Too Risk Averse to Purchase Insurance? A Theoretical Glance at the Annuity Puzzle

This paper suggests a new explanation for the low level of annuitization, which is valid even if one assumes perfect markets. We show that, as soon there exists a positive bequest motive, sufficiently risk averse individuals should not purchase annuities. A model calibration accounting for temporal risk aversion generates a willingness-to-pay for annuities, which is significantly smaller than the one generated by a standard Yaari (1965) model. Moreover, the calibration predicts that riskless savings finances one third of consumption, in line with empirical findings.annuity puzzle, insurance demand, bequest, intergenerational transfers, temporal risk aversion, multiplicative preferences

Comparative Risk Aversion: A Formal Approach with Applications to Saving Behaviors

We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Selden [26], Epstein and Zin [9] and Quiggin [24] are well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. Moreover, opting for this model-free approach allows us to establish new general results on the impact of risk aversion on savings behaviors. In particular, we show that risk aversion enhances precautionary savings, clarifying the link that exists between the notions of prudence and risk aversion.Risk aversion, Savings behaviors, Precautionary savings

Household Finance and the Value of Life

We analyze life-cycle saving strategies with a recursive model that is designed to provide reasonable positive values for the value of a statistical life. With a positive value of life, risk aversion amplifies the impact of uncertain survival on the discount rate, and thus reduces savings. Our model also predicts that risk aversion lowers stock market participation and leads to choose more conservative portfolios

Comparative Risk Aversion: A Formal Approach with Applications to Saving Behaviors

We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Selden [26], Epstein and Zin [9] and Quiggin [24] are well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. Moreover, opting for this model-free approach allows us to establish new general results on the impact of risk aversion on savings behaviors. In particular, we show that risk aversion enhances precautionary savings, clarifying the link that exists between the notions of prudence and risk aversion

Comparative Risk Aversion: A Formal Approach with Applications to Savings Behaviors

We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Selden (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989) and Quiggin (1982) are well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. Moreover, opting for this model-free approach allows us to establish new general results on the impact of risk aversion on savings behaviors. In particular, we show that risk aversion enhances precautionary savings, clarifying the link that exists between the notions of prudence and risk aversion

Recursive Preferences, the Value of Life, and Household Finance

We analyze lifecycle saving strategies using a recursive utility model calibrated to match empirical estimates of the value of a statistical life. The novelty of our approach is that we require preferences to be monotone with respect to first order stochastic dominance. The framework we use can disentangle risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity and can feature a positive value of life without placing constraints on the value of the risk aversion parameter or the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We show that, with a positive value of life, risk aversion reduces savings, decreases stock market participation and decreases annuity purchase. Risk averse agents are willing to make an early death a not-so-adverse outcome by enjoying greater consumption when young and bequeathing wealth in case of death. The model can rationalize low annuity demand while also matching empirically documented levels of wealth and private investments in stocks

Recursive Preferences, the Value of Life, and Household Finance

We analyze lifecycle saving strategies using a recursive utility model calibrated to match empirical estimates for the value of a statistical life. We show that, with a positive value of life, risk aversion reduces savings and annuity purchase. Risk averse agents are willing to make an early death a not-so-adverse outcome by enjoying greater consumption when young and bequeathing wealth in case of death. We also find that greater risk aversion lowers stock market participation. We show that this model can rationalize low annuity demand while also matching empirically documented levels of wealth and private investments in stocks. Our findings stand in contrast to studies that implicitly assume a negative value of life

Louis de La Forge and the ‘Non-Transfer Argument’ for Occasionalism

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Psychology as a natural science in the eighteenth century

Psychology considered as a natural science began as Aristotelian "physics" or "natural philosophy" of the soul. C. Wolff placed psychology under metaphysics, coordinate with cosmology. Scottish thinkers placed it within moral philosophy, but distinguished its "physical" laws from properly moral laws (for guiding conduct). Several Germans sought to establish an autonomous empirical psychology as a branch of natural science. British and French visual theorists developed mathematically precise theories of size and distance perception; they created instruments to test these theories and to measure visual phenomena such as the duration of visual impressions. These investigators typically were dualists who included mental phenomena within nature