Incentive Contracts

Labor relations involve incentive problems. The market solves these problems by developing a variety of institutions. This paper describes and assesses the various forms of incentive contracts.

Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach

One problem with the theory of firm-specific human capital is that it is difficult to generate convincing examples of investment that could generate the sometimes observed large and continuing effects on earnings. Another approach, called the skill-weights' view, allows all skills to be general in that there are other firms that use each of the skills. But firms use them in different combinations and with different weights attached to them. The skill-weights view not only has aesthetic appeal, but is consistent with the frequently observed large tenure effects. All of the implications of the traditional view are produced by this approach, and there are a number of other implications that distinguish the new view from the traditional one. The empirical evidence already contains some support for the skill-weights view.

Incentives and Wage Rigidity

With the growth of the literature on incentive compensation has come the belief by some that incentive pay may be less rigid than pay that is not designed to effect incentives. Some have gone so far as to argue that this may explain differences in unemployment rates across countries. it is shown that there is no direct link between incentives and wage rigidity. Many compensation schemes that provide incentives have the reverse effect: That is, they tend to make wages more rigid than would be the case were incentives not an issue atall. This paper explores the relationship between wage rigidity and the provision of incentives in a variety of circumstances.

Age, Experience and Wage Growth

During the past decade, much has been said about the role that on-the-job training plays in augmenting one's stock of human capital. Up to this point, little has been done to distinguish the effect of on-the-job training from that of aging on the increase in human wealth. The reason rests primarily on the fact that it is difficult to observe or even define in some appropriate way the amount of on-the-job training that an individual possesses. In this paper, a method is developed by which one may compare the effects of work experience to those of aging per se. The difference is then attributed to on-the-job training.

Human Wealth and Human Capital

In this paper, a few theoretical issues will be raised regarding the relationship between the distribution of human capital and that of human wealth. Special attention will be paid to the empirical implications of the analysis.

Severance Pay, Pensions, and Efficient Mobility

This paper argues that pensions are used as severance pay devices in an efficient compensation scheme. The major points of the study are: (1) Severance pay, which takes the form of higher pension values for early retirement, is widespread. (2) A major reason for the existence of pensions is the desire to provide an incentive mechanism that can also function as an efficient severance pay device. It is incorrect to think of pensions merely as a tax-deferred savings account. (3) The wage rates that older workers receive exceed their marginal products. This is evidenced by the fact that employers are willing to buy them out with higher pensions if they retire early. These conclusions are based upon examination of a data set which was generated as part of this study. That data set contains detailed information on 244 of the largest pension plans in the country, covering about 8 million workers.

Wage Differentials Are Larger Than You Think

This paper will employ a method (devised in Lazear [1976] ) to estimate the unobserved component of wages. The size of this component will be calculated for non-whites and whites separately and then compared. Since, as it turns out, the component is larger for whites than non-whites, observed wage differentials understate true differentials. Furthermore, comparison of the period between1966-1969 with the 1972-1974 period reveals that this unobserved differential increased substantially over time. The results of this study suggest that although the pecuniary non-white -- white differential has narrowed substantially between 1966 and 1974 for young men, the on-the-job training differential has increased by almost the exact same amount. This implies that in real wealth terms there has not been any narrowing of the differential at all. This will become more apparent in later years as those non-whites who were hired into skilled jobs today fail to be promoted or obtain higher paying jobs elsewhere at the same rate as their white counterparts.

Incentive Effects of Pensions

Many different types of pension plans exist in American firms. The stipulations of plans vary dramatically, even among large firms, with respect to vesting, relationship of the pension to final salary, maximum and minimum years of service constraints, and maximum and minimum benefit levels. These provisions are examined to determine their effects on worker behavior.Specifically, the paper analyes which plans encourage or discourage appropriate worker responses in hours worked, turnover, human capital investment and effort. An attempt is made to explain the provisions in light of the findings.