The Compassionate Gift of Vice: Śāntideva on Gifts, Altruism, and Poverty

The Mahāyāna Buddhist thinker Śāntideva tells his audience to give out alcohol, weapons and sex for reasons of Buddhist compassion, though he repeatedly warns of the dangers of all these three. The article shows how Śāntideva resolves this issue: these gifts, and gifts in general, attract their recipients to the virtuous giver, in a way that helps the recipients to become more virtuous in the long run. As a consequence, Śāntideva does recommend the alleviation of poverty, but assigns it a much smaller significance than is usually supposed. His views run counter to many engaged Buddhist discussions of political action, and lend support to the “modernist” interpretation of engaged Buddhist practice

On the Capacity of the Noncausal Relay Channel

This paper studies the noncausal relay channel, also known as the relay channel with unlimited lookahead, introduced by El Gamal, Hassanpour, and Mammen. Unlike the standard relay channel model, where the relay encodes its signal based on the previous received output symbols, the relay in the noncausal relay channel encodes its signal as a function of the entire received sequence. In the existing coding schemes, the relay uses this noncausal information solely to recover the transmitted message and then cooperates with the sender to communicate this message to the receiver. However, it is shown in this paper that by applying the Gelfand--Pinsker coding scheme, the relay can take further advantage of the noncausally available information, which can achieve strictly higher rates than existing coding schemes. This paper also provides a new upper bound on the capacity of the noncausal relay that strictly improves upon the cutset bound. These new lower and upper bounds on the capacity coincide for the class of degraded noncausal relay channels and establish the capacity for this class.Comment: To appear in the IEEE Transactions on Information Theor

Universal Polarization

A method to polarize channels universally is introduced. The method is based on combining two distinct channels in each polarization step, as opposed to Arikan's original method of combining identical channels. This creates an equal number of only two types of channels, one of which becomes progressively better as the other becomes worse. The locations of the good polarized channels are independent of the underlying channel, guaranteeing universality. Polarizing the good channels further with Arikan's method results in universal polar codes of rate 1/2. The method is generalized to construct codes of arbitrary rates. It is also shown that the less noisy ordering of channels is preserved under polarization, and thus a good polar code for a given channel will perform well over a less noisy one.Comment: Submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Information Theor

Polar coding for interference networks

A polar coding scheme for interference networks is introduced. The scheme combines Arikan's monotone chain rules for multiple-access channels and a method by Hassani and Urbanke to 'align' two incompatible polarization processes. It achieves the Han--Kobayashi inner bound for two-user interference channels and generalizes to interference networks.Comment: Shorter version submitted to ISIT 201

Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India

The process of liberalisation of India's economy since 1991 has brought with it considerable development both of its financial markets and the legal institutions which support these. An influential body of recent economic work asserts that a country's 'legal origin'-as a civilian or common law jurisdiction-plays an important part in determining the development of its investor protection regulations, and consequently its financial development. An alternative theory claims that the determinants of investor protection are political, rather than legal. We use the case of India to test these theories. We find little support for the idea that India's legal heritage as a common law country has been influential in speeding the path of regulatory reforms and financial development. There is a complementarity between (i) India's relative success in services and software, (ii) the relative strength of its financial markets for outside equity, as opposed to outside debt, and (iii) the relative success of stock market regulation, as opposed to reforms of creditor rights. We conclude that political explanations have more traction in explaining the case of India than do theories based on 'legal origins'.India, Law and Finance, Investor Protection, Economic structure and financial structure