The Passive Journalist: How sources dominate the local news

This study explores which sources are “making” local news and whether these sources are simply indicating the type of news that appears, or are shaping newspaper coverage. It provides an empirical record of the extent to which sources are able to dominate news coverage from which future trends in local journalism can be measured. The type and number of sources used in 2979 sampled news stories in four West Yorkshire papers, representing the three main proprietors of local newspapers in the United Kingdom, were recorded for one month and revealed the relatively narrow range of routine sources; 76 per cent of articles cited only a single source. The analysis indicates that journalists are relying less on their readers for news, and that stories of little consequence are being elevated to significant positions, or are filling news pages at the expense of more important stories. Additionally, the reliance on a single source means that alternative views and perspectives relevant to the readership are being overlooked. Journalists are becoming more passive, mere processors of one-sided information or bland copy dictated by sources. These trends indicate poor journalistic standards and may be exacerbating declining local newspaper sales

Community Service: Editor pride and user preference on local newspaper websites

Armed with readily accessible online traffic logs that provide detailed information about the items users are selecting to view, editors are voicing concern about the potential effect on their own content decisions. Through a survey of local British newspaper editors, this article examines the overlap between user preferences, as suggested by assessments of website traffic, and content that editors identify as their best. Results are considered in the context of two related subsets of agenda-setting theory, as well as the sociological process of “making news.” The study finds overlap between broad categories of stories preferred by editors and users, but a considerable disconnect over the nature of the items within those categories

Going it alone? North Korea’s adaptability as a small power in a changing world

This article uses small states scholarship to map North Korea’s evolution from a post-colonial small state to a system-influencing state due to its nuclear weapons programme. The framework allows for contributions to: (1) The DPRK literature which in some parts has suggested the future collapse of the state, (2) The small states literature that suggests they can only survive if they integrate larger political and/or economic units, (3) The mainstream IR literature and its dominant realist streak that considers great powers and their will as the main drivers in contemporary world politics

Corporate Interests: How the News Media Portray the Economy

This study examines contradictory claims about the news media's coverage of the economy. After discussing various sociological perspectives on news media, I compare the objective performance of California's economy, as measured by statistical indicators, to accounts of the economy found in the state's largest newspaper—the Los Angeles Times. The data reveal that, despite growth patterns that overwhelmingly favored economic elites, the negative news about the economy disproportionately depicted events and problems affecting corporations and investors instead of the general workforce. When the Times did discuss problems affecting workers, the articles were relatively short, most often placed in the back sections of the newspaper, and rarely discussed policy alternatives to the status quo. Moreover, unlike the viewpoints of business leaders and government officials, the viewpoints of workers or their spokespersons were rarely used as sources of information. These findings provide qualified support for existing scholarship purporting that the news media, when reporting on the economy, privilege the interests of corporations and investors over the interests of the general workforce

The Singapore Summit and Northeast Asian Security

The Singapore summit meeting between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un committed the DPRK to complete denuclearization. In return, the United States pledged to satisfy key elements of the DPRK’s longstanding aim: an end to US enmity. Denuclearization is unlikely without political and economic normalization, a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War, regional security arrangements, and, ultimately, a US–DPRK alliance long sought by Pyongyang. If implemented, those actions could have profound consequences for the balance of power in Northeast Asia. Such a radical shift could raise concern in Japan, South Korea, China and Russia. To ease their concern, a multilateral solution might be preferable. A nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) could potentially serve as an alternative form of security partnership. A NWFZ could offer an effective substitute for outright alliance by providing the DPRK, once it is certified as nuclear weapons-free, with a guarantee that the United States will not make it the subject of nuclear threat or attack and will defend it against attacks by another nuclear weapons state or ally of such a state

The U.S. Election and Nuclear Order in the Post-Pandemic World

US power and prestige may have diminished in recent years, but the United States still plays a pivotal role in international institutions, alliances, and media, so who becomes president and which party controls Congress matter for the global nuclear order. Nuclear weapons are often considered the esoteric domain of experts. Yet three recent developments – the ban on above-ground nuclear tests, INF Treaty, and collapse of the Berlin Wall – would not have happened without mass protests. Popular preoccupation with COVID-19, economic distress, racial animus, and climate change makes mobilization of a mass anti-nuclear movement unlikely. The international milieu is thus critical for the nuclear future. President Trump’s reelection is likely to have a pernicious effect on that milieu, hindering international cooperation to limit nuclear weapons and accelerating a destabilizing qualitative arms race. Yet an intense crisis risking nuclear war is unlikely because he wants to avoid involvement in any wars, not start new ones. He will also try to sustain nuclear diplomacy with North Korea, though whether he would satisfy Pyongyang’s stiffer demands remains in doubt. His opponent, Joseph Biden, will face those same demands. Personnel is policy, and the Biden administration will likely be staffed with officials who served under President Obama. That means a return to shoring up alliances, international cooperation, and continuity with Obama’s nuclear policies. Whether or not he will curtail nuclear modernization, but he will try to restore the JCPOA, save New START, preserve the Open Skies accord, and seek technical talks with China

Paved With Good Intentions: Trumps Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea

The first-ever U.S.-DPRK summit meeting in Singapore yielded an agreement in principle that satisfied both sides' key demands, but the two overreached in Hanoi. Ever since then, North Korea has been demanding unilateral steps by the United States to demonstrate its commitment to end enmity before it will return to the negotiating table. After the failed summit, opponents of engagement in Pyongyang began pushing back against negotiations. Kim Jong Un responded with an April 12, 2019 policy speech to the Supreme People's Assembly imposing an end-of-the-year deadline for an offer he could accept and hinted he would end his self-imposed moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and the longer-range missiles to deliver them. Despite U.S. attempts to meet him part-way, he ramped up testing of other missiles and continued fissile material production. He also held relations with Seoul hostage to further advances in talks with Washington. Yet it seems unlikely he is giving up seeking the same goals sought by his grandfather and father to reconcile – end enmity - with Washington and Seoul in order to hedge against the rise of China. Unlike his forebears, he has willing partners in the U.S and South Korean presidents, but his increasing nuclear leverage may tempt him to overplay his hand in coercive diplomacy either by resuming tests to enhance that leverage or by asking for more than President Trump can give