Structural Injustice and the Place of Attachment

Reflection on the historical injustice suffered by many formerly colonized groups has left us with a peculiar account of their claims to material objects. One important upshot of that account, relevant to present day justice, is that many people seem to think that members of indigenous groups have special claims to the use of particular external objects by virtue of their attachment to them. In the first part of this paper I argue against that attachment-based claim. In the second part I suggest that, to provide a normatively defensible account of why sometimes agents who are attached to certain external objects might also have special claims over them, the most important consideration is whether the agents making such claims suffer from structural injustice in the present. In the third part I try to explain why structural injustice matters, in what way attachment-based claims relate to it and when they count

Revolutions between Kant and Hegel: comments on Hegel and world revolutions

This paper comments on Richard Bourke's Hegel and World Revolutions, focusing on its analysis of Hegel's relevance for debates on revolution, freedom, and the Enlightenment. While agreeing with Bourke's call for critically engaging with Hegel's ideas rather than dismissing them outright, the paper raises some questions concerning Bourke's reconstruction of Hegel's interpretation of Kant, his account of the French Revolution, and the impact of Hegel's work on contemporary debates

Europe's xhiro - the EU enlargement process

EU enlargement was one of the main topics on the agenda at the European Political Community summit in Granada on 5 October. Lea Ypi writes that much like an Albanian xhiro, Europe continues to go round in circles over the issue

Capitalism will not give us the will to fight capitalism - what we need is a new International

With the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer, and with socialist parties around Europe fighting only for national attention, is there hope for an international left? Lea Ypi writes that, more than ever, the world has to be made by those sceptical of capitalism. She makes the case for rebuilding international solidarity

Jeremy Corbyn’s rise shows the true value of political parties

The process that led to the election of Jeremy Corbyn was so important because it questioned the model of political parties as electoral machines. It showed that a party can be a living association, writes Lea Ypi

Borders of class: migration and citizenship in the capitalist state

In many recent debates on the political theory of immigration, conflicts between immigrants and citizens of host societies are explored along identity lines. In this paper, I defend the relevance of social class. I focus on two types of conflict—distributive and cultural—and show how class boundaries play a crucial role in each. In contrast to both defenders and critics of freedom of movement, I argue that borders have always been (and will continue to be) open for some and closed for others. The same applies to barriers on integration and civic participation. It is time to revive the connection between immigration and social class and to start carving political solutions that begin with the recognition of class injustice as a fundamental democratic concern

Facts, Principles and the Third Man

In the dialogue entitled “Parmenides” Plato introduces an objection to his own theory of ideas, one that he never managed to answer, dubbed by Aristotle as the “Third Man” argument. According to that objection, the theory of ideas is threatened with infinite regress when examining why a specific Platonic form (say, justice) is predicated of a particular set of facts. This article seeks to show how any defence of fact-insensitive principles like the one offered by G.A. Cohen in his recent book “Rescuing Justice and Equality” is vulnerable to a similar objection. Cohen wants to insist that, when showing why facts support principles, the process of reason-giving is finite and terminates in fact-independent comprehensive principles. But something like the Third Man argument undermines Cohen’s conclusion just as it does Plato’s. The search for ultimate fact-independent principles is indeed threatened by infinite regress. Dans le dialogue intitulé ‘Parmenides’ Platon introduit une objection à sa propre théorie des idées, à laquelle il n’a jamais réussi à répondre, appelée par Aristote l’argument du « troisième homme ». D’après cette objection, la théorie des idées est menacée par une régression à l’infini lorsque l’on examine comment une forme platonique spécifique (par exemple, la justice) s’établit à partir d’un ensemble particulier de faits. Cet article cherche à montrer que toute défense de principes insensibles aux faits, comme celle offerte par G.A. Cohen dans son livre récent, Rescuing Justice and Equality est vulnérable à une objection semblable. Cohen voudrait montrer que lorsque l’on montre pourquoi certains faits soutiennent des principes, le processus explicatif est fini et se termine dans des principes complets qui sont indépendants des faits. Mais, quelque chose de semblable à l’argument du troisième homme est susceptible de saper les conclusions de Cohen comme celles de Platon. La recherche pour des principes ultimes indépendants des faits est bien menacé par une régression à l’infini

On revolution in Kant and Marx

This essay compares the thoughts of Kant and Marx on revolution. It focuses in particular on two issues: the contribution of revolutionary enthusiasm to the cause of emancipatory political agents and its educative role in illustrating the possibility of progress for future generations. In both cases, it is argued, the defence of revolution is offered in the context of illustrating the possibility of moral progress for the species, even if not for individual human beings, and brings out the centrality of collective agency in moving toward universal moral goals. Discussing the implications of these points is of significant historical interest: it allows us to defend an interpretation of Kant’s political thought which is sensitive to the material conditions of historical development and to rescue Marx from an amoral reading of his philosophy of history. Reflecting on the role and preconditions of transformative collective agency is also of normative interest: it allows us to better evaluate the significance of political events that, firstly, re-shape the boundaries of political feasibility and, secondly, play a crucial educative role in motivating future progressive initiatives

Political commitment and the value of partisanship

This article defends the value of partisanship for political commitment. It clarifies what political commitment is, how it resembles and differs from other forms of commitment, and under what conditions it can prosper. It argues that political commitment is sustained and enhanced when agents devoted to particular political projects form a lasting associative relation that coordinates future action both on behalf of their future selves and of similarly committed others. Partisanship contributes to the feasibility of such projects, and helps strengthen them from a motivational and epistemic perspective. Although partisanship is also often criticized for sacrificing individuals’ independence of thought and action, if we value political commitment, this is a necessary trade-off