Where Is the Conflict between Internalism and Externalism? A Reply to Lohndal and Narita (2009)

Where Is the Conflict between Internalism and Externalism? A Reply to Lohndal and Narita (2009

Vagueness as probabilistic linguistic knowledge

Consideration of the metalinguistic effects of utterances involving vague terms has led Barker [1] to treat vagueness using a modified Stalnakerian model of assertion. I present a sorites-like puzzle for factual beliefs in the standard Stalnakerian model [28] and show that it can be resolved by enriching the model to make use of probabilistic belief spaces. An analogous problem arises for metalinguistic information in Barker's model, and I suggest that a similar enrichment is needed here as well. The result is a probabilistic theory of linguistic representation that retains a classical metalanguage but avoids the undesirable divorce between meaning and use inherent in the epistemic theory [34]. I also show that the probabilistic approach provides a plausible account of the sorites paradox and higher-order vagueness and that it fares well empirically and conceptually in comparison to leading competitors

Syntactic satiation is driven by speaker-specific adaptation

Listeners adapt to variability in language use by updating their expectations over variants, often in speaker-specific ways. We propose that adaptation of this sort contributes to satiation, the phenomenon whereby the acceptability of unacceptable sentences increases after repeated exposure. We provide support for an adaptation account of satiation by showing that the satiation of purportedly unacceptable island-violating constructions demonstrates speaker-specificity, a key property of adaptation

Quantificational and modal interveners in degree constructions

Heim (2001) points out that the relational semantics for degrees predicts ambiguities in sentences with comparatives and quantifiers such as _every girl_ that are not observed. She also notes that the same ambiguities do appear with strong modals such as _must_ and _have to_, but not with weaker modals such as _should_, _ought_, and _want_. The problem is to explain why these classes of expressions would behave differently, given that they are all standardly treated as universal quantifiers. I present several counter-examples to Heim's account of this data and then argue that the puzzle involving universal DPs is the same as the puzzle of weak islands in amount wh-expressions, and that it yields to the analysis of weak islands due to Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993), who argue that degree expressions are restricted in their interaction with the semantic operations meet. This accounts for universal DPs but leaves to be explained the possibility of modal intervention with strong modals. I argue that the split between universal DPs and strong modals supports recent work proposing that modals are not quantifiers over worlds but scalar expressions. An independently motivated scalar semantics for strong modals generates the ambiguity in a way that is compatible with Szabolcsi & Zwarts' theory, and that the predicted truth-conditions are correct for both readings with strong modals. The corresponding account of mid-strength modals explains their lack of ambiguity as merely apparent, due to the fact that the truth-conditions of the two readings are virtually indistinguishable, and neither embodies the missing reading that the quantificational theory leads us to look for. These results support both the scalar semantics for modality and Szabolcsi & Zwarts' semantic approach to intervention constraints

Probabilistic modeling of rational communication with conditionals

While a large body of work has scrutinized the meaning of conditional sentences, considerably less attention has been paid to formal models of their pragmatic use and interpretation. Here, we take a probabilistic approach to pragmatic reasoning about indicative conditionals which flexibly integrates gradient beliefs about richly structured world states. We model listeners' update of their prior beliefs about the causal structure of the world and the joint probabilities of the consequent and antecedent based on assumptions about the speaker's utterance production protocol. We show that, when supplied with natural contextual assumptions, our model uniformly explains a number of inferences attested in the literature, including epistemic inferences, conditional perfection and the dependency between antecedent and consequent of a conditional. We argue that this approach also helps explain three puzzles introduced by Douven (2012) about updating with conditionals: depending on the utterance context, the listener's belief in the antecedent may increase, decrease or remain unchanged

The weakness of must: In defense of a Mantra

Many semanticists have claimed that must's meaning is weaker than epistemic necessity, a claim that von Fintel & Gillies (2010) dub "The Mantr". Recently von Fintel & Gillies have argued in an influential paper that the Mantra is false, and that the intuitions that have driven it can be accounted for by appealing to evidential meaning. I show that von Fintel & Gillies do not provide a compelling argument against the Mantra, and that their theory of evidential meaning, while promising in certain respects, also has serious empirical and conceptual problems. In addition, a variety of corpus examples indicate that speakers who assert must p are not always maximally confident in the truth of p. As an alternative, I reimplement on Fintel & Gillies' theory of indirect evidentiality in a probabilistic, Mantra-compatible framework. Ultimately, both sides of the debate are partly right: must is weak in several respects, but it also encodes an indirect evidential meaning