153 research outputs found
Workshop Report:Building a Civil Society Coalition to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
BWC Confidence Building Measures:Preparing for a comprehensive review of the CBM mechanism at the Seventh BWC Review Conference
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Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the "myths"
Synthetic biology, a field that aims to "make biology easier to engineer," is routinely described as leading to an increase in the "dual-use" threat, i.e., the potential for the same scientific research to be "used" for peaceful purposes or "misused" for warfare or terrorism. Fears have been expressed that the "de-skilling" of biology, combined with online access to the genomic DNA sequences of pathogenic organisms and the reduction in price for DNA synthesis, will make biology increasingly accessible to people operating outside well-equipped professional research laboratories, including people with malevolent intentions. The emergence of do-it-yourself (DIY) biology communities and of the student iGEM competition has come to epitomize this supposed trend toward greater ease of access and the associated potential threat from rogue actors. In this article, we identify five "myths" that permeate discussions about synthetic biology and biosecurity, and argue that they embody misleading assumptions about both synthetic biology and bioterrorism. We demonstrate how these myths are challenged by more realistic understandings of the scientific research currently being conducted in both professional and DIY laboratories, and by an analysis of historical cases of bioterrorism. We show that the importance of tacit knowledge is commonly overlooked in the dominant narrative: the focus is on access to biological materials and digital information, rather than on human practices and institutional dimensions. As a result, public discourse on synthetic biology and biosecurity tends to portray speculative scenarios about the future as realities in the present or the near future, when this is not warranted. We suggest that these "myths" play an important role in defining synthetic biology as a "promissory" field of research and as an "emerging technology" in need of governance
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Negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge: The case of dual use and synthetic biology
Institutions need to ignore some knowledge in order to function. This is "uncomfortable knowledge" because it undermines the ability of those institutions to pursue their goals (Rayner, 2012). We identify three bodies of knowledge that are relevant to understandings of the dual use threat posed by synthetic biology but are excluded from related policy discussions. We demonstrate how these "unknown knowns" constitute uncomfortable knowledge because they disrupt the simplified worldview that underpins contemporary discourse on the potential misuse of synthetic biology by malign actors. We describe how these inconvenient truths have been systematically ignored and argue that this is because they are perceived as a threat by organisations involved in the promotion of synthetic biology as well as by those involved in managing biosecurity risks. This has led to a situation where concerns about the biosecurity threat posed by synthetic biology are not only exaggerated, but are, more importantly, misplaced. This, in turn, means that related policies are misdirected and unlikely to have much impact. We focus on the dynamics of discussions about synthetic biology and dual use to demonstrate how the same "knowns" that are denied or dismissed as "unknown knowns" in certain circumstances are sometimes mobilised as "known knowns" by the same category of actors in a different context, when this serves to sustain the goals of the individuals and institutions involved. Based on our own experience, we argue that negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge is a difficult, but necessary, component of meaningful transdisciplinary collaborations
Imagining Future Biothreats: The Role of Popular Culture
This chapter explores the role of futurist storytelling in relation to biological weapons. It first describes some of the barriers and difficulties inherent in making realistic assessments of the threat from future biological weapons, before narrowing its focus to an understudied but significant element of these assessments: imagination and popular culture. The chapter makes a theoretical case for why science fiction and anticipatory knowledge production are interlinked, arguing that culture co-constitutes political actors, problems, values, representations and threat assessments, and that culture should be recognized as a major and integral part of the transaction that engenders political behaviour. As such, the chapter uses pop culture as a ‘lens’ to provide insight into understanding how different groups ‘see’ biological weapons and how science fiction has a constitutive effect on biological threat assessments. The argument is illustrated with some of the most prominent examples from the bioweapons sci-fi genre. The chapter concludes with an outlook on key research questions for future work in this area
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