Competition Between Auctions

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions.auctions, bidding, competition, auction formats, auction houses

Short- and long-run competition of retailer pricing strategies

Retailers' pricing strategies are one of the most important determinants of the retail dynamics and the competitive structure of the retail market. Retailers use both short-term and long-term pricing strategies to optimize their market share. This study addresses several critical questions: (1) To what extent do retailers react to competitive price specials? (2) Do retailers alternate price specials of competing brands? and, (3) Can one identify stores or brands, that are price leaders or do retailers/brands set prices independently? We use cointegration analysis to estimate a model which allows us to study both the short- and the long-run dynamics of competitive prices within a single framework

Store switching behavior

Abstract This study describes temporal aspects of consumer shopping behavior. Most cross-sectional studies either explicitly or implicitly assume that consumer choice behavior is constant over time. The results of this study, which is based on scanner panel data for twenty-one grocery stores for three years in Missouri, indicates that consumers are involved in substantial store-switching and variety-seeking behavior, the degree of which is related to a set of sociodemographic variables

Economics, Psychology, and Social Dynamics of Consumer Bidding in Auctions

With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic, social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumers' behavior in auctions. We also highlight specific research streams that could contribute towards enriching existing economic models of bidding behavior in emerging market mechanisms.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47034/1/11002_2005_Article_5901.pd

To bundle or not to bundle: determinants of the profitability of multi-item auctions

This article introduces and empirically tests a conceptual model of the key determinants of the profitability of bundling in auction markets. The model encapsulates hypotheses about how seller revenue from the combined (i.e., bundle) auction of component products relative to that from separate auctions of the components is influenced by the heterogeneity in bidders' product valuations, the degree of complementarity between component products, the particular multi-item selling strategy, and the outside availability of the products. The results of three field experiments show that though bundle auctions tend to be less profitable for noncomplementary and substitute products, they are on average 50% more profitable than separate auctions when there is (even only moderate) complementarity between the component products. The latter effect is greater when the bundle and the separate components are offered at different times, and it is more pronounced for services than for tangible goods. The findings also identify conditions under which each of the essential multi-item selling strategies for fixed-price settings (pure components, pure bundling, and mixed bundling) tends to maximize seller revenue in auctions