Modes of Foreign Entry under Asymmetric Information about Potential Technology Spillovers

This paper studies the effect of technology spillovers on the entry decision of a multinational enterprise into a foreign market. Two alternative entry modes for a foreign direct investment are considered: Greenfield investment versus acquisition. We find that with quantity competition a spillover makes acquisitions less attractive, while with price competition acquisitions become more attractive. Asymmetric information about potential spillovers always reduces the number of acquisitions independently of whether the host country or the entrant has private information. Interestingly, we find that asymmetric information always hurts the entrant, while it sometimes is in favor of the host country.Foreign direct investment ; multinational enterprise ; enty mode ; technology spillovers ; asymmetric information ; transition economies

Minimum wage noncompliance and the sub-minimum wage rate

The present note examines the effect of minimum wage noncompliance on the sub-minimum wage rate in a competitive labor market. The note shows that noncompliance shifts leftward the demand curve of labor and shifts rightward the supply curve of labor, unambiguously leading to a fall in the equilibrium sub-minimum wage rate. Two implications follow: first, contrary to a major result in the minimum wage literature, noncompliance must not necessarily reduce employment (as compared to the pre-law level) it may even increase employment if the deterrent effect of the expected penalty is more than offset by the inducement effect of a lower wage rate. Secondly, and more importantly, if the minimum wage law aims at improving low wages, workers are better off without a law than with one which is not accompanied with sufficient inducement to ensure compliance.

Analyzing Modes of Foreign Entry

This paper studies the entry decision of a multinational enterprise into a foreign market. Two alternative entry modes for a foreign direct investment are considered: Greenfield investment versus acquisition. In contrast to existing approaches, the acquisition price and the profits under both entry modes are endogenously determined. Interestingly, we find that the optimal entry mode decision is a ected by the competition intensity in the market in a non-monotonic way. When markets are very much or very little competitive, greenfield investment is the optimal entry mode, while for intermediate values it is acquisition.Foreign direct investment ; multinational enterprise ; greenfield investment ; acquisition ; transition economies

Technology Transfer and Spillovers in International Joint Ventures

This paper analyzes the effects of a potential spillover on technology transfer of a multinational enterprise and on the host country policy. In particular, we examine how both parties' incentives can be controlled through the ownership structure in an international joint venture. In contrast to existing arguments we show that spillovers must not always have negative effects on technology transfer and they may be efficiency improving. Moreover, there are circumstances where a joint venture is mutually beneficial. Surprisingly, however, we find that despite the prospect of spillovers a joint venture is sometimes not in the interest of a host country.Foreign Direct Investment; Joint Venutres; Ownership Structure; Multinational Enterprise; Spillovers; Transition Economics

Heterogeneous Mark-ups, Demand Composition, and the Inequality-Growth Relation

We explore the relationship between inequality and demand structure in an endogenous growth model where consumers expand consumption along a hierarchy of needs. This enables us to study the impact of inequality on demand for innovative products, on their prices, and hence on research incentives. As a result, changes in inequality affect the aggregate price structure and there may be market exclusion of the poor. With exclusion, higher inequality tends to increase growth because the profit share increases. However, higher inequality due to a bigger group of poor people may reduce growth. Instead, if the innovators always sell to all, inequality has an unambiguously negative impact on growth.

Overconfidence in the Market for Lemons

We extend Akerlof ’s (1970) “Market for Lemons†by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is at display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes’ rule but take the noisy signal at face value. The main finding is that the presence of overconfident buyers can stabilize the market outcome by preventing total adverse selection. This stabilization, however, comes at a cost: rational buyers are crowded out of the market.Adverse Selection; Market for Lemons; Overconfidence

Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Quantity Discounts and Private Information

We consider a monopolistic supplier’s optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when downstream firms are privately informed about their retail costs. Under discriminatory pricing, downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail costs are offered different tariffs. Under uniform pricing, the same wholesale tariff is offered to all downstream firms. In contrast to the extant literature on thirddegree price discrimination with nonlinear wholesale tariffs, we find that banning discriminatory wholesale contracts—the usual legal practice in the EU and US— often is beneficial for social welfare. This result is shown to be robust even when the upstream supplier faces competition in the form of fringe supply.Asymmetric Information; InputMarkets; Quantity Discounts; Price Discrimination; Screening; Vertical Contracting

Safe and Sound: an EU approach to Sovereign Investment

This Policy Brief looks at how the EU should react to the changing patterns of inward foreign investment, including a recent rise in investment coming from countries with diverse, often non-democratic political regimes. Lars-Henrik Röller and Nicolas Véron advocate building an EU-level policy framework for the review of the security consequences of foreign acquisitions, the implementation of which would be carried out at national level.

The East End, the West End, and King's Cross: On Clustering in the Four-Player Hotelling Game

We study experimentally a standard four-player Hotelling game, with a uniform density of consumers and inelastic demand. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium configuration consists of two firms located at one quarter of the ``linear city'', and the other two at three quarters. We do not observe convergence to such an equilibrium. In our experimental data we find three clusters. Besides the direct proximity of the two equilibrium locations this concerns the focal mid-point. Moreover, we observe that whereas this mid-point appears to become more notable over time, other focal points fade away. We explain how these observations are related to best-response dynamics, and to the fact that the players rely on best-responses in particular when they are close to the equilibrium configuration.Location model, Nonconvergence, Focal point, Best-response dynamics