793 research outputs found
Information, fairness, and efficiency in bargaining
Economic theory assumes people strive for efficient agreements that benefit
all consenting parties. The frequency of mutually destructive conflicts
such as strikes, litigation, and military conflict, therefore, poses an important
challenge to the field
Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future
Behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of economics by providing it with
more realistic psychological foundations. This book consists of representative recent articles in
behavioral economics. This chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the approach and
methods of behavioral economics, and to some of its major findings, applications, and promising
new directions. It also seeks to fill some unavoidable gaps in the chapters’ coverage of topics
Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior
The economic conception of human behavior assumes that a person has a single set of well-defined goals, and that the person's behavior is chosen to best achieve those goals. We develop a model in which a person's behavior is the outcome of an interaction between two systems: a deliberative system that assesses options with a broad, goal-based perspective, and an affective system that encompasses emotions and motivational drives. Our model provides a framework for understanding many departures from full rationality discussed in the behavioral-economics literature, and captures the familiar feeling of being "of two minds." And by focusing on factors that moderate the relative influence of the two systems, our model also generates a variety of novel testable predictions.
The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis
In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed agents are assumed capable of reproducing the judgments of less-informed agents. We discuss a systematic violation of this assumption that we call the "curse of knowledge." Better-informed agents are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their interest to do so; more information is not always better. Comparing judgments made in individual-level and market experiments, we find that market forces reduce the curse by approximately 50 percent but do not eliminate it. Implications for bargaining, strategic behavior by firms, principal-agent problems, and choice under un-certainty are discussed
Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics
Neuroeconomics uses knowledge about brain mechanisms to inform economic analysis, and roots economics in biology. It opens up the "black box" of the brain, much as organizational economics adds detail to the theory of the firm. Neuroscientists use many tools— including brain imaging, behavior of patients with localized brain lesions, animal behavior, and recording single neuron activity. The key insight for economics is that the brain is composed of multiple systems which interact. Controlled systems ("executive function") interrupt automatic ones. Emotions and cognition both guide decisions. Just as prices and allocations emerge from the interaction of two processes—supply and demand— individual decisions can be modeled as the result of two (or more) processes interacting. Indeed, "dual-process" models of this sort are better rooted in neuroscientific fact, and more empirically accurate, than single-process models (such as utility-maximization). We discuss how brain evidence complicates standard assumptions about basic preference, to include homeostasis and other kinds of state-dependence. We also discuss applications to intertemporal choice, risk and decision making, and game theory. Intertemporal choice appears to be domain-specific and heavily influenced by emotion. The simplified ß-d of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is supported by activation in distinct regions of limbic and cortical systems. In risky decision, imaging data tentatively support the idea that gains and losses are coded separately, and that ambiguity is distinct from risk, because it activates fear and discomfort regions. (Ironically, lesion patients who do not receive fear signals in prefrontal cortex are "rationally" neutral toward ambiguity.) Game theory studies show the effect of brain regions implicated in "theory of mind", correlates of strategic skill, and effects of hormones and other biological variables. Finally, economics can contribute to neuroscience because simple rational-choice models are useful for understanding highly-evolved behavior like motor actions that earn rewards, and Bayesian integration of sensorimotor information
Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist
In The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, Adam Smith famously argued that
economic behavior was motivated by self-interest. But 17 years earlier in 1759,
Smith had proposed a theory of human behavior that looks anything but self-interested.
In his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argued that behavior
was determined by the struggle between what Smith termed the “passions” and the
“impartial spectator.” The passions included drives such as hunger and sex, emotions
such as fear and anger, and motivational feeling states such as pain. Smith viewed
behavior as under the direct control of the passions, but believed that people could
override passion-driven behavior by viewing their own behavior from the perspective of
an outsider—the impartial spectator—a “moral hector who, looking over the shoulder
of the economic man, scrutinizes every move he makes” (Grampp, 1948, p. 317)
Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility
People underappreciate how their own behavior and exogenous factors affect their future utility, and thus exaggerate the degree to which their future preferences resemble their current preferences. We present evidence which demonstrates the prevalence of such projection bias, and develop a formal model that draws out both descriptive and welfare implications of the bias. The model helps interpret established behavioral anomalies such as the endowment effect, and helps to explain commonly observed suboptimal patterns of behavior such as addiction and excessive pursuit of a high material standard of living. The model also suggests potentially welfare-improving policies, such as mandatory "cooling-off periods" for certain types of consumer decisions.
Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining
A persistently troubling question in the legal-economic literature is why cases proceed to trial. Litigation is a negative-sum proposition for the litigants-the longer the process continues, the lower their aggregate wealth. Although civil litigation is resolved by settlement in an estimated 95 percent of all disputes, what accounts for the failure of the remaining 5 percent to settle prior to trial
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism"
Regulation by the state can take a variety of forms. Some regulations are aimed entirely at redistribution, such as when we tax the rich and give to the poor. Other regulations seek to counteract externalities by restricting behavior in a way that imposes harm on an individual basis but yields net societal benefits. A good example is taxation to fund public goods such as roads. In such situations, an individual would be better off if she alone were exempt from the tax; she benefits when everyone (including herself) must pay the tax
The under-appreciated drive for sense-making
This paper draws attention to a powerful human motive that has not yet been incorporated into economics: the desire to make sense of our immediate experience, our life, and our world. We propose that evolution has produced a ‘drive for sense-making’ which motivates people to gather, attend to, and process information in a fashion that augments, and complements, autonomous sense-making. A large fraction of autonomous cognitive processes are devoted to making sense of the information we acquire: and they do this by seeking simple descriptions of the world. In some situations, however, autonomous information processing alone is inadequate to transform disparate information into simple representations, in which case, we argue, the drive for sense-making directs our attention and can lead us to seek out additional information. We propose a theoretical model of sense-making and of how it is traded off against other goals. We show that the drive for sense-making can help to make sense of a wide range of disparate phenomena, including curiosity, boredom, ‘flow’, confirmation bias and information avoidance, esthetics (both in art and in science), why we care about others’ beliefs, the importance of narrative and the role of ‘the good life’ in human decision making
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