Competition for the International Pool of Talent: Education Policy and Student Mobility

This paper presents a model of two countries competing for a pool of students from the rest of the world (ROW). In equilibrium, one country offers high educational quality for high tuition fees, while the other country provides a low quality and charges low fees. The quality in the high quality country, the tuition fees, and the quality and tuition fee differential between the countries increase with the income prospects in ROW and the number of international students. Higher stay rates of foreign students lead to more ambiguous results. In particular, an increase in educational quality can be accompanied by a decline in tuition fees. Furthermore, international competition for students can give rise to a brain gain in ROW.Higher education; student mobility; vertical quality dierentiation; return migration; brain gain

Competition for the International Pool of Talents : Education Policy with Student Mobility

The paper presents a model of two countries competing for the international pool of talented students from the rest of the world. To relax tuition-fee competition, countries differentiate their education systems in equilibrium. While one country offers high education quality at high charges for students - the most talented ones study in this country - the other one provides lower quality and charges lower tuition fees. The regional quality-differentiation increases with the size of the international pool of talents, with the stay rate of foreign students in the host countries upon graduation and with the degree of development of the sending countries of foreign students. Compared to the welfare-maximizing education-policy, the decentralized solution is likely to imply an inefficient allocation of foreign students to the two host countries, as well as an inefficient quality differentiation.higher education, student mobility, vertical quality differentiation, return migration

A Note on Brain Gain and Brain Drain: Permanent Migration and Education Policy

In this note, we present a novel channel for a brain gain. Students from a developing country study in a developed host country. A higher permanent migration probability of these students appears to be a brain drain for the developing country in the first place. However, it induces the host country to improve its education quality, as a larger share of the generated benefits accrue in this host country. A higher education quality raises in turn the human capital of the returning students. As long as the permanent migration probability is not too large, this positive effect causes both aggregate and per-capita human capital to increase in the developing country. Thus, a brain gain occurs.brain gain, education policy, human capital, return migration

Form Factors from Light-Cone Sum Rules with B-Meson Distribution Amplitudes

New sum rules for $B\to \pi,K$ and $B\to \rho,K^*$ form factors are derived from the correlation functions expanded near the light-cone in terms of B-meson distribution amplitudes. The contributions of quark-antiquark and quark-antiquark-gluon components in the B meson are taken into account. Models for the B-meson three-particle distribution amplitudes are suggested, based on QCD sum rules in HQET. Employing the new light-cone sum rules we calculate the form factors at small momentum transfers, including $SU(3)_{fl}$ violation effects. The results agree with the predictions of the conventional light-cone sum rules.Comment: 32 pages, 7 figures, the discussion of numerical results extended, two references added, version to be published in Phys.Rev.