Empirical perspectives on national index funds

Closed-end national index funds (NIFs of country funds) invest primarily in the stocks of the originating countries, such as Brazil, India, and the Republic of Korea. They are typically traded in the organized exchanges of industrial countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Although NIFs have not raised large amounts of external funds, recently they have expanded rapidly. In a companion paper ("The Pricing of Country Funds and Their Role in Capital Mobilization for Emerging Economies,"WPS 1058), the authors develop a theoretical model to compare the pricing of country funds in the reference markets (say the United States) with the pricing of the underlying component assets (or net asset valuation) in the originating securities market under various assumptions about market structure. In this paper, they empirically investigate the hypotheses that emerge from the model. They first analyze country fund pricing and associated premia, or discounts, and then explore the issue of diversification services provided by NIFs from emerging markets. The emphasis on emerging markets is important as many markets are otherwise closed to foreign investors. They compare results across emerging and industrial markets and, where appropriate, over different subperiods. Their evidence suggests that U.S. investors could benefit significantly in diversification that involves NIFs, particularly funds originating from countries to whose local markets they have limited access. The authors investigate the pricing of NIFs, testing their principal theoretical predictions about the relative significance of the home market, host market, and global closed-end fund factors. They analyze initial (public-offering literature) and after-market returns, and explain the behavior of fund premia/discounts. The evidence shows that variables that proxy the degree of access and substitution effects show up as significant determinants of country fund premia/discounts. The empirical study supports their theory about the welfare implication for emerging economies that originate country funds. The model suggests that country funds can improve pricing efficiency in local capital markets and promote local capital mobilization by firms at more favorable terms (lower costs of capital).Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets

Deposit insurance and financial development

The authors examine the effect of different design features of deposit insurance, on long-run financial development, defined to include the level of financial activity, the stability of the banking sector, and the quality of resource allocation. Their empirical analysis is guided by recent theories of banking regulation, that employ an agency framework. The authors examine the effect of deposit insurance on the size, and volatility of the financial sector, in a sample of fifty eight countries. They find that generous deposit insurance, leads to financial instability in lax regulatory environments. But in sound regulatory environments, deposit insurance does have the desired impact on financial development, and growth. Thus, countries introducing a deposit insurance scheme, need to ensure that it is accompanied by a sound regulatory framework. Otherwise, the scheme will likely lead to instability, and deter financial development. In weak regulatory environments, policymakers should at least limit deposit insurance coverage.Insurance Law,Financial Intermediation,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Insurance Law,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring

The pricing of country funds and their role in capital mobilization for emerging economies

The authors theoretically analyze country funds, focusing on emerging economies in which capital markets are not readily accessible to outside investors. They study country-fund pricing and the associated policy implications under alternative variations on segmentation of international markets. They show that country funds traded in the developed capital markets can help promote the efficiency of pricing in the emerging capital markets and can enhance capital mobilization by local firms. These efficiency gains vary depending on the degree of the international investor's access to the emerging market securities (access effect), on the degree to which the industrialized countries'securities market span the securities offered in the emerging markets (substitution effect), and on the existing cross-border arbitrage restrictions. As a byproduct of their analysis, the authors study the reasons why country funds sell at a premium or discount relative to their net underlying asset value. They also show that the efficiency gains that arise with the development of new funds can be positive even when these funds start trading at a discount. They conclude with a catalog of policy implications, including strategies for efficiently promoting country funds. For example : in general, introducing the country fund in the advanced or developed market increases the prices of the underlying component assets traded in the originating emerging markets; as a policy matter, country funds that should be encouraged by emerging countries for introduction by fund promoters should be targeted to those local assets with imperfect or no substitutes in the advanced core markets; and in some circumstances, it may be socially optimal to subsidize the introduction of new funds that are expected to sell at a discount.International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access,Banks&Banking Reform

African Financial Systems: A Review

We start by providing an overview of financial systems in the African continent. We then consider the regions of Arab North Africa, West Africa, East and Central Africa, and Southern Africa in more detail. The paper covers, among other things, central banks, deposit-taking banks, non-bank institutions, such as the stock markets, fixed income markets, insurance markets, and microfinance institutions

African financial systems: A review

AbstractWe start by providing an overview of financial systems in the African continent. We then consider the regions of Arab North Africa, West Africa, East and Central Africa, and Southern Africa in more detail. The paper covers, among other things, central banks, deposit-taking banks, non-bank institutions, such as the stock markets, fixed income markets, insurance markets, and microfinance institutions

The African Financial Development Gap

Economic growth in Africa has long been disappointing. We document that the financial sectors of most sub-Saharan African countries remain significantly underdeveloped by the standards of other developing countries. We examine the factors that are associated with financial development in Africa and compare them with those in other developing countries. Population density appears to be considerably more important for banking sector development in Africa than elsewhere. Given the high costs of developing viable banking sectors outside metropolitan areas, technology advances, such as mobile banking, could be a promising way to facilitate African financial development. Similarly to other developing countries, natural resources endowment is associated with a lower level of financial development in Africa, but macro policies do not appear to be an important determinant.Africa, finance and growth, banks, institutions, population density

Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness

This paper surveys the empirical and theoretical literature on the mechanisms of corporate governance. We focus on the internat mechanisms of corporate governance (e.g., arising from conflicts of interests between managers and equityholders, equityholders and creditors, and capital contributors and other stakeholders to the corporate firm. We also examine the substitution effect between internal mechanisms of corporate governance and external mechanisms, particularly markets for corporate control. Directors for future research are provided

A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation

This paper examines the incentive structure underlying the current features of bank regulation, particularly the role of prompt corrective action, capital requirements and mandatory restrictions on asset choice as primary tools to control risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions. We show that capital regulation has limited effectiveness, given the observed high leverage ratios of banks. We propose instead a more direct and effective mechanism of influencing incentives through the role of top-management compensation, whereby a fair and revenue-neutral FDIC premium incorporates incentive features of top-management compensation as well as the level of bank capitalization. With this pricing scheme (for FDIC insurance) we show that bank owners choose an optimal management compensation structure which induces first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank’s management. We also characterize the parameters of the optimal managerial compensation structure and the FDIC premium schedule explicitly

A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation

This paper examines the incentive structure underlying the current features of bank regulation, particularly the role of prompt corrective action, capital requirements and mandatory restrictions on asset choice as primary tools to control risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions. We propose instead a more direct and effective mechanism of influencing incentives through the role of top-management compensation, whereby a fair and revenue-neutral FDIC premium incorporates incentive features top-management compensation as well as the level of bank capitalization. With this pricing scheme (for FDIC insurance) we show that bank owners choose an optimal management compensation structure which induces first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank’s management. We also characterize the parameters of the optimal managerial compensation structure and the FDIC premium schedule explicitly

A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation

This paper examines the incentive structure underlying the current features of bank regulation. We show that capital regulation has limited effectiveness, given the observed high leverage ratios of banks. We propose instead a more direct and effective mechanism of influencing incentives through the role of top-management compensation, whereby a fair and revenue-neutral FDIC premium incorporates incentive features of top-management compensation. With this pricing scheme (for FDIC insurance), we show that bank owners choose an optimal management compensation structure which induces first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank's management. We also characterize the parameters of the optimal managerial compensation structure and the FDIC premium schedule explicitly