Testing the bottleneck account for post-error slowing beyond the post-error response

The bottleneck account for post-error slowing assumes that cognitive resources are depleted after errors and thus the processing of subsequent events is delayed. To test this, we used a novel speeded-choice task and recorded behavioral measures and ERP (event-related potential) components on five trials following either an erroneous or correct response. We found that participants were slower and less accurate immediately after making an error and that this reduction of performance decayed on the following trials. Moreover, post-correct versus post-error differences in both the visual N1 and the P3 component were found. However, the difference in the P3 component rapidly diminished over time, whereas the differences in the N1 component were still evident in the fourth trial following the erroneous response. The results lay further support to the bottleneck account for post-error slowing and show a combination of early attentional and higher-order processing changes that occur after erroneous responses

Response time distribution parameters show posterror behavioral adjustment in mental arithmetic

After making an error, we usually slow down before our next response. This phenomenon is known as the posterror slowing (PES) effect. It has been interpreted to be an indicator of posterror behavioral adjustments and, therefore, has been linked to cognitive control. However, contradictory findings regarding PES and posterror accuracy cast doubt on such a relation. To determine whether behavior is adjusted after making an error, we investigated other features of behavior, such as the distribution of response times (RT) in a mental arithmetic task. Participants performed an arithmetic task with (Experiments 1 and 2) and without (Experiment 1) an accuracy-tracking procedure. On both tasks, participants responded more slowly and less accurately after errors. However, the RT distribution was more symmetrical on posterror trials compared to postcorrect trials, suggesting that a change in processing mode occurred after making an error, thus linking cognitive control to error monitoring, even in cases when accuracy decreased after errors. These findings expand our understanding on how posterror behavior is adjusted in mental arithmetic, and we propose that the measures of the RT distribution can be further used in other domains of error-monitoring research