Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC-Telecommunications Access Pricing and Regulator Accountability through Administrative Law and Takings Jurisprudence

In this Article, Michael Legg examines the Supreme Court decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, and asserts that shortcomings associated with administrative law have led to an environment of unaccountability in the sphere of telecommunications regulations. Arguing that communications oversight has become exceedingly reliant upon regulatory expertise and that power over economic policy has been excessively ceded to the regulators, the Author concludes that Congress should become more involved in access pricing to prevent further undermining of the democratic governance in this important sector. Finally, Mr. Legg maintains that without further guidance with respect to the relationship between TELRIC and the Takings Clause, further ratesetting cases may become inevitable

Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC-Telecommunications Access Pricing and Regulator Accountability through Administrative Law and Takings Jurisprudence

In this Article, Michael Legg examines the Supreme Court decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, and asserts that shortcomings associated with administrative law have led to an environment of unaccountability in the sphere of telecommunications regulations. Arguing that communications oversight has become exceedingly reliant upon regulatory expertise and that power over economic policy has been excessively ceded to the regulators, the Author concludes that Congress should become more involved in access pricing to prevent further undermining of the democratic governance in this important sector. Finally, Mr. Legg maintains that without further guidance with respect to the relationship between TELRIC and the Takings Clause, further ratesetting cases may become inevitable