232 research outputs found
The Prohibition of the Proposed Springer-Prosiebensat.1-Merger: How Much Economics in German Merger Control?
We review the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office Germany) decision on the proposed merger between Springer and ProSiebenSat.1 from an economic point of view. In doing so, it is not our goal to analyse whether the controversial decision by the Bundeskar-tellamt has been correct or flawed from a legal point of view. Instead, we analyse whether the economic reasoning in the decision document reflects state-of-the-art economic theory on conglomerate mergers. Regarding such types of mergers, anticompetitive effects either do not occur regularly or are more often than not overcompensated by efficiency gains, so that a standard welfare perspective demands reluctance concerning antitrust interventions. This is particularly true if two-sided markets, like media markets, are involved. However, anticompe-titive conglomerate mergers are not impossible, in particular in neighbouring markets where there is some relationship between the products of the merging companies. In line with the more-economic approach in European merger control, a particular thorough line of argumen-tation, backed with particularly convincing economic evidence, is necessary to justify a pro-hibition of a conglomerate merger from an economic point of view. Against this background, we do not find the reasoning of the Bundeskartellamt entirely convincing and sufficiently strong to justify a prohibition of the proposed combination from an economic perspective. The reasons are that (i) the Bundeskartellamt fails to continuously consider consumer and customer welfare as the relevant standards, (ii) positive efficiency and welfare effects of cross-media strategies are neglected, (iii) in contrast, the competition agency sometimes ap-pears to view profitability of post-merger strategy options to be per se anticompetitive (effi-ciency offence), (iv) the incontestability of the relevant markets is not sufficiently substanti-ated, (v) inconsistencies occur regarding the symmetry of the TV advertising market duopoly versus the unique role of the BILD-Zeitung and (vi) the employment of modern economic instruments appears to be underdeveloped. Thus, we conclude that the Bundeskartellamt has not embraced the European more-economic approach in the analysed decision. However, one can discuss whether economic effects are overcompensated in this case by concerns about a reduction in diversity of opinion and threats to free speech. Similar to the Bundeskartellamt, we do not consider these concerns in our analysis
Chronique Droit européen de la concurrence : pratiques anticoncurrentielles - Actualité du droit des cartels
International audienc
Procédures quasi-répressives en droit de la concurrence
International audienc
Chronique Droit européen de la concurrence : pratiques anticoncurrentielles - Actualité du droit des cartels : les questions de preuve et de confidentialité dominent les débats
International audience(CJUE 12 janv. 2017, aff. C-411/15 P, Timab Industries ; CJUE 18 janv. 2017, aff. C-623/15 P, Toshiba ; CJUE 26 janv. 2017, aff. C-613/13 P, Commission c/ Keramag Keramische Werke ; CJUE, gr. ch., 14 mars 2017, aff. C-162/15 P, Evonik Degussa ; CJUE 27 avr. 2017, aff. C-469/15 P, FSL Holding ; CJUE 27 avr. 2017, aff. C-516/15 P, Akzo Nobel ; CJUE 15 sept. 2017, aff. jtes C-588/15 et C-612/15, LG Electronics, Koninklijke Philips Electronics ; Trib. UE 13 déc. 2016, aff. T-95/15, Printeos
Chronique Droit européen de la concurrence : pratiques anticoncurrentielles - Les GAFA en première ligne, prégnance des questions procédurales
International audienceRetour sur les derniers développements de la politique européenne de concurrenc
Chronique Droit européen de la concurrence - Article 101 TFUE et relations horizontales dans le secteur du gaz. Concurrence potentielle. Incidence de la libéralisation
International audienceTrib. UE 29 juin 2012, 2 arrêts, E.ON Ruhrgas e.a., T-360/09 et GDF Suez, T-370/09 (CCC 2012. comm. 235, G. Decocq ; Concurrences, 4/2012. 64, obs. M. D. ; Europe, 2012. comm. 332, L. Idot
Les procédures quasi répressives en droit communautaire
International audienc
La « matière civile et commerciale » à l'épreuve de l'intervention du Ministre de l'Économie en droit de la consommation
International audience(CJUE, 1re ch., 16 juill. 2020, aff. C-73/19, Movic, D. 2020. 1472 ; ibid. 1970, obs. L. d'Avout, S. Bollée et E. Farnoux ; RTD eur. 2020. 934, obs. M.-E. Ancel ; Europe, 2020. 322, obs. L. Idot
Chronique Droit européen de la concurrence : pratiques anticoncurrentielles - Application de l'article 101, § 1, du TFUE aux ententes verticales : le commerce en ligne sous les feux de l'actualité
International audience(Trib. UE 23 oct. 2017, aff. T-712/14, CEAHR, D. 2018. 865, obs. D. Ferrier ; CJUE 6 déc. 2017, aff. C-230/16, Coty Germany, D. 2018. 150, note C. Grimaldi ; ibid. 865, obs. D. Ferrier ; Dalloz IP/IT 2018. 317, obs. C. Maréchal ; AJ contrat 2018. 34, obs. F. Buy et J.-C. Roda
Chronique Droit européen de la concurrence : pratiques anticoncurrentielles - Actualité de l'article 102 TFUE : quelles leçons tirer de la période et surtout de l'arrêt Intel ?
International audience(CJUE, gr. ch., 6 sept. 2017, aff. C-413/14 P, Intel Corporation ; CJUE 14 sept. 2017, aff. C-177/16, Autortiesibu un komunicesanas konsultaciju agentura
- …