How Do Banks Set Interest Rates?

The aim of this paper is to study cross-sectional differences in banks interest rates. It adds to the existing literature in two ways. First, it analyzes in a systematic way both micro and macroeconomic factors that influence the price setting behavior of banks. Second, by using banks' prices (rather than quantities) it provides an alternative way to disentangle loan supply from loan demand shift in the bank lending channel' literature. The results, derived from a sample of Italian banks, suggest that heterogeneity in the banking rates pass-through exists only in the short run. Consistently with the literature for Italy, interest rates on shortterm lending of liquid and well-capitalized banks react less to a monetary policy shock. Also banks with a high proportion of long-term lending tend to change their prices less. Heterogeneity in the pass-through on the interest rate on current accounts depends mainly on banks' liability structure. Bank's size is never relevant.

Bank-Specific Characteristics and Monetary Policy Transmission: The Case of Italy

This paper tests cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in Italy from 1986 to 1998 using a panel approach. After a monetary tightening the decrease in deposits subject to reserve requirements is sharper for those banks that have less incentive to shield the effect of a monetary squeeze: small banks characterized by a higher ratio of deposits to loans and well-capitalized banks that have a greater capacity to raise other forms of external funds. As to lending, size does not affect the banksÂ’ reaction to a monetary policy impulse. This can be explained by a closer customer relationship, which provides an incentive for small banks, which are more liquid on average, to smooth the effects of a tightening on credit supplied. BanksÂ’ liquidity is the most significant factor enabling them to attenuate the effect of a decrease in deposits on lending.monetary policy; transmission mechanisms; bank lending channel

Bank-specific characteristics and monetary policy transmission: the case of Italy,

This paper tests cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in Italy from 1986 to 1998 using a panel approach. After a monetary tightening the decrease in deposits subject to reserve requirements is sharper for those banks that have less incentive to shield the effect of a monetary squeeze: small banks characterized by a higher ratio of deposits to loans and well-capitalized banks that have a greater capacity to raise other forms of external funds. As to lending, size does not affect the banks' reaction to a monetary policy impulse. This can be explained by a closer customer relationship, which provides an incentive for small banks, which are more liquid on average, to smooth the effects of a tightening on credit supplied. Banks' liquidity is the most significant factor enabling them to attenuate the effect of a decrease in deposits on lending. JEL Classification: E44, E51, E52bank lending channel, monetary policy, transmission mechanisms

Are there asymmetries in the response of bank interest rates monetary shocks?

This paper examines the velocity and asymmetry in the response of bank interest rates to monetary policy shocks. Using an Asymmetric Vector Error Correction Model (AVECM), it analyses the pass-through of changes in the money market rates to retail bank interest rates in Italy in the period 1985-2002. The main results of the paper are: 1) the speed in adjustment of bank interest rates to monetary policy changes have significantly increased after the introduction of the 1993 Consolidated Law on Banking; 2) interest rate adjustment, in response to positive and negative shocks, are asymmetric in the short run, but not in the long run; 3) banks adjust their loan (deposit) rate at a faster rate during period of monetary tightening (easing); 4) this asymmetry has almost vanished since the nineties.monetary policy transmission, interest rates, asymmetries, liberalization

Bank Profitability and Taxation

This paper investigates how bank profitability is affected by the corporate income tax (CIT). For this purpose it uses aggregate data of the banking sector of the main industrialized countries, for the period 1980-2003. The main novelties with respect to the existing literature are two. First, it explicitly considers that the CIT is not specific to the banking sector so that changes in CIT rate can affect both banks and borrowing firms. With the help of a simple theoretical model we derive a set of predictions about the impact of the CIT on banks’ income statement. Second, we consider all main components of banks’ profit and loss accounts: net interest income, interest expenses, non-interest income, operating costs, and provisions. In this way, we are able to disentangle the extent to which a bank is able to shift its tax-burden forward to its lenders, depositors, and purchasers of fee-generating servicesTax-Shifting, Corporate Income Tax, Bank Profitability

Securitisation and the bank lending channel

The dramatic increase in securitisation activity has modified the functioning of credit markets by reducing the fundamental role of liquidity transformation performed by financial intermediaries. We claim that the changing role of banks from “originate and hold” to “originate, repackage and sell” has also modified banks’ abilities to grant credit and the effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary policy. Using a large sample of European banks, we find that the use of securitisation appears to shelter banks’ loan supply from the effects of monetary policy. Securitisation activity has also strengthened the capacity of banks to supply new loans but this capacity depends upon business cycle conditions as well as upon banks’ risk positions. In this respect the recent experience of the sub-prime mortgage loans crisis is very instructive.asset securitisation, bank lending channel, monetary policy

Regulation, formal and informal enforcement and the development of the household loan market. Lessons from Italy.

Regulation and contract enforcement may be important determinants of the development of the household loan market, as much as they are of the supply of corporate loans on which the literature has focused. This paper draws on the Italian experience to provide evidence that formal and informal institutions and banking regulation are crucial determinants of availability and cost of the household credit. Historically the Italian household credit market has been very small by international standards and its degree of development differs considerably across local markets. It has grown very fast over the last decade. This paper argues that the traditional small size reflects the joint operation of more limited legal and informal enforcement and tight financial regulation. Differences within Italy in the efficiency of the courts, in social trust and in exposure to regulation explain the geographical differences, while massive deregulation of market entry during the 1990s spurred supply and led to fast lending growth. This evidence, together with marked differences in the quality of legal enforcement, endowment of social capital and tightness of financial regulation across countries, implies that the forces found in Italy are likely to be a major explanation for the international differences in the size of the household loan market.consumer loans, financial liberalization, financial contracts enforcement