Economic Development in China and Its Implications for East Asia

In the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1997-98 South Korea has undertaken a number of major institutional reforms. What are these reforms? Why were they undertaken? What is the outcome of the reforms? In answering these questions the paper examines the influence that the ideas of political leaders on political economy had in setting forth the reform agenda and the role that various interest groups have played in implementing the reform. It argues that there was a shift in the developmental paradigm in the early 1980s, that the new paradigm guided reforms in Korea during the 1980s and 1990s but with initial conditions and interest politics influencing the implementation and actual outcome of reform, and that the post-crisis reform was a culmination of the reform process that began in the early 1980s.Korea, Institutional Reform, Asian Financial Crisis.

Chaebol, Financial Liberalization, and Economic Crisis: Transformation of Quasi-Internal Organization in Korea

This paper argues that the Korean governmentís policy with regard to financial deregulation and liberalization was endogenously determined, being largely influenced by the interest politics of perhaps the most powerful interest group in Korea, chaebol. It also argues that the cause of Koreaís financial crisis of 1997-98 cannot be analyzed without first examining the influence of chaebol on the post-1993 financial liberalization, which planted the seeds of the crisis. The paper concludes that financial liberalization undertaken in a haphazard manner, manipulated by a few dominant players in the economy runs into the danger of producing an outcome worse than before.Financial liberalization, The Asian crisis, Chaebol, Government intervention

Economic Development in China and Its Implications for East Asia

Economic development in China, East Asia, trade adjustment

Insolvency in the Corporate Sector and Financial Crisis in Korea

The paper shows that between the late 1980s and 1997, the year when Korea was engulfed in a financial crisis, its corporate-sector profitability was on a decreasing trend, albeit short-term ups and downs. The evidence presented in the paper suggests that Korea’s corporate and financial sectors had been highly vulnerable to a crisis for some years before 1997 and the actual timing of the crisis was triggered by the financial crisis in Thailand in July 1997 and its contagion effect.Asian crisis; Korean economy; corporate sector insolvency.

Post-Crisis Financial Reform in Korea: A Critical Appraisal

In the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1997-98 South Korea has undertaken a number of financial reforms under IMF auspices. One of such reforms was in financial supervision, which created the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service. In spite of these reforms Korea has recently experienced a costly financial instability relating to credit-card companies and household debts. Korea’s success in bringing about rapid economic recovery from the crisis may have lessened, as suggested by the World Bank, the urgency for full financial reform. This paper, however, argues that the newly created supervisory agencies, although created as independent agencies, have not in fact functioned as such and thus failed to carry out proper supervision over credit-card companies. It is argued that those agencies have not been able to function independently due to institutional constraints imposed on them by other extant, formal as well as informal, institutions in Korea.Financial reform, financial supervision, institutions

Parallel Opportunistic Routing in Wireless Networks

We study benefits of opportunistic routing in a large wireless ad hoc network by examining how the power, delay, and total throughput scale as the number of source- destination pairs increases up to the operating maximum. Our opportunistic routing is novel in a sense that it is massively parallel, i.e., it is performed by many nodes simultaneously to maximize the opportunistic gain while controlling the inter-user interference. The scaling behavior of conventional multi-hop transmission that does not employ opportunistic routing is also examined for comparison. Our results indicate that our opportunistic routing can exhibit a net improvement in overall power--delay trade-off over the conventional routing by providing up to a logarithmic boost in the scaling law. Such a gain is possible since the receivers can tolerate more interference due to the increased received signal power provided by the multi-user diversity gain, which means that having more simultaneous transmissions is possible.Comment: 18 pages, 7 figures, Under Review for Possible Publication in IEEE Transactions on Information Theor

Visible success and invisible failure in post-crisis reform in the Republic of Korea : interplay of the global standards, agents, and local specificity

The reform package in post-crisis Korea was one of the most comprehensively designed and decisively implemented. Though impressed by the quick recovery, many are now raising doubts about real changes in the economy, as the result of a cost-benefits analysis: While the business climate is more stable and supportive, the economy is suffering from weak investment and rising unemployment. This study views the Korean story as one of"visible success and invisible failure,"based on the following findings: First, while some new laws were enacted and several quantifiable targets met, little real progress was made in changing institutional conventions, habits, and beliefs, such as enhancing transparency in management or trust in labor relations. Second, the reform process involved tension between global standards and local specificity, which accounts for the mixed results. Third, special interest politics at the implementation stage, plus the complexities caused by increasing democratization and globalization, have undermined the authorities'implementation capacity, which accounts for uneven outcomes of the reform. While globalization necessitates increasing flexibility, Korean managers are now facing much stronger labor unions. The outcome is not a fully flexible but segmented labor market, divided between the core, unionized workers and unorganized peripheral workers, and between the one overprotected and the other underprotected. Fourth, it is important to have an effective system of legislative bargaining to help resolve disputes. Only with this institutional vehicle will special interest groups reach some consensus. Korea tried to overhaul its financial system and achieve substantial financial liberalization in the early 1990s but those attempts were partly aborted and partly distorted, which paved the way for the financial crisis in 1997. This was due to the lack of clear consensus, without which reforms are more likely to be aborted or be unsuccessful. Fifth, implementation problems stem from institutional complementarities and inappropriate sequencing. One logical sequence might be banking reform, corporate governance, labor relations, and then finally business restructuring. Now, an emerging question is whether the reform blueprint was right. Post-crisis Korea just tried to be more market- or Anglo-Saxon model-oriented without paying attention to growth potential. While firms have now lowered their debt ratios, they are not borrowing to fund investments. The issue of right or wrong blueprint underscores the need to define the reform goal correctly. The goals of reform should not just be a move toward a market-oriented economy but toward a growth-oriented one or a pro-growth market-oriented one.Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Children and Youth,Economic Theory&Research,National Governance