Exploring the relationship between anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind in brain and behaviour

The process of understanding the minds of other people, such as their emotions and intentions, is mimicked when individuals try to understand an artificial mind. The assumption is that anthropomorphism, attributing human-like characteristics to non-human agents and objects, is an analogue to theory-of-mind, the ability to infer mental states of other people. Here, we test to what extent these two constructs formally overlap. Specifically, using a multi-method approach, we test if and how anthropomorphism is related to theory-of-mind using brain (Experiment 1) and behavioural (Experiment 2) measures. In a first exploratory experiment, we examine the relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity within the theory-of-mind brain network (n = 108). Results from a Bayesian regression analysis showed no consistent relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity in regions of the theory-of-mind network. In a follow-up, pre-registered experiment, we explored the relationship between theory-of-mind and situational and dispositional anthropomorphism in more depth. Participants (n = 311) watched a short movie while simultaneously completing situational anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind ratings, as well as measures of dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory-of-mind. Only situational anthropomorphism predicted the ability to understand and predict the behaviour of the film's characters. No relationship between situational or dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory-of-mind was observed. Together, these results suggest that while the constructs of anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind might overlap in certain situations, they remain separate and possibly unrelated at the personality level. These findings point to a possible dissociation between brain and behavioural measures when considering the relationship between theory-of-mind and anthropomorphism

Teaching Turkish‐Dutch kindergartners Dutch vocabulary with a social robot:Does the robot's use of Turkish translations benefit children's Dutch vocabulary learning?

Providing first language (L1) translations in L2 vocabulary interventions may be beneficial for L2 vocabulary learning. However, in linguistically diverse L2 classrooms, teachers cannot provide L1 translations to all children. Social robots do offer such opportunities, as they can be programmed to speak any combination of languages. This study investigates whether providing L1 translations in a robot-assisted L2 vocabulary training facilitates children's learning. Participants were Turkish-Dutch kindergartners (n = 67) who were taught six Dutch (L2) words for which they knew the L1 (Turkish), but not the L2 Dutch form. Half of these words were taught by a Turkish-Dutch bilingual robot, alongside their Turkish translations; the other half by a monolingual Dutch robot. Children also completed Dutch and Turkish receptive vocabulary tests. Results of generalized linear regression models indicated better performance in the Dutch-only condition than in the Turkish-Dutch condition. Children with well-developed Turkish and Dutch vocabulary knowledge outperformed children with less well-developed vocabulary knowledge. The majority of children preferred working with the bilingual robot, but children's preference did not affect word learning. Thus, contrary to our prediction, we found no evidence for a facilitating effect of providing L1 translations through a robot on bilingual children's L2 word learning

Motivation through gamification: A Self-Determination Theory perspective for the design of an adaptive reward system

Research on the nature and origins of human motivation has addressed the role of rewards in learning and behaviour. Gamification finds its raison d'être in being able to leverage motivational theories, to foster motivation in users through the use of game elements. One of the main criticisms moved to the use of gamification for learning purposes is related to the one-size-fits-all approach that tends to characterize many gamified applications. In this paper we explore the possibilities that can arise from the convergence of Self-Determination Theory principles and machine learning, to improve the efficacy of gamification reward systems

Exploring the role of motor and non-motor predictive mechanisms in sensory attenuation: Perceptual and neurophysiological findings

Sounds that result from our own actions are perceptually and neurophysiologically attenuated compared to sounds with an external origin. This sensory attenuation phenomenon is commonly attributed to prediction processes implicated in motor control. However, accumulating evidence suggests that attenuation effects can also result from prediction processes beyond the motor domain. The aim of the present study was two-fold. First, we attempted to replicate the role of identity-specific motor predictions in sensory attenuation. Second, we set out to examine whether attenuation effects can be observed when tones cannot be predicted from preceding actions, but only from the non-motor cues accompanying them. Participants completed a two-alternative forced choice task on the loudness of tones whose pitch was congruent or incongruent with previously learned key-tone or cue-tone associations. No convincing evidence was observed for identity predictions on a perceptual level nor on a neurophysiological level. However, exploratory analyses revealed that attenuation was more pronounced for participants who first learned to rely on motor (instead of non-motor predictions). Together, these findings suggest that the role of motor identity predictions in sensory attenuation might have to be reconsidered

The Role of Intentional Strength in Shaping the Sense of Agency.

Awareness of action is a pervasive personal experience that is crucial in understanding self-generated and other-generated actions as well as their effects. A large body of research suggests that action awareness, as measured by the magnitude of temporal binding between an action and its effect in an operant action task (i.e., intentional binding), is rooted in the human capacity to experience self-agency and establish action intentions. Whereas previous research mainly addressed the role of intentionality itself in these socially well-shared experiences, in the present study we focused specifically on one important aspect of it: the quality or strength of action intentions. We expected and established that stronger intentions increase intentional binding. Specifically, the magnitude of the binding effect, as assessed by the Libet clock task in which two actions were followed by the same neutral tone, was elevated for the action that was enacted with stronger intentions. We briefly discuss the implications of the observed role of intentional strength in temporal binding between action and effect, for promoting a better understanding and examination of how the concept of intentionality is associated with action awareness in general, and the experience of being the agent of one’s own actions in particular

Moving Forward: On the Limits of Motor-Based Forward Models

The human ability to anticipate the consequences that result from action is an essential building block for cognitive, emotional, and social functioning. A dominant view is that this faculty is based on motor predictions, in which a forward model uses a copy of the motor command to predict imminent sensory action-consequences. Although this account was originally conceived to explain the processing of action-outcomes that are tightly coupled to bodily movements, it has been increasingly extrapolated to effects beyond the body. Here, we critically evaluate this generalization and argue that, although there is ample evidence for the role of predictions in the processing of environment-related action-outcomes, there is hitherto little reason to assume that these predictions result from motor-based forward models

Intentionality and temporal binding: Do causality beliefs increase the perceived temporal attraction between events?

Intentional motor actions and their effects are bound together in temporal perception, resulting in the so-called intentional binding effect. In the current study, we address an alternative explanatory mechanism for the emergence of temporal binding by excluding the role of motor action. Employing a sensory-based Libet clock paradigm, we examined temporal perception of two different auditory stimuli, and tested the influence of beliefs about the causal relationship between the two auditory stimuli, thus simulating a crucial feature of intentional action. In two experiments, we found a robust temporal repulsion effect, indicating that instead of being attracted to each other, the auditory stimuli were shifted away from each other in temporal perception. Interestingly, repulsion was attenuated by causal beliefs, but this effect was fragile. Furthermore, temporal repulsion was unaffected by the intensity of prior learning. Findings are discussed in the context of intentional action awareness research and multisensory integration

Intentional action and limitation of personal autonomy. Do restrictions of action selection decrease the sense of agency?

The experience of being an intentional agent is a key component of personal autonomy. Here, we tested how undermining intentional action affects the sense of agency as indexed by intentional binding. In three experiments using the Libet clock paradigm, participants judged the onset of their action (key presses) and resulting effect (auditory stimuli) under conditions of no, partial, or full autonomy over selecting and timing their actions. In all cases, we observed a moderate to strong intentional binding effect. However, we found no evidence for an influence of personal autonomy on intentional binding. These findings thus suggest that being unable to decide how and when to perform actions does not affect the perceived temporal binding between action and effect, a phenomenon suggested to be associated with the implicit sense of agency. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of research on personal autonomy and goal-directed behavior

Ideomotor Action: Evidence for Automaticity in Learning, but Not Execution

Human habits are widely assumed to result from stimulus-response (S-R) associations that are formed if one frequently and consistently does the same thing in the same situation. According to Ideomotor Theory, a distinct but similar process could lead to response-outcome (R-O) associations if responses frequently and consistently produce the same outcomes. This process is assumed to occur spontaneously, and because these associations can operate in a bidirectional manner, merely perceiving or thinking of an outcome should automatically activate the associated action. In the current paper we test this automaticity feature of ideomotor learning. In four experiments, participants completed the same learning phase in which they could acquire associations, and were either explicitly informed about the contingency between actions and outcomes, or not. Automatic action selection and initiation were investigated using a free-choice task in Experiment 1 and forced-choice tasks in Experiment 2, 3a, and 3b. An ideomotor effect was only obtained in the free-choice, but not convincingly in the forced-choice tasks. Together, this suggests that action-outcome relations can be learned spontaneously, but that there may be limits to the automaticity of the ideomotor effect

Studying the sense of agency in the absence of motor movement: an investigation into temporal binding of tactile sensations and auditory effects

People form coherent representations of goal-directed actions. Such agency experiences of intentional action are reflected by a shift in temporal perception: self-generated motor movements and subsequent sensory effects are perceived to occur closer together in time—a phenomenon termed intentional binding. Building on recent research suggesting that temporal binding occurs without intentionally performing actions, we further examined whether such perceptual compression occurs when motor action is fully absent. In three experiments, we used a novel sensory-based adaptation of the Libet clock paradigm to assess how a brief tactile sensation on the index finger and a resulting auditory stimulus perceptually bind together in time. Findings revealed robust temporal repulsion (instead of binding) between tactile sensation and auditory effect. Temporal repulsion was attenuated when participants could anticipate the identity and temporal onset (two crucial components of intentional action) of the tactile sensation. These findings are briefly discussed in the context of differences between intentional movement and anticipated bodily sensations in shaping action coherence and agentic experiences