Introduction: Ideology, propaganda, and political discourse in the Xi Jinping era

The ideology, propaganda, and political discourse of the Communist Party of China (CPC) have continued to function as key elements of the political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Maoist period since 1978. In the first term of the Xi Jinping leadership (2012–2017), the CPC, for instance, elaborated on its guiding ideological concepts, devised inventive ideational framings of phenomena usually perceived as tangible (such as the BNew Normal^), engaged in complex intellectual debates on crucial topics (such as Beco-civilization^), intensified and diversified its argumentation patterns and discursive strategies, and consolidated ideational governance over some citizens’ individual values, beliefs, and loyalties. Furthermore, it is often no longer possible to differentiate between the CPC’s internal and external propaganda, as seemingly exclusively domestic ideational and discursive issues increasingly correlate with international phenomena. However, the trends in the Xi era do not present paradigmatic shifts, but rather an overall reassertion-cuminnovation of previous Maoist and post-Maoist uses of ideology, propaganda, and political discourse, primarily aiming at strengthening one-party rule

China’s Pledge to Civilise “All Under Heaven”

With China's global rise, both its state leadership and key academics have engaged in developing a civilisational discourse for the twenty-first century partly based on ancient cosmological concepts. This article explores the meanings of and intentions behind this discourse, including its promise of a Chinese-led world order, and discusses its intended audience and international appeal. In the backdrop of theoretical debates on empires and their missions, the article claims that without a corresponding cultural appeal, China's rising economic power and geostrategic clout are insufficient conditions to realise an empire in the classical sense. Growing inconsistencies mar the country's imperial ambitions, such as those between a global civilising outreach and a toughening domestic embrace. Instead, imperial rhetoric is cautiously integrated in the party-state's restoration of a Chinese "empire within," indicating self-centredness and a lurking re-traditionalising of Chinese state power

The Issue of Political Reform and the Evolution of the So-Called ‘Deng Xiaoping Model’ in Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping’s China

This chapter analyses the position of recent Chinese leaders on political reform: the similarities between Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao, and the different rhetoric and approach by Wen Jiabao. Moreover, it examines the concept of the so-called ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’ and the concept’s interpretation by Yu Keping, an innovative theorist of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The final part of the chapter deals with the special features of the model of reference pursued by Chinese leaders—the so-called ‘Deng Xiaoping Model’, which over the lastdecade underwent evolution and revision