Do R&D Subsidies Stimulate or Displace Private R&D? Evidence from Israel

In evaluating the effect of an R&D subsidy we need to know what the subsidized firm would have spent on R&D had it not received the subsidy. Using data on Israeli manufacturing firms in the 1990s we find evidence suggesting that the R&D subsidies granted by the Ministry of Industry and Trade stimulated long-run company-financed R&D expenditures: their long-run elasticity with respect to R&D subsidies is 0.22. At the means of the data, an extra dollar of R&D subsidies increases long-run company-financed R&D expenditures by 41 cents (total R&D expenditures increase by 1.41 dollars). Although the magnitude of this effect is large enough to justify the existence of the subsidy program, it is lower than expected given the dollar-by-dollar matching upon which most subsidized projects are based. This less than full' effect reflects two forces: first, subsidies are sometimes granted to projects that would have been undertaken even in the absence of the subsidy and, second, firms adjust their portfolio of R&D projects-closing or slowing down non-subsidized projects-after the subsidy is received.

Existence and Persistence of Price Dispersion: an Empirical Analysis

Using a unique data set on store-level monthly prices of four homogenous products sold in Israel, I study the existence and characteristics of the dispersion of prices across stores, as well as its persistence over time. I find that price dispersion prevails even after controlling for observed and unobserved product heterogeneity. Moreover, intra-distribution mobility is significant: stores move up and down the cross-sectional price distribution. Thus, consumers cannot learn about stores that consistently post low prices. As a consequence, price dispersion does not disappear and persists over time as predicted by Varian's (1980) model of sales.

Staggering and Synchronization in Price-Setting: Evidence from Multipro-duct Firms

Most of the theoretical literature on price-setting behavior deals with the special case in which only a single price is changed. At the retail-store level, at least, where dozens of products are sold by a single price-setter, price-setting policies are not formulated for individual products. This feature of economic behavior raises a host of questions whose answers carry interesting implications. Are price setters staggered in the timing of price changes? Are price changes of different products synchronized within the store? If so, is this a result of aggregate shocks or of the presence of a store- specific component in the cost of adjusting prices? Can observed small changes in prices be rationalized by a menu cost model? We exploit the multiproduct dimension of the dataset on prices used in Lach and Tsiddon (1992a) to explore several of these and other issues. To the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical work on this subject.

Incentives and Invention in Universities

Using data on U.S. universities, we show that universities that give higher royalty shares to faculty scientists generate greater license income, controlling for university size, academic quality, research funding and other factors. We use pre-sample data on university patenting to control for the potential endogeneity of royalty shares. We find that scientists respond both to cash royalties and to royalties used to support their research labs, suggesting both pecuniary and intrinsic (research) motivations. The incentive effects appear to be larger in private universities than in public ones, and we provide survey evidence indicating this may be related to differences in the use of performance pay, government constraints, and local development objectives of technology license offices. Royalty incentives work both by raising faculty effort and sorting scientists across universities. The effect of incentives works primarily by increasing the quality (value) rather than the quantity of inventions.royalty incentives, invention, technology licensing

The Interaction Between Capital Investment and R&D in Science-Based Firms

This paper analyzes the interaction among R&D, capital investment , and the stock market rate of return for 191 firms in science-based industries for the period 1973-1981. Using a framework based on dynamic factor analysis, we show how several prominent hypotheses about the determination of R&D and investment generate testable parameter restrictions. The data indicate that R&D Granger-causes investment, but that investment does not Granger-cause R&D. We use this finding to examine the validity of those hypotheses, to characterize the movements over time of R&D and investment, and to measure the stock market valuation of these movements.

Incentives and Invention in Universities

We show that economic incentives affect the commercial value of inventions generated in universities. Using data for 102 U.S. universities during the period 1991-1999, we find that universities which give higher royalty shares to academic scientists generate higher license income, controlling for other factors including university size, quality, research funding and technology licensing inputs. We provide evidence that this is due to the fact that public universities are less effective at commercialising inventions, which weakens the incentive effect of higher royalty shares. Other findings include: 1) there is a Laffer effect in private universities: raising the inventor's royalty share increases the license income retained by the university; 2) the incentive effect works primarily by increasing the quality of inventions, and 3) the incentive effect appears to operate both by raising faculty effort and by sorting academic scientists across universities.Academic research, incentives, licensing, royalties, technology transfer, intellectual property.

Incentives and Invention in Universities

We show that economic incentives affect the number and commercial value of inventions generated in universities. Using panel data for 102 U.S. universities during the period 1991-1999, we find that universities which give higher royalty shares to academic scientists generate more inventions and higher license income, controlling for other factors including university size, quality, research funding and technology licensing inputs. The incentive effects are much larger in private universities than in public ones. For private institutions there is a Laffer curve effect: raising the inventor's royalty share increases the license income retained by the university. The incentive effect appears to work both through the level of effort and sorting of academic scientists.

Measuring Temporary Labor Outsourcing in U.S. Manufacturing

Several analysts claim that firms have been using more flexible work arrangements in order to contain the costly adjustment of labor to changes in economic conditions. In particular, temporary help supply (THS) employment has increased dramatically in the last ten years. However, there is only scant evidence on the industries that are hiring this type of worker. In particular, some anecdotal evidence points to the fact that manufacturing industries have substantially stepped up their demand for THS workers since the mid-1980s. If this is true, not accounting for this flow of workers from the service sector to manufacturing may lead to misleading conclusions about the cyclical and long-term path of manufacturing employment and hours of work. We close this gap by providing several estimates of the number of individuals employed by temporary help supply (THS) firms who worked in the manufacturing sector from 1972 to 1997. One estimate, in particular, is based on a new methodology that uses minimal assumptions to put bounds on the probability that a manufacturing worker is employed by a THS firm. The bounds rely on readily available data on workers' individual characteristics observable in the CPS. We show that manufacturers have been using THS workers more intensively in the 1990s. In addition, the apparent flatness of manufacturing employment in the 1990s can be explained in part by this type of outsourcing from the service sector. Finally, not accounting for THS hours overstated the increase in average annual manufacturing labor productivity by « percentage point during the 1991-1997 period.

R&D, Investment and Industry Dynamics

We present a model of industry evolution where the dynamics are driven by a process of endogenous innovations, followed by subsequent embodiments in physical capital. Traditionally, the only distinction between R&D and physical investment was one of labeling: the first process accumulates an intangible stock (knowledge) while the second accumulates physical capital; both stocks affect output in a symmetric fashion. We argue that the story is not that simple, and there is more to it than differences in the object of accumulation. Our model stresses the causal relationship between past R&D expenditures and current investments in machinery and equipment. This causality pattern, which is supported by the data, also explains the observed higher volatility of physical investment (relative to R&D expenditures).

Asymmetric price effects of competition

This paper examines how the distribution of prices changes with the number of competitors in the market. Using gasoline price data from the Netherlands we find that as competition increases, the distribution of prices spreads out: the low prices go down while the high prices go up, on average. As a result, competition has an asymmetric effect on prices. These findings, which are consistent with a theoretical model where consumers differ in the information they have about prices, imply that consumers' gains from competition depend on their shopping behavior. In our data, all consumers, irrespective of the number of prices they observe, benefit from an increase in the number of gas stations. The magnitude of the welfare gain, however, is greater for those consumers that are aware of more prices. We conclude that an increase in the number of gas stations has a positive but unequal effect on the welfare of consumers in the Netherlands.Asymmetric; Price; Effects; Competition;