29 research outputs found
Revisiting and expanding the meta-analysis of variation:The log coefficient of variation ratio
Revisiting and expanding the metaâanalysis of variation: The log coefficient of variation ratio
The Impact of Inflow Angle on Aneurysm Hemodynamics: A Simulation Study Based on Patient-Specific Intracranial Aneurysm Models
Subsets of NLR genes show differential signatures of adaptation during colonization of new habitats
Genetic species identification of ecologically important planthoppers (Prokelisia spp.) of coastal Spartina saltmarshes using High Resolution Melting Analysis (HRMA)
Candesartan ameliorates acute myocardial infarction in rats through inducible nitric oxide synthase, nuclear factor-ÎșB, monocyte chemoattractant protein-1, activator protein-1 and restoration of heat shock protein 72
How to Compare Homology Concepts: Class Reasoning About Evolution and Morphology in Phylogenetics and Developmental Biology
Artificial consciousness: from impossibility to multiplicity
How has multiplicity superseded impossibility in philosophical challenges to artificial consciousness? I assess a trajectory in recent debates on artificial consciousness, in which metaphysical and explanatory challenges to the possibility of building conscious machines lead to epistemological concerns about the multiplicity underlying âwhat it is likeâ to be a conscious creature or be in a conscious state. First, I analyse earlier challenges which claim that phenomenal consciousness cannot arise, or cannot be built, in machines. These are based on Blockâs Chinese Nation and Chalmersâ Hard Problem. To defuse such challenges, theorists of artificial consciousness can appeal to empirical methods and models of explanation. Second, I explain why this naturalistic approach produces an epistemological puzzle on the role of biological properties in phenomenal consciousness. Neither behavioural tests nor theoretical inferences seem to settle whether our machines are conscious. Third, I evaluate whether the new challenge can be managed through a more fine-grained taxonomy of conscious states. This strategy is supported by the development of similar taxonomies for biological species and animal consciousness. Although it makes sense of some current models of artificial consciousness, it raises questions about their subjective and moral significance