Conclusion: Where next for non-market strategy?

As David Baron noted in his Foreword to this book, non-market strategies serve one or more of five purposes: rent seeking (e.g. the continuation of government subsidies); unlocking opportunities (such as pushing for industry deregulation); defense (against rivals, non-governmental organization (NGO) criticism, community activism, or government directives); attracting customers (those who place a premium on environmental protection, social justice, or the protection of rights); and strengthening reputation, building trust, and enhancing legitimacy

Conclusion: Where next for non-market strategy?

As David Baron noted in his Foreword to this book, non-market strategies serve one or more of five purposes: rent seeking (e.g. the continuation of government subsidies); unlocking opportunities (such as pushing for industry deregulation); defense (against rivals, non-governmental organization (NGO) criticism, community activism, or government directives); attracting customers (those who place a premium on environmental protection, social justice, or the protection of rights); and strengthening reputation, building trust, and enhancing legitimacy

Introduction: The evolution of non-market strategy in theory and practice

The late Kenneth Waltz, father of the neorealist approach to international relations, first suggested that a bipolar world is more stable,1 arguing that a world dominated by two great powers is less prone to large-scale conflict.2 The end of the Cold War heralded the dissolution of this system and the emergence of a unipolar world dominated by the United States. Susan Strange’s notion of structural power3 seemed to support this thesis, since, during the 1990s, the US had the authority to shape and determine the structure of the global political economy. This power manifests as the ability to control the four key pillars of the world economy: security, production, finance, and knowledge

Introduction: The evolution of non-market strategy in theory and practice

The late Kenneth Waltz, father of the neorealist approach to international relations, first suggested that a bipolar world is more stable,1 arguing that a world dominated by two great powers is less prone to large-scale conflict.2 The end of the Cold War heralded the dissolution of this system and the emergence of a unipolar world dominated by the United States. Susan Strange’s notion of structural power3 seemed to support this thesis, since, during the 1990s, the US had the authority to shape and determine the structure of the global political economy. This power manifests as the ability to control the four key pillars of the world economy: security, production, finance, and knowledge

Corporate political activity

The creation and preservation of competitive advantage remains the central concern of strategic managers (Lawton et al., 2013). Throughout this book, the contributors argue that in the modern world economy, the competitive advantage of a company is determined as much by its non-market strategy as it is by its market engagement. Following on Chapter 7’s discussion of corporate social responsibility (CSR), in this chapter we focus on the second pillar of non-market strategy, usually referred to in the literature as “corporate political activity” (CPA). This ranges from lobbying government through the use of political campaign contributions, to sharing information with political or regulatory actors, to attending political action committee meetings on policy formulation. Therefore, the key objectives of this chapter are to reflect on the various perspectives in the field, shed light on the dominant theoretical constructs in CPA, and set out a future research agenda. Our discussion underpins numerous subsequent chapters of this book