Biochemical and molecular biological studies of human pituary tumours

Imperial Users onl

Explicit Evidence on an Implicit Contract

We offer the first direct evidence of an implicit contract in a goods market. The evidence we offer comes from the market for Coca-Cola. We demonstrate that the Coca-Cola Company left a substantial amount of written evidence of its implicit contract with its consumers—a very explicit form of an implicit contract. In general, observing implicit contracts directly is difficult because of their implicit nature. In the case of Coca-Cola, however, we are able to document the Company not only saying that it had an important implicit contract with its consumers, but also acting on it. This study makes an additional and unique contribution by exploring quality as a margin of adjustment available to Coca-Cola. We present evidence that the implicit contract included a promise not only of a constant nominal price but also a constant quality. We document the dedication to a 6.5oz serving of the "Secret Formula." Indeed, during a period of over 70 years, we find evidence of only a single case of true quality change. By studying the margin of adjustment the Coca-Cola Company chose in response to changes in market conditions, we demonstrate that the perceived costs of breaking the implicit contract were large. In addition, we are able to offer one piece of direct evidence on the magnitude of these costs by studying the events surrounding the failed introduction of the New Coke in 1985.Implicit Contract, Explicit Contract, Invisible Handshake, Customer Market, Long-Term Relationship, Price Rigidity, Coca-Cola, Nickel Coke

"The Real Thing:" Nominal Price Rigidity of the Nickel Coke, 1886-1959

We report that the price of a 6.5oz Coke was 5¢ from 1886 until 1959. Thus, we are documenting a nominal price rigidity that lasted more than 70 years! The case of Coca-Cola is particularly interesting because during the 70-year period there were substantial changes in the soft drink industry as well as two World Wars, the Great Depression, and numerous regulatory interventions and lawsuits, which led to substantial changes in the Coca-Cola market conditions. The nickel price of Coke, nevertheless, remained unchanged. We find that this unusual rigidity is best explained by (1) a contract between the Company and its parent bottlers that encouraged retail price maintenance, (2) a single-coin vending machine technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to limited availability and unreliability of the existing flexible price adjustment technologies, and (3) a single-coin monetary transaction technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to the customer “inconvenience cost.” We show that these price adjustment costs are of a different nature than the standard menu cost, and their estimates exceed the existing estimates by an order of magnitude. A possible broader relevance of the nickel Coke phenomenon is discussed in the context of Nickel and Dime Stores, which were popular in the US in the late 1800s and the early 1900s.Sticky Prices, Cost of Adjustment, Menu Cost, Retail Price Maintenance, Single-Coin Vending Machine, Customer Inconvenience Cost, Coca-Cola, Coke, Nickel Coke, Pepsi, Nickel and Dime Stores

The Real Thing: Nominal Price Rigidity of the Nickel Coke, 1886–1959

We report that the price of a 6.5oz Coke was 5¢ from 1886 until 1959. Thus, we are documenting a nominal price rigidity that lasted more than 70 years! The case of Coca-Cola is particularly interesting because during the 70-year period there were substantial changes in the soft drink industry as well as two World Wars, the Great Depression, and numerous regulatory interventions and lawsuits, which led to substantial changes in the Coca-Cola market conditions. The nickel price of Coke, nevertheless, remained unchanged. We find that this unusual rigidity is best explained by (1) a contract between the Company and its parent bottlers that encouraged retail price maintenance, (2) a single-coin vending machine technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to limited availability and unreliability of the existing flexible price adjustment technologies, and (3) a single-coin monetary transaction technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to the customer “inconvenience cost.” We show that these price adjustment costs are of a different nature than the standard menu cost, and their estimates exceed the existing estimates by an order of magnitude. A possible broader relevance of the nickel Coke phenomenon is discussed in the context of Nickel and Dime Stores, which were popular in the US in the late 1800s and the early 1900s.Sticky Prices; Cost of Adjustment; Menu Cost; Retail Price Maintenance; Single-Coin Vending Machine; Customer Inconvenience Cost; Coca-Cola; Coke; Nickel Coke; Pepsi; Nickel and Dime Stores

Explicit Evidence on an Implicit Contract

We offer the first direct evidence of an implicit contract in a goods market. The evidence we offer comes from the market for Coca-Cola. We demonstrate that the Coca-Cola Company left a substantial amount of written evidence of its implicit contract with its consumers—a very explicit form of an implicit contract. In general, observing implicit contracts directly is difficult because of their implicit nature. To overcome the difficulty, we adopt a narrative approach. Based on the analysis of a large number of historical documents obtained from the Coca-Cola Archives and other sources, we offer evidence of the Coca-Cola Company not only saying that it had an important implicit contract with its consumers, but also acting on it. This study makes an additional and unique contribution by exploring quality as a margin of adjustment available to Coca-Cola. We present evidence that the implicit contract included a promise not only of a constant nominal price but also a constant quality. We document the dedication to a 6.5oz serving of the "Secret Formula." Indeed, during a period of over 70 years, we find evidence of only a single case of true quality change. By studying the margin of adjustment the Coca-Cola Company chose in response to changes in market conditions, we demonstrate that the perceived costs of breaking the implicit contract were large. In addition, we are able to offer one piece of direct evidence on the magnitude of these costs by studying the events surrounding the failed introduction of the New Coke in 1985.E12; E31; L14; L16; L66; M30; N80; A14

Explicit Evidence on an Implicit Contract

We offer the first direct evidence of an implicit contract in a goods market. The evidence we offer comes from the market for Coca-Cola. We demonstrate that the Coca-Cola Company left a substantial amount of written evidence of its implicit contract with its consumers—a very explicit form of an implicit contract. The contract represented the promise of a five cent (nominal) price and adherence to the “Secret Formula”. In general, the implicit nature of such contracts makes observation difficult. To overcome this difficulty, we adopt a narrative approach. Based on the analysis of a large number of historical documents obtained from the Coca-Cola Archives and other sources, we offer evidence of the Coca-Cola Company both acknowledging and acting on this implicit contract. We also make another unique contribution by exploring quality as a margin of adjustment available to Coca-Cola. The implicit contract included a promise not only of a constant nominal price but also a constant quality (i.e., 6.5 oz. of the Secret Formula). During a period of over 70 years, we find evidence of only a single case of true quality change. By studying the margin of adjustment the Coca-Cola Company chose in response to changes in market conditions, we demonstrate that the perceived costs of breaking the implicit contract were large. We argue that one piece of direct evidence on the magnitude of these costs is the aftermath “New Coke’s” introduction in 1985.Implicit Contract, Explicit Contract, Invisible Handshake, Customer Market, Long- Term Relationship, Price Rigidity, Nickel Coke, Coca-Cola

"The Real Thing:" Nominal Price Rigidity of the Nickel Coke, 1886-1959

We report that the price of a 6.5oz Coke was 5¢ from 1886 until 1959. Thus, we are documenting a nominal price rigidity that lasted more than 70 years! The case of Coca-Cola is particularly interesting because during the 70-year period there were substantial changes in the soft drink industry as well as two World Wars, the Great Depression, and numerous regulatory interventions and lawsuits, which led to substantial changes in the Coca-Cola market conditions. The nickel price of Coke, nevertheless, remained unchanged. We find that this unusual rigidity is best explained by (1) a contract between the Company and its parent bottlers that encouraged retail price maintenance, (2) a single-coin vending machine technology, which limited the Company's price adjustment options due to limited availability and unreliability of the existing flexible price adjustment technologies, and (3) a single-coin monetary transaction technology, which limited the Company's price adjustment options due to the customer "inconvenience cost." We show that these price adjustment costs are of a different nature than the standard menu cost, and their estimates exceed the existing estimates by an order of magnitude. A possible broader relevance of the nickel Coke phenomenon is discussed in the context of Nickel and Dime Stores, which were popular in the US in the late 1800s and the early 1900s.Sticky Prices, Cost of Adjustment, Menu Cost, Retail Price Maintenance, Single-Coin Vending Machine, Customer Inconvenience Cost, Coca-Cola, Coke, Nickel Coke, Pepsi, Nickel and Dime Stores

Public institutions and private transactions : the legal and regulatory environment for business private transactions in Brazil and Chile

Drawing on the new institutional economics, the authors examine the impact on businesses of Brazil's relatively complex, nontransparent legal and regulatory institutions and compare their costs with those of Chile's institutions, which are relatively simple. They examine four basic areas where legal and regulatory institutions could create critical obstacles to efficiency in the garment industries of Sao Paulo and Santiago: (a) the start-up of a new business (entry); (b) the regulation of business; (c) orders by customers of garment firms; and (d) sales with credit. They find that Chilean business transactions benefit from legal simplicity and more consistent enforcement than in Brazil, but that these perceived advantages are offset because of the differences between formal law and practice in Brazil. In two of these areas, Brazil has evolved some effective institutional substitutes to reduce the costs that would otherwise have been imposed by inefficient formal institutions. In the entry of new businesses, professions have evolved to transform the process of registering a new business from a potentially tortuous obstacle path into a fairly affordable one-stop process. In debt collection, information systems limit the need to resort to the formal legal system. Nevertheless, regulation raises the cost of transactions for Brazilian businesses. Costs are further raised by greater uncertainty and frequent renegotiation of orders.National Governance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Legal Products,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Small Scale Enterprise

Sigma-Convergence Versus Beta-Convergence: Evidence from U.S. County-Level Data

In this paper we outline (i) why ó-convergence may not accompany â- convergence, (ii)cite evidence of â-convergence in the U.S., (iii) and use USA county-level data containing over 3,000 cross-sectional observations to demonstrate that ó-convergence does not hold across the U.S., or within the vast majority of the individual U.S. states.Economic Growth, Convergence, ó-convergence, sigma convergence, â-convergence, beta convergence, US County Level Data

Many Types of Human Capital and Many Roles in U.S. Growth: Evidence from County-Level Educational Attainment Data

We utilize county-level data to explore the roles of different types of human capital accumulation in U.S. growth determination. The data includes over 3,000 cross-sectional observations and 39 demographic control variables. The large number of observations provides enough degrees of freedom to obtain estimates for the U.S. as a whole and for 32 states in and of themselves. This data contains measures of educational attainment for four distinct categories: (a) 9 to11 years, (b) high school diploma, (c) some college and (d) bachelor degree or more. These variables represent human capital stocks for each and every county. This is a departure from much of the economic growth literature, which has (at least in part) relied on extrapolation of stocks from flows, e.g. school enrollment data. We use a consistent two stage least squares estimation procedure. We find that (i) the percentage of a county’s population with less than a high-school education is negatively correlated with economic growth, (ii) the percentage obtaining a high school diploma is positively correlated with growth, and (iii) the percentage obtaining some college education has no clear relationship with economic growth but (iv) the percentage that obtains a bachelor degree or more is positively correlated with growth. Further, we find that (v) there is significant qualitative heterogeneity in estimated coefficients across states for the 9 to 11 years and high school diploma categories but (vi) no qualitative heterogeneity for the college level categories. The most consistent conclusion across samples is that the percent of a county’s population obtaining a bachelor degree or higher level of college education has a positive relationship with economic growth. Oddly enough, despite findings (ii), (iv) and (vi) above, we find that the percentage of a county’s population employed in educational services is negatively correlated with economic growth.Human Capital Stock, Educational Attainment, Economic Growth, County Level Data