Keeping it off the books: an empirical investigation of firms that engage in tax evasion

This article uses a unique dataset that contains detailed information on firms from around the world to investigate factors that affect under-reporting behaviour. The empirical strategy employed exploits the nature of the dependent variable, which is interval coded, and uses interval regression which provides an asymptotically efficient estimator provided that the classical linear model assumptions hold. These assumptions are investigated using standard diagnostic tests that have been modified for the interval regression model. Evidence is presented that shows that the firms in all regions engage in under-reporting. Regression results indicate that government corruption has the single largest causal effect on under-reporting, resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 51.3% higher. Taxes have the second single largest causal effect on under-reporting, resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 18.0% higher, followed by access to financing at 8.9% higher and organized crime at 7.6% higher. Inflation, political instability, exchange rates and the fairness of the legal system were found to have no effect on under-reporting. It is also found that there is a significant correlation between under-reporting and the legal organization of the business, size, age, ownership, competition and audit controls.

Characteristics of households in the informal sector of an emerging economy

Using the case study of Trinidad and Tobago, we investigate the socio-economic, demographic and attitudinal characteristics of households that participate in the informal sector of an emerging economy and their perception of the risk of detection by tax authorities while doing so. Data are gathered from a cross-sectional field survey covering 570 households. Results using multinomial logit and ordered probit models suggest that households are motivated to participate in the informal sector when members spend little time in formal sector activity, believe that taxes are too high and their incomes are too low, have dependents to support and believe that the resulting tax evasion will go undetected. Their perception of the risk of detection by the tax authority is determined largely by the income they earn in the formal sector and the extent of government bureaucracy prevailing there.