Monetary Policy and Regional Interest Rates in the United States, 1880-2002

The long running debate among economic historians over how long it took regional financial markets in the United States to become fully integrated should be of considerable interest to students of monetary unions. This paper reviews the debate, discusses the implications of various hypotheses for the optimality of the US monetary union, and presents some new findings on the origin and diffusion of monetary shocks. It appears that financial markets were integrated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the sense that monetary shocks were routinely transmitted from one part of the United States to another. In particular, shocks to interest rates in the eastern financial centers were routinely transmitted to the periphery. However, it also appears that during this period significant shocks to bank lending rates in the periphery often arose on the periphery itself. This suggests that a nineteenth century monetary authority that relied on operations confined to eastern financial centers would have had a difficult time managing the U.S. monetary union. After World War II the problem of eruptions on the periphery declined.

Can government policies increase national long-run growth rates?

We obtain time series estimates of the long run growth rates of 17 OECD countries, and test the hypothesis that these are the same across countries. We find that we cannot reject this hypothesis for the first and last three decades of the 20th century. We conclude that: (i) there are few, if any, feasible policies available that have a significant effect on long run growth rates, and; (ii) any policies that can raise national growth rates must be international in scope. The results therefore have bleak implications for the ability of countries to affect their long run growth rates.economic policy, technological change, convergence, economic growth

WWII and Long Run Convergence in the OECD

Existing evidence for unconditional convergence in the OECD is mixed, and depends largely on whether time series or cross sectional methods are used. In this paper we reconsider the evidence for unconditional convergence by dividing the long run data into several subperiods. We use a two stage approach in this work. We first model the growth rate of output directly and use this model to estimate the long-run growth rate for the countries in our sample. We then use the estimates of long-run growth in output to test for unconditional convergence and to test for equality of long-run growth across countries. GLS is used to explicitly take into account the sampling uncertainty inherent in our estimates of the long-run growth rate we found in the first stage of the process. The results show strong evidence for unconditional convergence in the post WWII period 1951-1974, but no evidence of convergence in the periods preceding or following this period. Moreover, it is di±cult to reject the hypothesis that most of the countries in our sample had the same growth rate outside of this period. Thus find little evidence to suggest that absolute convergence has been a continuous long run process, and some evidence for the view that national policies mainly affect income levels rather than growth rateGrowth, Convergence, Technological Change

Directional Mobility of Ratings

In this paper we describe a method to decompose a well-known measure of debt ratings mobility into it’s directional components. We show, using sovereign debt ratings as an example, that this directional decomposition allows us to better understand the underlying characteristics of debt ratings migration and, for the case of the data set used, that the standard Markov chain model is not homogeneous in either the time or cross-sectional dimensions. We find that the directional decomposition also allows us to sign the change in quality of debt over time and across sub-groups of the population.Ratings migration, Mobility, Sovereign debt

The Informal Sector During Crisis and Transition

employment, mobility, informal sector, transition, dual economy, Bulgaria

Revealed Informal Activity

What does it mean to be in the informal sector? Many characterizations have been used in the literature, for example, firms that are unregistered or employ a small workforce or firms/economic enterprises that do not have access to formal capital markets. But many people participate in both formal and informal activities, while classification of participation is often based on primary employment. This creates limitations to the analytical power of existing measures of informality. We develop a method for assigning households to the informal sector by inferring informal sector activity using income and expenditure surveys. We apply this method to the case of Bulgaria using LSMS income and expenditure surveys before and after a significant economic reform and compare it to those made using other indicators of informal sector activity. Our work shows that the informal sector acts as a buffer for households during periods of crisis when formal sector employment opportunities are limited. It shows the limitations of alternative stylized measures of informality in assessing the vulnerability of households involved in the informal sector, especially during periods of extreme economic hardship.informal labour markets, crisis, Bulgaria

Good versus Bad Deflation: Lessons from the Gold Standard Era

Deflation has had a bad rap, largely based on the experience of the 1930's when deflation was synonymous with depression. Recent experience with declining prices in Japan and China together with the concern over deflation in Europe and the United States has led to renewed attention to the topic of deflation. In this paper we focus our attention on the deflation experience of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in the late nineteenth century during a period characterized by low deflation, rapid productivity growth, positive output growth, and where many nations had a credible nominal anchor based on gold: circumstances which have resonance with the world of today. We identify aggregate supply, aggregate demand, and money supply shocks using a structural panel vector autoregression. We then use historical decompositions to investigate the impact that these structural shocks had on output and prices. Our findings are that the deflation of the late nineteenth century reflected both positive aggregate supply shocks and negative money supply shocks. However, the negative money supply shocks had little effect on output. This we posit is because the aggregate supply curve was very steep in the short run during this period. This contrasts greatly with the deflation experience during the Great Depression. Thus our empirical evidence suggests that deflation in the nineteenth century was primarily good.

Migration as a Substitute for Informal Activities: Evidence from Tajikistan

How is migration related to informal activities? They may be complementary since new migrants may have difficulty finding employment in formal work, so many of them end up informally employed. Alternatively, migration and informality may be substitutes since migrants' incomes in their new locations and income earned in the home informal economy (without migration) are an imperfect trade-off. Tajikistan possesses both a very large informal sector and extensive international emigration. Using the gap between household expenditure and income as an indicator of informal activity, we find negative significant correlations between informal activities and migration: the gap between expenditure and income falls in the presence of migration. Furthermore, Tajikistan's professional workers ability to engage in informal activities enables them to forgo migration, while low-skilled non-professionals without post-secondary education choose to migrate instead of working in the informal sector. Our empirical evidence suggests migration and informality substitute for one another.remittances, migration, informal, Tajikistan

Where to Work? Gender Differences in Labor Market Outcomes during Economic Crisis

In Central and Eastern European women started the process of transition from socialist to market economies with a status quo that differed markedly from women in both de-veloped western and traditional developing economies. They enjoyed an equal or higher level of education than men, virtually no unemployment, only temporary labor force departures, lavish maternity and child related benefits. Using panel data constructed from the 1995 and 1997 Bulgarian Integrated Household Surveys, our results reveal striking gender differences with respect to the reallocation of male and female employ-ees to and out of the public and private sectors.Employment, Mobility, Gender, Household

The Lessons from the Banking Panics in the United States in the 1930s for the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008

In this paper we revisit the debate over the role of the banking panics in 1930-33 in precipitating the Great Contraction. The issue hinges over whether the panics were illiquidity shocks and hence in support of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) greatly exacerbated the recession which had begun in 1929, or whether they largely reflected insolvency in response to the recession caused by other forces. Based on a VAR and new data on the sources of bank failures in the 1930s from Richardson (2007), we find that illiquidity shocks played a key role in explaining the bank failures during the Friedman and Schwartz banking panic windows. In the recent crisis the Federal Reserve learned the Friedman and Schwartz lesson from the banking panics of the 1930s of conducting expansionary open market policy to meet demands for liquidity. Unlike the 1930s the deepest problem of the recent crisis was not illiquidity but insolvency and especially the fear of insolvency of counterparties.