Will the Kyoto Protocol affect growth in Russia?

In light of the recent argument that rapid economic growth in Russia over the next decade, might result in emissions higher than the Kyoto target, thereby putting much-needed growth at risk, the authors revisit the discussion on the costs and benefits of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia. They conclude that even under a very high economic growth assumption, and even under very conservative assumptions about the decoupling between carbon dioxide emissions, and economic growth, Russia still benefits from a net surplus of emissions allowances, and thus will not see its growth adversely affected by the Kyoto target. In addition, a review of the possible costs, and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol suggests that the potential sale of excess allowances, far outweighs the other costs.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Global Environment Facility,Climate Change,Montreal Protocol,Climate Change,Energy and Environment,Environmental Economics&Policies,Montreal Protocol,Carbon Policy and Trading

Climate change and the economics of targeted mitigation in sectors with long-lived capital stock

Mitigation investments in long-lived capital stock (LLKS) differ from other types of mitigation investments in that, once established, LLKS can lock-in a stream of emissions for extended periods of time. Moreover, historical examples from industrial countries suggest that investments in LLKS projects or networks tend to be lumpy, and tend to generate significant indirect and induced emissions besides direct emissions. Looking forward, urbanization and rapid economic growth suggest that similar decisions about LLKS are being or will soon be made in many developing countries. In their current form, carbon markets do not provide correct incentives for mitigation investments in LLKS because the constraint on carbon extends only to 2012, and does not extend to many developing countries. Targeted mitigation programs in regions and sectors in which LLKS is being built at rapid rate are thus necessary to avoid getting locked into highly carbon-intensive LLKS. Even if the carbon markets were extended (geographically, sectorally, and over time), public intervention would still be required, for three main reasons. First, to ensure that indirect and induced emissions associated with LLKS are taken into account in investor’s financial cost-benefit analysis. Second, to facilitate project or network financing to bridge the gap between carbon revenues that accrue over time as the project/network unfolds and the capital needed upfront to finance lumpy investments. Third, to internalize other non-carbon externalities (e.g., local pollution) and/or to lift barriers (e.g., lack of capacity to handle new technologies) that penalize the low-carbon alternatives relative to the high-carbon ones.Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Climate Change Economics,Energy Production and Transportation,Energy and Environment

Optimal use of carbon sequestration in a global climate change strategy : is there a wooden bridge to a clean energy future ?

s. Whether it should be part of a global climate mitigation strategy, however, remains controversial. One of the key issues is that, contrary to emission abatement, carbon sequestration might not be permanent. But some argue that even temporary sequestration is beneficial as it delays climate change impacts and"buys"time for technical change in the energy sector. To rigorously assess these arguments, the authors build an international optimization model in which both sequestration and abatement can be used to mitigate climate change. They confirm that permanent sequestration, if feasible, can be overall part of a climate mitigation strategy. When permanence can be guaranteed, sequestration is equivalent to fossil-fuel emissions abatement. The optimal use of temporary sequestration, on the other hand, depends mostly on marginal damages of climate change. Temporary sequestration projects starting now, in particular, are not attractive if marginal damages of climate change at current concentration levels are assumed to be low.Montreal Protocol,Environmental Economics&Policies,Climate Change,Economic Theory&Research,Global Environment Facility,Energy and Environment,Environmental Economics&Policies,Montreal Protocol,Carbon Policy and Trading,Climate Change

How might climate change affect economic growth in developing countries ? a review of the growth literature with a climate lens

This paper reviews the empirical and theoretical literature on economic growth to examine how the four components of the climate change bill, namely mitigation, proactive (ex ante) adaptation, reactive (ex post) adaptation, and ultimate damages of climate change affect growth, especially in developing countries. The authors consider successivelythe Cass-Koopmans growth model and three major strands of the subsequent literature on growth: with multiple sectors, with rigidities, and with increasing returns. The paper finds that although the growth literature rarely addresses climate change per se, some issues discussed in the growth literature are directly relevant for climate change analysis. Notably, destruction of production factors, or decrease in factor productivity may strongly affect long-run equilibrium growth even in one-sector neoclassical growth models; climatic shocks have had large impacts on growth in developing countries because of rigidities; and the introducing increasing returns has a major impact on growth dynamics, in particular through induced technical change, poverty traps, or lock-ins. Among the most important gaps identified in the literature are lack of understanding of the channels by which shocks affect economic growth, lack of understanding of lock-ins, heavy reliance of numerical models assessing climate policies on neoclassical-type growth frameworks, and frequent use of an inappropriate"without climate change"counterfactual.Economic Growth,Economic Theory&Research,Climate Change,Achieving Shared Growth,Population Policies

Balancing expenditures on mitigation of and adaptation to climate change : an exploration of Issues relevant to developing countries

Although climate policies have been so far mostly focused on mitigation, adaptation to climate change is a growing concern in developed and developing countries. This paper discusses how adaptation fits into the global climate strategy, at the global and national levels. To do so, a partial equilibrium optimization model of climate policies-which includes mitigation, proactive adaptation (ex ante), and reactive adaptation (ex post)-is solved without and with uncertainty. Mitigation, proactive adaptation, and reactive adaptation are found to be generally jointly determined. Uncertainty on the location of damages reduces the benefits of"targeted"proactive adaptation with regard to mitigation and reactive adaptation. However, no single country controls global mitigation policies, and budget constraints might make it difficult for developing countries to finance reactive adaptation, especially if climate shocks affect the fiscal base. Rainy-day funds are identified as a supplemental instrument that can alleviate future budget constraints while avoiding the risk of misallocating resources when the location of damages is uncertain.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Educational Sciences,Disability,Social Inclusion&Institutions

International climate regime beyond 2012 - are quota allocation rules robust to uncertainty?

Bringing the United States and major developing countries to control their greenhouse gas emissions will be the key challenge for the international climate regime beyond the Kyoto Protocol. But in the current quantity-based coordination, large uncertainties surrounding future emissions and future abatement opportunities make the costs of any commitment very difficult to assess ex ante, hence a strong risk that the negotiation will be stalled. The authors use a partial equilibrium model of the international allowance market to quantify the economic consequences of the main post-Kyoto quota allocation rules proposed in the literature and to assess how robust these consequences are to uncertainty on future population, economic, and emissions growth. They confirm that, regardless of the rule selected, the prices of allowances and the net costs of climate mitigation for all parties are very sensitive to uncertainty, and in some scenarios very large. This constitutes a strong barrier against adopting any of these schemes if no additional mechanism is introduced to limit the uncertainty on costs. On the other hand, parties'preferred (least-cost) rules are essentially robust to uncertainty. And although these preferences differ across countries, the authors'analysis suggest some bargaining is possible if developing countries make a commitment and join the allowance market earlier in exchange for tighter quotas in the North. This underscores the importance of the rules governing the entry of new parties into the coordination. But the magnitude of the win-win potential strongly depends on how different abatement costs are assumed to be between industrial and developing countries, and on how long that gap is assumed to persist.Montreal Protocol,Climate Change,Global Environment Facility,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Climate Change,Energy and Environment,Carbon Policy and Trading,Montreal Protocol

Do intensity targets control uncertainty better than quotas ? Conditions, calibrations, and caveats

Among policy instruments to control future greenhouse gas emissions, well-calibrated general intensity targets are known to lead to lower uncertainty on the amount of abatement than emissions quotas (Jotzo and Pezzey 2004). The authors test whether this result holds in a broader framework, and whether it applies to other policy-relevant variables as well. To do so, they provide a general representation of the uncertainty on future GDP, future business-as-usual emissions, and future abatement costs. The authors derive the variances of four variables, namely (effective) emissions, abatement effort, marginal abatement costs, and total abatement costs over GDP under a quota, a linear (LIT) and a general intensity target (GIT)-where the emissions ceiling is a power-law function of GDP. They confirm that GITs can yield a lower variance than a quota for marginal costs, but find that this is not true for total costs over GDP. Using economic and emissions scenarios and forecast errors of past projections, the authors estimate ranges of values for key parameters in their model. They find that quotas dominate LITs over most of this range, that calibrating GITs over this wide range is difficult, and that GITs would yield only modest reductions in uncertainty relative to quotas.Transport and Environment,Climate Change,Environment and Energy Efficiency,Economic Theory&Research,Energy and Environment

Equitable provision of long-term public goods: the role of negotiation mandates

In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties'willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures.Montreal Protocol,Economic Theory&Research,Information Technology,Environmental Economics&Policies,General Technology,Montreal Protocol,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Energy and Environment,Transport and Environment

Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public GoodsThe role of Negotiation Mandates

We examine the international distribution of expenditures for the provision ofa global, long-term and uncertain public goods from the point of view of abenevolent planner. Even assuming a "no-redistribution" constraint, first periodexpenditures are in general progressive with income, and independent both fromtotal level of action, and from future distribution of damages. However, instatus-quo mandates-where current negotiating powers shape both present andfuture allocation-future distributions of efforts are very unequal, andagreement, if any, is at high risk of instability. An adaptative mandate provesnecessary to provide an acceptable solution.Equitable Provision; Long-Term Public Goods; Negotiation Mandates

Designing climate change adaptation policies : an economic framework

Adaptation has long been neglected in the debate and policies surrounding climate change. However, increasing awareness of climate change has led many stakeholders to look for the best way to limit its consequences and has resulted in a large number of initiatives related to adaptation, particularly at the local level. This report proposes a general economic framework to help stakeholders in the public sector to develop effective adaptation strategies. To do so, it lays out the general issues involved in adaptation, including the role of uncertainty and inertia, and the need to consider structural changes in addition to marginal adjustments. Then, it identifies the reasons for legitimate public action in terms of adaptation, and four main domains of action: the production and dissemination of information on climate change and its impacts; the adaptation of standards, regulations and fiscal policies; the required changes in institutions; and direct adaptation actions of governments and local communities in terms of public infrastructure, public buildings and ecosystems. Finally, the report suggests a method to build public adaptation plans and to assess the desirability of possible policies.Climate Change Economics,Wetlands,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Adaptation to Climate Change,Science of Climate Change