Governing Islam and regulating Muslims in Singapore's secular authoritarian state

  Governance of Islam in Singapore has been strongly shaped by the authoritarian state\u27s micro-management of nation-building, commanding influence of Islamic institutions such as the peak religious bureaucracy MUIS (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura or Islamic Religious Council) and reliance on draconian legislation such as the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), Sedition Act and the Internal Security Act (ISA). Inter alia, these Acts are geared towards curbing the politicisation of religion by attempting to separate religion from politics, regulate religious activity, restrain the development of an autonomous Muslim civil society. The efficacy of the MRHA and no-tudung (headscarf) policy is analysed in the context of the ‘othering’ of the Muslim community and the denial of their localised socio-economic and political grievances in motivating some to support radical Islamist ideology in the era of the ‘war on terror’

Introduction: states, critical citizens, and the challenge of democratization in Southeast Asia

The political trajectories in Southeast Asia are much more complex than neat theoretical models would suggest. In particular, the diverse experience of post-authoritarian states are far from linear – often moving forward, backward, and forward again, or stalling for a number of years. Political trajectories can thus be uneven and erratic, as exemplified by Thailand's military coups, graduating from hegemonic to competitive electoral authoritarian rule in Singapore and Malaysia and lingering within the zone of low-quality democracy as characterized by Indonesia's poor governance and neo-patrimonial dynamics. Indeed, since 2014, Freedom House no longer classifies Indonesia as ‘Free’, following the passage of legislation restricting the activity of civil society and the human rights violations against religious minorities. Similarly, Thailand lost its ‘Free’ ranking in 2006 and the Philippines in 2007

Electoral theocracy and hybrid sovereignty in Iran

Post-revolution Iran is uniquely based upon the contradictory principles of divine and popular sovereignty but with ultimate authority delegated to jurists. At the same time, the theocratic basis of clerical dominance is rooted within a pluralistic and decentralised theological tradition peculiar to the Shiite establishment. Despite the tutelary institutional arrangements engineered by the ruling clergy, elections have generated unexpected outcomes and unleashed power and policy shifts. Emphasising the political dynamic generated by elections, this paper examines the uncertainties stemming from electoral processes that have been constructed by conflicting electoral and theocratic principles. In developing the concept of electoral theocracy, the paper highlights the paradoxes underpinning the hybridity of Iran’s clerical and electoral authoritarian system of governance. These hybrid features have remained largely neglected in the literature on electoral authoritarian regimes