Leibniz on Intellectual Pleasure, Perception of Perfection, and Power

Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. Happiness is a cognitive process (akin to a mood), constituted fundamentally out of pleasure, which is grounded in increases in a substance’s power. A rational substance will sustain its happiness so long as it is more powerful than it is weak, and it is engaging in activities that increase its power

Relational interpretation of the wave function and a possible way around Bell's theorem

The famous ``spooky action at a distance'' in the EPR-szenario is shown to be a local interaction, once entanglement is interpreted as a kind of ``nearest neighbor'' relation among quantum systems. Furthermore, the wave function itself is interpreted as encoding the ``nearest neighbor'' relations between a quantum system and spatial points. This interpretation becomes natural, if we view space and distance in terms of relations among spatial points. Therefore, ``position'' becomes a purely relational concept. This relational picture leads to a new perspective onto the quantum mechanical formalism, where many of the ``weird'' aspects, like the particle-wave duality, the non-locality of entanglement, or the ``mystery'' of the double-slit experiment, disappear. Furthermore, this picture cirumvents the restrictions set by Bell's inequalities, i.e., a possible (realistic) hidden variable theory based on these concepts can be local and at the same time reproduce the results of quantum mechanics.Comment: Accepted for publication in "International Journal of Theoretical Physics

Total Degree Formula for the Generic Offset to a Parametric Surface

We provide a resultant-based formula for the total degree w.r.t. the spatial variables of the generic offset to a parametric surface. The parametrization of the surface is not assumed to be proper.Comment: Preprint of an article to be published at the International Journal of Algebra and Computation, World Scientific Publishing, DOI:10.1142/S021819671100680

Ten Misconceptions from the History of Analysis and Their Debunking

The widespread idea that infinitesimals were "eliminated" by the "great triumvirate" of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass is refuted by an uninterrupted chain of work on infinitesimal-enriched number systems. The elimination claim is an oversimplification created by triumvirate followers, who tend to view the history of analysis as a pre-ordained march toward the radiant future of Weierstrassian epsilontics. In the present text, we document distortions of the history of analysis stemming from the triumvirate ideology of ontological minimalism, which identified the continuum with a single number system. Such anachronistic distortions characterize the received interpretation of Stevin, Leibniz, d'Alembert, Cauchy, and others.Comment: 46 pages, 4 figures; Foundations of Science (2012). arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1108.2885 and arXiv:1110.545

The Self Model and the Conception of Biological Identity in Immunology

The self/non-self model, first proposed by F.M. Burnet, has dominated immunology for sixty years now. According to this model, any foreign element will trigger an immune reaction in an organism, whereas endogenous elements will not, in normal circumstances, induce an immune reaction. In this paper we show that the self/non-self model is no longer an appropriate explanation of experimental data in immunology, and that this inadequacy may be rooted in an excessively strong metaphysical conception of biological identity. We suggest that another hypothesis, one based on the notion of continuity, gives a better account of immune phenomena. Finally, we underscore the mapping between this metaphysical deflation from self to continuity in immunology and the philosophical debate between substantialism and empiricism about identity

"An infinitude of Possible Worlds": towards a research method for hypertext fiction

While the investigation of creative writing as a research method is gathering apace, little work has been done into the specific case of hypertext fiction (fiction written through a digital medium). This paper argues that, while there remain certain similarities between paper-based and digital texts, fundamental differences in design and construction remain. If hypertext fictions are to be successfully understood, then the role and purpose of the digital writer needs to be more fully analysed as part of the creative process. This paper argues that Possible Worlds Theory offers a way forward. With its focus on the ontological structures created by hypertext fiction, Possible World Theory actively embraces narrative indeterminacy and ontological changeability. In this sense the method provides a structured means by which the creative manipulation of the unique affordances of a digital medium by a writer can be theorised

A Reply to My Critics

In this paper, I respond to three commentators on my book Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel Kierkegaard. Anne Margaret Baxley focuses on my treatment of Kant, Dean Moyar on my treatment of Hegel, and William Bristow on my treatment of Kierkegaard. In this reply, I try to show how the critical points that they raise can be addresse

Getting nowhere fast: a teleological conception of socio-technical acceleration

It has been frequently recognized that the perceived acceleration of life that has been experienced from the Industrial Revolution onward is engendered, at least in part, by an understanding of speed as an end in itself. There is no equilibrium to be reached – no perfect speed – and as such, social processes are increasingly driven not by rational ends, but by an indeterminate demand for acceleration that both defines and restricts the decisional possibilities of actors. In Aristotelian terms, this is a final cause – i.e. a teleology – of speed: it is not a defined end-point, but rather, a purposive aim that predicates the emergence of possibilities. By tracing this notion of telos from its beginnings in ancient Greece, through the ur-empiricism of Francis Bacon, and then to our present epoch, this paper seeks to tentatively examine the way in which such a teleology can be theoretically divorced from the idea of historical progress, arguing that the former is premised upon an untenable ontological privileging of becoming