OSHA Enforcement, Industrial Compliance and Workplace Injuries

This paper develops and tests a three-equation simultaneous model of OSHA enforcement behavior, industrial compliance and workplace injuries. The enforcement equation is based on the assumption that OSHA acts as a political institution that gains support through the transfer of wealth from firms to employees; the empirical results are largely consistent with this notion. Contrary to previous work, we find that OSHA enforcement efforts have, indeed, had a statistically significant impact on industrial compliance and, further, that this compliance has led to a statistically significant decrease in worker injuries. The point estimate of the elasticity of the lost workday rate with respect to the OSHA inspection rate is -.04.

Predation through Regulation: The Wage and Profit Impacts of OSHA and EPA

This paper documents the importance of studying the indirect effects of OSHA and EPA regulations -- the competitive advantages which arise from the asymmetrical distributions of regulatory impact among different types of firms. We argue that if the competitive advantage gained through indirect effects is sufficiently large, it can more than offset any direct costs producing a net benefit for the regulated firm and its workers. The indirect effects of OSHA and EPA regulations arise in two ways. The first source is compliance asymmetries, whereby one firm suffers a greater cost burden even when regulations are evenly enforced across firms. The second source is enforcement asymmetry, whereby regulations are more vigorously enforced against certain firms. Earlier research shows that these asymmetries do exist and are based on firm size, unionization, and regional location. In this paper we empirically document that the indirect effects produced by these asymmetries mitigate the direct costs of regulations for manyfirms. Large, unionized firms in the Frostbelt are clearly gaining wealth at the expense of small, nonunionized firms in the Sunbelt.

Review: Far-infrared instrumentation and technological development for the next decade

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported License.Far-infrared astronomy has advanced rapidly since its inception in the late 1950s, driven by a maturing technology base and an expanding community of researchers. This advancement has shown that observations at far-infrared wavelengths are important in nearly all areas of astrophysics, from the search for habitable planets and the origin of life to the earliest stages of galaxy assembly in the first few hundred million years of cosmic history. The combination of a still-developing portfolio of technologies, particularly in the field of detectors, and a widening ensemble of platforms within which these technologies can be deployed, means that far-infrared astronomy holds the potential for paradigm-shifting advances over the next decade. We examine the current and future far-infrared observing platforms, including ground-based, suborbital, and space-based facilities, and discuss the technology development pathways that will enable and enhance these platforms to best address the challenges facing far-infrared astronomy in the 21st century

Regulation and Firm Size: FDA Impacts on Innovation

This article estimates the highly differential impacts of FDA regulations on pharmaceutical firms of various sizes (where size is measured as scale of R&D expenditures). Estimation is performed using the method of maximum quasi-likelihoods, using productivity trends of the United Kingdom as a control to isolate FDA regulatory effects in the United States. It is shown that smaller U.S. pharmaceutical firms suffered devastating reductions in research productivity because of FDA regulations. In contrast, the largest U.S. pharmaceutical firms apparently benefited from regulation, as sales gains due to reduced competition more than offset their quite moderate declines in research productivity.

Revealed Bureaucratic Preference: Priorities of the Consumer Product Safety Commission

In June 1977, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission announced priorities for those projects to be executed during subsequent fiscal years. I use conditional logit techniques to analyze random orderings to estimate the Commission's preference functions among projects. I show that the Commission overselects both projects with large safety benefits but even larger consumer costs and projects that require mandatory standards.