protection, these risk measures are reduced when equity investments are held for longer, an effect attenuated at higher levels of shareholder protection

Canal des provisions bancaires et cyclicité du marché du crédit

International audienceRésumé : Des travaux empiriques portant sur les comportements de provisionnement des banques montrent que les provisions pour pertes évoluent de façon contracyclique. Ce fait stylisé est intégré dans un modèle théorique déterminant le comportement d'une banque représentative sur le marché du crédit. Le modèle et les simulations réalisées montrent que les modi…cations du coût de provisionnement supportées par la banque à travers un cycle économique ampli…ent les uctuations sur le marché du crédit. Deux mécanismes sont identi…és pour éliminer cette e¤et d'ampli…cation. D'un point de vue réglementaire, l'adoption d'un système de provisionnement dynamique représente une première solution. Au niveau de la banque, la constitution d'un "coussin de sécurité" en capital bancaire représente une seconde solution. Abstract :The literature on provisioning bank behaviour shows that loan loss provisions are counter-cyclical. Based on this stylised fact, this paper develops a partial equilibrium model of a banking …rm that analyzes how provisioning rules inuence credit market uctuations. The model and the simulations show that a backward-looking provisioning system ampli…es the uctuations in the credit market over an economic cycle. Two solutions are proposed to remove this bank provision channel. First, the regulatory authority can implement a forward-looking provisioning system. Second, if a backward-looking provisioning system rules are implemented, banks can build a capital bu¤er to cover the expected losses which are not covered by loan loss reserves

Banks' procyclicality behavior: does provisioning matter?

URL des Cahiers : https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/CAHIERS-MSECahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques 2006.35 - ISSN 1624-0340A panel of 186 European banks is used for the period 1992-2004 to determine if banking behaviors induced by the capital adequacy constraint and the provisioning system, amplify credit fluctuations. Our finding is consistent with the bank capital channel hypothesis, which means that poorly capitalized banks are constrained to expand credit. We also find that loan loss provisions (LLP) made in order to cover identified credit losses (non discretionary LLP) amplify credit fluctuations. Indeed, non discretionary LLP evolve cyclically. This leads to a misevaluation of expected credit risk which affect banks' incentives to grant new loans since lending costs are misstated. By contrast, LLP use for management objectives (discretionary LLP) do not affect credit fluctuations. The findings of our research are consistent with the call for the implementation of dynamic provisioning in Europe.Un panel de 186 banques européennes sur la période 1992-2004 est utilisé pour déterminer si les fluctuations de l'offre de crédit des banques sont amplifiées par la contrainte réglementaire sur les fonds propres et par les règles de provisionnement. Nos résultats sont en accord avec l'hypothèse du canal du capital bancaire : les banques faiblement capitalisées se trouvent contraintes pour accroître leur offre de crédit. Nous montrons également que les provisions contractées pour couvrir des pertes identifiées (provisions non discrétionnaires) amplifient les fluctuations de l'offre de crédits. En effet, ces provisions non discrétionnaires évoluent de façon cyclique et conduisent à une mauvaise prise en compte des pertes anticipées. L'incitation de la banque à offrir du crédit est donc affectée dans la mesure où les coûts liés à l'accord d'un crédit sont mal évalués. D'autre part, la proportion des provisions utilisée pour des objectifs de management (provisions discrétionnaires) n'affecte pas les fluctuations de l'offre de crédit. Les résultats de cet article conduisent à recommander la mise en place d'un système de provisionnement dynamique en Europe

Monetary, Financial and Fiscal Stability in the East African Community: Ready for a Monetary Union?

We examine prospects for a monetary union in the East African Community (EAC) by developing a stylized model of policymakers' decision problem that allows for uncertain benefits derived from monetary,financial and fiscal stability, and then calibrating the model for the EAC for the period 2003-2010. When policymakers properly allow for uncertainty, none of the countries wants to pursue a monetary union based on either monetary or financial stability grounds, and only Rwanda might favor it on fiscal stability grounds; we argue that robust institutional arrangements assuring substantial improvements in monetary, financial and fiscal stability are needed to compensate

Ultimate Ownership Structure and Bank Regulatory Capital Adjustment: Evidence from European Commercial Banks

This paper empirically investigates whether a bank's decision to adjust its capital is influenced by the existence of a divergence between the voting and the cash-flow rights of its ultimate owner. We use a novel hand-collected dataset on detailed control and ownership characteristics of 405 European commercial banks to estimate an ownership-augmented capital adjustment model over the 2003-2010 period. We find no differences in adjustment speeds when banks need to adjust their Tier 1 capital downwards to reach their target capital ratio. However, when the adjustment process requires an upward shift in Tier 1 capital, the adjustment is significantly slower for banks controlled by a shareholder with a divergence between voting and cash-flow rights. Further investigation shows that such an asymmetry only holds if the ultimate owner is a family or a state or if the bank is headquartered in a country with relatively weak shareholder protection. Moreover, this behavior is tempered during the 2008 financial crisis, possibly because of government capital injections or support from ultimate owners (propping up). Our findings provide new insights for understanding capital adjustment in general and have policy implications on the road to the final stage of Basel III in 2019

Excess control rights, bank capital structure adjustment and lending

We investigate whether excess control rights of ultimate owners in pyramids affect banks' adjustment to their target capital ratio. When ultimate control rights and cash-flow rights are identical, banks increase their capital ratio by issuing equity and by reshuffling their assets without slowing their lending. However, when control rights exceed cash-flow rights, banks are reluctant to issue equity to increase their capital ratio and, instead, shrink their assets by mainly cutting their lending. A deeper investigation shows that this behavior is only apparent in family-controlled banks and in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection rights. Our findings provide new insights in the capital structure adjustment process and have critical policy implications for the implementation of Basel III

Does uncertainty matter for loan charge-offs?

International audienceUsing a stylized real options model, we show that discretion over the timing of charging off a non-performing loan could be economically justified when collateral values are uncertain and there is a chance of loan recovery. The implied hypothesis of an “uncertainty dependence” aspect in loan charge-offs is empirically tested and validated using a panel of European banks. A welfare-maximizing regulator might want to let banks pursue such discretionary loan charge-off behavior, with the problem of distinguishing it from alternative capital management and income smoothing objectives, while transparency-seeking accounting standards setters would presumably not

The Provision of Services, Interest Margins and Loan Pricing in European Banking

This paper assesses the implications on bank interest margins of the expansion into non- traditional fee-based activities in European banking. We use a sample of 602 European commercial and cooperative banks from 1996 to 2002 and consider the total income shares of trading income and commission and fee income as measures of product diversification to explore loan pricing. Our results show that a higher income share from commission and fee activities is associated with lower margins and lower lending rates but that there is no link with trading activities. For banks exhibiting a higher share of commission and fee income there is a weaker link between the rate they charge on loans and borrower default risk. The hypothesis that banks use loans as a loss leader altering default screening and monitoring activities and consequently risk pricing cannot be rejected

Product Diversification in the European Banking Industry: Risk and Loan Pricing Implications

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between bank risk and product diversification in the changing structure of the European banking industry. Based on a broad set of European banks for the period 1996-2002, our study shows that banks expanding into non-interest income activities present higher risk than banks which mainly supply loans. Whereas previous studies (mainly on U.S. banks) focused on portfolio diversification effects we explore risk implications of cross-selling determinants of loan pricing as an alternative explanation. Our results show that higher income from other activities is associated with lower lending rates which suggests that banks may actually use loans as a loss leader altering default screening and monitoring activities and consequently risk pricing