19 research outputs found
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A portable gamma-ray spectrometer using compressed xenon
An ionization chamber using compressed xenon has been designed and built for gamma-ray spectrometry. The device is based on signal measurement from a parallel plate detector, with the gas enclosure constructed specifically for packaging into a portable instrument; thus, appropriate engineering practices comprises two small containers that can be setup for operation in just a few minutes. Its sensitivity is 100 keV to over 1 MeV, with a resolution at 662 keV of 2.5% FWHM for uniform irradiation, and 2% FWHM for collimated irradiation, comparable to the best ever with compressed xenon. It also exhibits greater specificity that most scintillators, such as NaI. The device is insensitive to neutron damage and has a low power requirement
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A field-deployable gamma-ray spectrometer utilizing high pressure xenon
Most nuclear materials in the nuclear energy, safeguards, arms control, and nonproliferation regimes emit gamma rays with a unique signature. Currently, two categories of spectrometers are available to evaluate these materials: (1) Semiconductors, with excellent energy resolution, which operate at cryogenic temperatures. (2) Scintillation detectors, which function at ambient temperature, but with poor energy resolution. A detector which functions for extended periods in a range of environments, with an energy resolution superior to that of a scintillation spectrometer, would have evident utility. Recently, in the research community, such a device has evolved, an ionization chamber utilizing xenon gas at very high pressure (60 atm). Its energy resolution, typically, is 20 keV for the 661 keV gamma ray of {sup 137}Cs. With high xenon density and its high atomic number (Z=54), and superior energy resolution, its sensitivity is comparable to that of a scintillator
Complete remission in the nephrotic syndrome study network
Background and objectives This analysis from the Nephrotic Syndrome Study Network (NEPTUNE) assessed the phenotypic and pathology characteristics of proteinuric patients undergoing kidney biopsy and defined the frequency and factors associated with complete proteinuria remission (CRever). Design, setting, participants, & measurements We enrolled adults and children with proteinuria ≥0.5 g/d at the time of first clinically indicated renal biopsy at 21 sites in North America from April 2010 to June 2014 into a prospective cohort study. NEPTUNE central pathologists assigned participants to minimal-change disease (MCD), FSGS, membranous nephropathy, or other glomerulopathy cohorts. Outcome measures for this analysis were (1) CRever with urine protein-to-creatinine ratio (UPC)<0.3 g/g with preserved native kidney function and (2) ESRD. Continuous variables are reported as median and interquartile range (IQR; 25th, 75th percentile). Cox proportional hazards modeling was used to assess factors associated with CRever. Results We enrolled 441 patients: 116 (27%) had MCD, 142 (32%) had FSGS, 66 (15%) had membranous nephropathy, and 117 (27%) had other glomerulopathy. The baseline UPC was 4.1 g/g (IQR, 1.9, 7.7) and the eGFR was 81 ml/min per 1.73 m2 (IQR, 50, 105). Median duration of observation was 19 months (IQR, 11, 30). CRever occurred in 46% of patients, and 4.6% progressed to ESRD. Multivariate analysis demonstrated that higher prebiopsy proteinuria (hazard ratio, 0.3; 95% confidence interval, 0.2 to 0.5) and pathology diagnosis (FSGS versus MCD; hazard ratio, 0.2; 95% confidence interval, 0.1 to 0.5) were inversely associated with CRever. The effect of immunosuppressive therapy on remission varied by pathology diagnosis. Conclusions In NEPTUNE, the high frequency of other pathology in proteinuric patients affirms the value of the diagnostic kidney biopsy. Clinical factors, including level of proteinuria before biopsy, pathology diagnosis, and immunosuppression, are associated with complete remission
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Technology for managing risk during international inspections
Inspections under international agreements related to nonproliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons place sensitive commercial and national-defense information at risk. Facility operators can control risk to sensitive information by denying physical access to inspectors and providing alternative means of inspection. Similarly, exposure of inspectors and facility personnel to radiation or hazardous environments can be reduced, and damage to sensitive processing environments can be avoided if inspection objectives can be achieved without the need for direct physical access by inspectors. A system developed at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) enables inspectors to achieve inspection objectives in sensitive or hazardous areas by providing virtual presence at an inspection location in place of physical presence. The system has two parts, a mobile unit operated by facility personnel and a stationary base station operated by inspectors. The mobile and stationary units are connected by a fiber-optic communications link. The mobile unit is equipped with two video cameras, a global positioning system (GPS) with dead-reckoning capability, distance measuring equipment (DME), and a theodolite. Five unused channels of RS-232 are available to accommodate data transfer from and control of additional sensor modules. The base station is equipped with monitors for video signals and a notebook computer for analysis and display of sensor data. Inspectors can direct inspection activities through two-way voice communication with the operators of the mobile unit; the real-time response to interactions between inspectors and operators enhances the credibility of the inspection process. Applications involving international inspections for arms control and nonproliferation as well as other applications, such as As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and two-person-rule implementation, are discussed. Planned improvements and extensions of system capabilities are outlined
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Open Skies and monitoring a fissile materials cut-off treaty
The Treaty on Open Skies (Open Skies) is intended among other things to provide, in the words of its preamble, means ``to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements.`` Open Skies permits overflights of the territory of member states by aircraft equipped with an array of sensors of various types. Their types and capabilities are treaty-limited. To find useful application in monitoring a cut-off treaty Open Skies would need to be amended. The number of signatories would need to be expanded so as to provide greater geographical coverage, and restrictions on sensor-array capabilities would need to be relaxed. To facilitate the detection of impending violations of a cut-off convention by Open Skies overflights, the data base provided by parties to the former should include among other things an enumeration of existing and former fuel cycle and research facilities including those converted to other uses, their precise geographic location, and a site plan
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A NEW METHDOLOGY FOR DETERMINING FISSILE MASS IN INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTING ITEMS WITH THE USE OF GAMMA-RAY SPECTROMETRY.
In the safeguards, arms control, and nonproliferation regimes measurements are required which give the quantity of fissile material in an accounting item, e.g., a standard container of plutonium or uranium oxide. Because of the complexity of modeling the absorption of gamma rays in high-Z materials, gamma-ray spectrometry is not customarily used for this purpose. Gamma-ray measurements can be used to determine the fissile mass when two conditions are met: (1) The material is in a standard container, and (2) The material is finely divided, or a solid item with a reproducible shape. The methodology consists of: (A) Measurement of the emitted gamma rays, and (B) Measurement of the transmission through the item of the high-energy gamma rays of Co-60 and Th-228. We have demonstrated that items containing nuclear materials possess a characteristic ''fingerprint'' of gamma rays which depends not only on the nuclear properties, but also on the mass, density, shape, etc.. The material's spectrum confirms its integrity, homogeneity, and volume as well. While there is attenuation of radiation from the interior, the residual radiation confirms the homogeneity of the material throughout the volume. Transmission measurements, where the attenuation depends almost entirely on Compton scattering, determine the material mass. With well-characterized standards, this methodology can provide an accurate measure of the contained fissile material
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ON ATTRIBUTES AND TEMPLATES FOR IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ARMS CONTROL.
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A field-deployable gamma-ray spectrometer utilizing xenon at high pressure
Prototype gamma-ray spectrometers utilizing xenon gas at high pressure, suitable for applications in the nuclear safeguards, arms control, and nonproliferation communities, have been developed at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). These spectrometers function as ambient-temperature ionization chambers detecting gamma rays with good efficiency in the energy range 50 keV - 2 MeV, with an energy resolution intermediate between semiconductor (Ge) and scintillation (NaI) spectrometers. They are capable of prolonged, low-power operation without a requirement for cryogenic fluids or other cooling mechanisms, and with the addition of small quantities of {sup 3}He gas, can function simultaneously as efficient thermal neutron detectors
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Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies
The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification