Assessing Empirical Research in Managerial Accounting: A Value-Based Management Perspective

This paper applies a value-based management framework to critically review empirical research in managerial accounting. This framework enables us to place the exceptionally diverse set of managerial accounting studies from the past several decades into an integrated structure. Our synthesis highlights the many consistent results in prior research, identifies remaining gaps and inconsistencies, discusses common methodological and econometric problems, and suggests fruitful avenues for future managerial accounting research

Determinants of Performance Measure Choices in Worker Incentive Plans

This study examines the determinants of performance measure choices in worker incentive plans. The results indicate that inform- ativeness issues such as those addressed in economic theories have a significant effect on measurement choices. However, other reasons for adopting the plans, such as upgrading the workforce and linking bonuses to the firm’s ability to pay, also influence measurement choices, as do union representation and management participation in plan design. Moreover, the factors influencing the use of specific measures vary, suggesting that the aggregate performance measure classifications commonly used in compensation research provide somewhat misleading inferences regarding performance measurement choices

Performance-Based Compensation in Member-Owned Firms: An Examination of Medical Group Practices

We examine the importance of agency considerations for the mix of salary and performance-based compensation in member-owned medical practices. Performance-based pay increases with the informativeness of clinical productivity measures, and declines with greater reimbursement from capitation contracts. Inexperienced physicians receive more compensation from salary, but compensation mix does not change as physicians near retirement. Larger practices and practices using outside management companies place more weight on performance-based compensation. However, when more physicians in the group practice the same specialty, less emphasis is placed on performance-based compensation. Finally, the presence of an executive partner has no influence on compensation mix

Performance Implications of Strategic Performance Measurement in Financial Services Firms

This study examines the relation between measurement system satisfaction, economic performance, and two general approaches to strategic performance measurement: greater measurement diversity and improved alignment with firm strategy and value drivers. We find consistent evidence that firms making more extensive use of a broad set of financial and (particularly) non-financial measures than firms with similar strategies or value drivers have higher measurement system satisfaction and stock market returns. However, we find little support for the alignment hypothesis that more or less extensive measurement than predicted by the firm\u27s strategy or value drivers adversely affect performance. Instead, our results indicate that greater measurement emphasis and diversity than predicted by our benchmark model is associated with higher satisfaction and stock market performance. Our results also suggest that greater measurement diversity relative to firms with similar value drivers has a stronger relationship with stock market performance than greater measurement on an absolute scale. Finally, the balanced scorecard process, economic value measurement, and causal business modeling are associated with higher measurement system satisfaction, but exhibit almost no association with economic performance

The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence From Equity Compensation Plans

This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent CEO compensation. Using cross-sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive compensation. We also find that, in cases where the equity compensation plan is rejected by shareholders, firms are more likely to propose, and shareholders are more likely to approve, a plan the following year. Our results suggest that shareholder votes for equity pay plans have little substantive impact on firms’ incentive compensation policies. Thus, recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening shareholder voting rights, particularly in the context of executive compensation, may have limited effect on firms’ compensation policies

Commentary—The Stock Market\u27s Pricing of Customer Satisfaction

A number of recent marketing studies examine the stock market\u27s response to the release of American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) scores. The broad purpose of these studies is to investigate the stock market\u27s valuation of customer satisfaction. However, a key focus is on whether customer satisfaction information predicts long-run returns. We provide evidence on the market\u27s pricing of ACSI information using a more comprehensive set of well-established tests from the accounting and finance literatures. We find that ACSI scores provide some incremental information on future operating income and that the market quickly responds to the release of information on large increases in satisfaction. However, we find no evidence that ACSI predicts long-run returns. These results suggest that customer satisfaction information is value relevant, but they are also consistent with Jacobson and Mizik\u27s conclusion [Jacobson, R., N. Mizik. 2009. The financial markets and customer satisfaction: Reexamining possible financial market mispricing of customer satisfaction. Marketing Sci. 28(5) 810–819] that mispricing of ACSI information, if present at all, is limited

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity-score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives

The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms

The paper examines the determinants and performance consequences of equity grants to senior-level executives, lower-level managers, and non-exempt employees of “new economy” firms. We find that the determinants of equity grants are significantly different in new versus old economy firms. We also find that employee retention objectives, which new economy firms rank as the most important goal of their equity grant programs, have a significant impact on new hire grants, but not subsequent grants. Our exploratory performance tests indicate that lower than expected grants and/or existing holdings of options are associated with poorer performance in subsequent years

Corporate Governance, Compensation Consultants, and CEO Pay Levels

This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and CEO pay levels and the extent to which the higher pay found in firms using compensation consultants is related to governance differences. Using proxy statement disclosures from 2,110 companies, we find that CEO pay is higher in firms with weaker governance and that firms with weaker governance are more likely to use compensation consultants. CEO pay remains higher in clients of consulting firms even after controlling for economic determinants of compensation. However, when consultant users and non-users are matched on both economic and governance characteristics, differences in pay levels are not statistically significant, indicating that governance differences explain much of the higher pay in clients of compensation consultants. We find no support for claims that CEO pay is higher in potentially “conflicted” consultants that also offer additional non-compensation-related services

Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance

We examine the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and corporate tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities that involve risky expected cash flows, unresolved agency problems may lead managers to engage in more or less corporate tax avoidance than shareholders would otherwise prefer. Consistent with the mixed results reported in prior studies, we find no relation between various corporate governance mechanisms and tax avoidance at the conditional mean and median of the tax avoidance distribution. However, using quantile regression, we find a positive relation between board independence and financial sophistication for low levels of tax avoidance, but a negative relation for high levels of tax avoidance. These results indicate that these governance attributes have a stronger relation with more extreme levels of tax avoidance, which are more likely to be symptomatic of over- and under-investment by managers