Dirac Equations, Light Cone Supersymmetry, and Superconformal Algebras

After a brief historical survey that emphasizes the role of the algebra obeyed by the Dirac operator, we examine an algebraic Dirac operator associated with Lie algebras and Lie algebra cosets. For symmetric cosets, its ``massless'' solutions display non-relativistic supersymmetry, and can be identified with the massless degrees of freedom of some supersymmetric theories: N=1 supergravity in eleven dimensions (M-theory), type IIB string theory in ten and four dimensions, and in four dimensions, N=8 supergravity, N=4 super-Yang-Mills, and the N=1 Wess-Zumino multiplet. By generalizing this Dirac operator to the affine case, we generate superconformal algebras associated with cosets ${\bf g}/\bf h$, where $\bf h$ contains the {\it space} little group. Only for eleven dimensional supergravity is $\bf h$ simple. This suggests, albeit in a non-relativistic setting, that these may be the limit of theories with underlying two-dimensional superconformal structure.Comment: 19 pages, latex, [sprocl]. Contributed article to Golfand's Memorial Volume, M. Shifman ed., World Scientifi

The European Constitution Project from the Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives’ potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the European Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU level. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competencies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European federation should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.European Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights, Separation of Powers, Competitive Federalism, Referendums, European demos.

On Tax Competition: The (Un-)Expected Advantages of Decentralized Fiscal Autonomy

Tax competition is much discussed in the political arena these days. Although it is not a new phenomenon, the political pressure has increased to restrict tax competition by intensifying tax coordination and accomplishing tax harmonization. This particularly holds for the EU which has established a Code of Conduct for business taxation in 1997 and is about to establish a system of information exchange with respect to capital income taxation (allowing Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg a minimum source tax on capital income as an alternative). In 2001, the Commission has additionally released the so called ‚Ruding II‘-report in which a uniform corporate tax base with formulary apportionment is proposed for the EU. In addition, the OECD (1998) aims at stronger tax coordination among its members also favoring a system of information exchange. Such a system would necessarily involve the abolishment of (or the reduction of the strictness of) bank secrecy laws around the world (Feld 2002).

The structure of binary Lennard-Jones clusters: The effects of atomic size ratio

We introduce a global optimization approach for binary clusters that for a given cluster size is able to directly search for the structure and composition that has the greatest stability. We apply this approach to binary Lennard-Jones clusters, where the strength of the interactions between the two atom types is the same, but where the atoms have different sizes. We map out how the most stable structure depends on the cluster size and the atomic size ratio for clusters with up to 100 atoms and up to 30% difference in atom size. A substantial portion of this parameter space is occupied by structures that are polytetrahedral, both those that are polyicosahedral and those that involve disclination lines. Such structures involve substantial strains for one-component Lennard-Jones clusters, but can be stabilized by the different-sized atoms in the binary clusters. These structures often have a `core-shell' geometry, where the larger atoms are on the surface, and the smaller atoms are in the core.Comment: 13 pages, 9 figure

State and local taxation

State and local taxation comprises those taxes that are collected at the sub-federal government levels in order to finance state and local public services, assigning discretion in the determination of rates and bases of these taxes to sub-federal governments. Consider a nation with different layers of government that are only serving administrative purposes. Each government level only distributes the public services to and collects the taxes from that nation’s citizens upon which they agreed at the national level. In such a country, no state or local taxation is necessary since the level of public goods and services is uniformly decided upon for the whole country. This leaves citizens in some local jurisdictions, which prefer more public services than the national average, as much dissatisfied as citizens in local jurisdictions, which prefer less. It is possible to provide public services, the benefits of which are geographically limited and which are not national in scope, at different levels in different sub-federal jurisdictions. Enabling citizens to consume publicly provided goods and services at different levels according to their preferences makes everyone better off without making someone worse off. In order to let people, who want to consume more, pay a higher tax price for those state and local services, taxes must be differentiated accordingly between states and local jurisdictions. In such a world with a differentiated supply of publicly provided goods, each individual can reside in a jurisdiction where a certain level of public services is provided to adequate tax prices. The art of state and local taxation is the assignment of different kinds of taxes to government levels such that an invisible hand properly guides a nation in an ideal world to an optimal multi-unit fiscal system. This is not necessarily the case in the real world and some answers exist why fiscal systems are not optimal.

Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary

It is argued that an independent judiciary is a necessary condition for both individual liberty and economic prosperity. After having surveyed the literature dealing with how to arrange for an independent judiciary, the authors derive some additional policy implications by drawing on two indicators of judicial independence (JI) recently introduced by them. De facto JI has a robust and highly significant impact on economic growth. Individual components of both de jure and de facto JI on economic growth are estimated for their impact on economic growth. Additionally, the effects of other institutional arrangements such as presidential vs. parliamentary systems are inquired into.judicial independence, constitutional design, positive constitutional economics, economic growth

The Role of Direct Democracy in the European Union

In this paper, the introduction of direct-democratic decision-making in all EU decisions is considered when it is feasible without prohibitively increasing decision-making costs. We start with the contractarian argument that each constitution is a contract joining the citizens of a state and requires as such the explicit agreement of (a majority of) citizens. Thus, the future European Constitution as well as future changes of it should be decided by the European citizens. After a discussion of the pros and cons of direct democracy, the ability of direct democracy to help creating a European demos is discussed. Consequently, we propose a mandatory (required and binding) referendum on total and partial revisions of the European Constitution. In addition, we propose a constitutional initiative, a statutory and a general initiative as well as a fiscal referendum for financially important projects.democracy, referenda, initiatives

Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralisation: The Case of Russia

In a centralized federation, where tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal government, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection could be attractive for regional authorities because of a variety of reasons. These range from tax competition to principal-agent problems, state capture and benefits of fiscal equalisation. In this paper we discuss strategic tax auditing and collection from the perspective of fiscal federalism and test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federation. Russia’s regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspect of tax auditing manipulations in their favour. However, in the 2000s increasing bargaining power of the centre seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favour of the federation. We find partial evidence in favour of both of these hypotheses.fiscal federalism, tax arrears, transition economies

Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons

Tax competition is discussed as a source of inefficiency in international taxation and in fiscal federalism. Two preconditions for the existence of such effects of tax competition are that mobile factors locate or reside in jurisdictions with – ceteris paribus – lower tax rates and that taxes are actually set strategically in order to attract mobile production factors. It is well known from studies about Swiss cantonal and local income tax competition that Swiss taxpayers reside where income taxes are low. In this paper, empirical results on strategic tax setting by cantonal governments are presented for a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1984 to 1999. Completing the evidence on Swiss tax competition, the income tax rates in cantons are lower, the lower the tax rates of their neighbors.tax competition, strategic tax setting, personal income taxes